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ABSTRACT
In today's fast evolving Central and Eastern Europe, economic perspectives,
especially European Union perspectives are indispensable to the success of the
transformation process initiated in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Based on our
research output, this thesis offers many such perspectives that can help understand
the logic of the transformation and the subsequent business done by national and
international enterprises. We have interwoven many information-rich threads of
transformation principles with banking, dynamic cultural factors and tax policy
that influence these new market-economy countries. We observe the role and the
process of financial institutions and also consider the impact that information
technology exerts on these economies and thus concluding that the significance of
culture development and the betterment of the population are the central driving
force within a wider Europe.
This thesis offers fundamental notions that influence cross-cultural interactions
also, providing a concrete basis for understanding the influence of Central and
Eastern European countries on the European Union's political choices and vice
versa. We examine the transformation and its significance, paradoxes and the
interplay of economic approaches and entrepreneurship. In the specific, we look at
how the European Union policy towards these countries evolved, suggesting that a
trend towards a Brwcelles Consensus is the specific outcome of the European
Union's attitudes towards Central and Eastern Europe. An extended evaluation of
the consequences for all of us will also emerge as our approach has been that to
present all these aspects in a way that inspire understanding of basic governing
issues and expectations concerning the future on Central and Eastern Europe in the
ever-growing European Union.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Economic and Political Direction of Central-East European
Countries
New economic and political direction in Central-East Europe and the role played
by the European Union in the process of economic convergence and the overall
catch up process has emerged as a major focus of interest in economics and
politics over the last decade. At the beginning of the transformation, international
economic organisations and some economists believed this process would last only
a few years and market economy prescriptions would become reality almost
overnight (Kornai, 1990; World Bank, 2005). Unfortunately, this did not occur and
the transformation has proved painful and socially unsustainable, and scholars
such as Kornai (2000) felt that he had been too optimistic in his previous
predictions of economic growth. In fact, it was not easy to expose the new
economic reality without a precise logic of arguments. Indeed, it was difficult
when concerning transitional economies in Central-East Europe that neglected
previous procedures and took up liberalism and market impulses in an open
context almost hastily. In moving towards a market setting, there was one main
issue being addressed: to what extent would liberal thinking be accepted leading to
complete market reform in a new society. Therefore, privatisation policy and the
need to complete restructuring, while offering minimum social protection by the
state, combined to create a situation both favourable for the state and the people.
We may interpret economic reforms in terms of 'institutional reforms', 'political
business cycles' and vast 'write-offs of knowledge'. The early 1990s were driven
by the dismantling of previous communist practice and the initiation of market
reforms with the aim to carry the process of transformation forward favouring the
economic growth and a reduction in the overall gap with the most advanced
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economies in the West. However, due to the acceptance of neoclassical paradigms,
experts on the region have partially neglected the role of institutions and
overlooked the role of an overall strategic state policy towards the passage to a
market economy and the achievement of a wider economic consensus (see e.g.
Kornai, 2007; Fischer and Sahay, 2004; Ofer and Pomfret, 2004; De Melo et al.,
2001; Rodrik, 2006; Sergi, 2003a).
As a matter of fact, the transition lasted longer than expected and it continues in
some parts of the post-Soviet block and the Balkan Peninsula. In this context, a
specific objective of international observers is to understand the ways in which
governments and international financial institutions have effectively done in the
past and what they should achieve in the future regarding ethical accomplishment.
Especially the ethical perspective (Sergi, 2004b) could serve to interpret main
issues, trigger debates, and further lines of thinking along the European context
characterised by the so-called Briixelles Consensus.
1.2. The Washington Consensus and the International Economic
Institutions
The starting point of interpretation introduced by Sergi (2003a, 2004b, 1999b,
1998a, 1997b, 1996) was the analysis of the Washington Consensus as developed
by Williamson in 1990 and also rethink its application to the case of Central-East
Europe when the countries from this region were trying to join the European
Union.
The concept of the Washington Consensus served the purpose to reflect a
perceived economic belief among governmental and international organisations in
Washington D.C. and it became a widely used notion regarding global economic
issues. Although little has changed since the term was coined and the book by
Kolodko (2000) or the recent paper by Dani Rodrik's (2006) 'Goodbye
Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion?' are two examples of why
the consensus has not produced its desired results due to its internal
inconsistencies, much has changed regarding the global economic realities,
especially in Central-East Europe. Despite proponents and critics agree on the fact
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that the Washington Consensus has not produced the desired results, the question
we must answer is whether regional and global realities mark the Washington
Consensus with consistency at both the policy level and in terms of successful
outcomes. An analysis of the historical record will tell as much, perhaps too much
to allow us to continue to ignore an ever-growing reality confronting the
application of ethics to everyday life for everyday people globally. The
implications for decision-makers are enormous. The Washington Consensus
essentially concerned the ability of the US government, through its Treasury
Department, to influence and coordinate the IMF and the World Bank regarding
agenda specific economic issues used for many countries throughout the so-called
Third World. 1 In Latin America, Africa or Asia, a pattern emerged, especially
noticeable after the 1980s and continuing to the present. Meanwhile, the expanded
reform agenda emphasizing second-generation reforms and policies able to address
inequalities and social issues was launched (see e.g. Kuczynski and Williamson,
2003).
1 The World Bank broadened its role by 1960s. Robert McNamara (1968-1981) steered the World
Bank to deal with poverty issue and direct policy intervention. In McNamara's fresh view,
managerial competence proved more important than private entrepreneurship, and loans had to
induce reforms the same as the IMF's approach. In this new setting, the IMF should care about
short-term stabilisation programmes and the World Bank on long-term structural adjustment
lending. Macroecononuc policy stabilisation and balance of payments adjustments followed a
strong rightist market oriented approach after 1981. The debt crisis in the 1980s and increasing
World Bank loans contingently on policy reforms led to conditionality more extensive (often to
fifty or more measures) with respect to the ten or even fewer policy measures requested by the
IMF. Therefore, a change in the World Bank's attitude and a renewed emphasis on poverty issues
spurred from within its own management and by the appointment of Barber Conable as president in
1986. Furthermore, it has been under James Wolfensohn (1997-2005) that the World Bank
supported an integrated approach to development in closer relationship with other institutions
(Sergi, 2005b). In addition, the IMF recognised that the conditionality policy needed to be revised
and the Executive Board revised guidelines in September 2002. Even before that, the IMF had set
up a permanent Independent Evaluation Office in 2001, and its new focal point shitted to
distinguishing between what is relevant but not critical to the objectives ot a programme, and also
to improving the division of operations between the IMF and World Bank in ways that both would
share conditionality policy when possible with the number of structural benchmarks decreased and
put comes under coordination between the two institutions (Sergi, 2005b).
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These second-generation reforms based on policies emphasizing both
inequalities and social issues together with institutional reforms and selected
investment is growing consensus in Europe. The Bnvcelles Consensus is a term
first used by Sergi (2003a) - in fact it developed since the late 1990s (see also
Sergi, 1996, 1997b, 1999a, 1999b) - to address growing concerns globally with
what passes for the Washington Consensus. The historical record of the
Washington Consensus as it had been applied in the Latin America region might
provide with revealing information and push us in a direction. Whether or not the
European policy and society are prepared to accept and benefit from that sort of
policymaking (World Bank, 2005).
In this light, we must ask whether more people are better off now than before
the Washington Consensus became a perceived and noticeable reality at a global
level. The emergence of a pattern is completely consistent with deteriorating
economic realities for most of the world's population in the 1970s. High inflation
in the US caused by the financing of the Vietnam War and OPEC's oil price
increases 3, certainly were not limited to the US. In fact, the US could export much
of its inflation throughout the world. Obviously, the Bretton Woods fixed
exchange rate system, in existence since the end of World War II, was the exporter
of such inflation and its ultimate casualty. It is interesting as this fixed exchange
rate system collapses, global poverty increases. From an ethical point of view, we
clearly have a problem, and it is appropriate that global economic policies during
the 1980s and 1990s be addressed in the light of current criticisms, being focussed
on the policies of the IMF (Sergi, 2004b and 2005c). Washington's economic
policies during the 1980s distinctively offered an economic model and patterns
based among others on privatisations, free trade, deregulation, lower taxes on
wealth.
2 The US combat troops were committed from 1965 to 1973, even though it is not easy to identity
the exact beginning of the Vietnam War.
3 The oil crisis began on October 1973, when Arab members of the OPEC during the Yom Kippur
War announced that they would no longer supply oil to Western Europe and the US because they
had supported Israel in its conflict with Egypt.
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Overall, it is believed that a 'triad' formed by the IMF, the World Bank and the
World Trade Organisation would set economic policies worldwide (e.g. Peet,
2003). Said 'triad' would be 'unholy' because it serves to introduce neoliberal
corporate capitalism in order to control the global economy, for the well-being of
the American political-economic power and do good to transnational corporations
(Peet, 2003). However, the IMF's policies or the Washington Consensus, by which
the IMF is more accurately portrayed as a relater of information from the US
Treasury than as the internationally prominent financial institution which (with the
World Bank) was established in the post World War II framework to directly
address issues afflicting third world countries, comes from Joseph Stiglitz (2002).
Professor Stiglitz has been the World Bank's chief economist, and then was
Chairman of the US Council for Economic Advisors under former President
Clinton. Professor Stiglitz offers the following commentary:
'It is understandable then why the IMF [Washington Consensus] and the strategies it foists
[forces] on countries around the world are greeted with such hostility. The billions of
dollars which it [IMF] provides are used to maintain exchange rates at unsustainable
levels for a short period, during which the foreigners and the rich are able to get their
money out of the country at more favorable terms (through the open capital markets that
the IMF has pushed on the countries). For each ruble, for each rupiah, for each cruzeiro,
those in the country get more dollars as long as the exchange rates are sustained' (Stiglitz,
2002, p. 209).
Stiglitz was in an unusually credible position to offer commentary concerning
the effectiveness of the IMF through the Washington Consensus. His comments
are offered in more regional and global terms than perhaps others would care to
admit, therefore, they might be more revealing. As concerns Stiglitz's view of a
Washington Consensus:
'In the Asian Financial crisis, this was great for American and European creditors, who
were glad to get back the money they had lent to Thai or Korean banks and businesses or
at least more of it than they otherwise would have. However, it was not so great for the
workers and other taxpayers of Thailand and Korea, whose tax money is used to repay the
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IMF loans, whether or not they got much benefit from the money. But adding insult to
injury, after the billions are spent to maintain the exchange rate at an unsustainable level
and to bail out the foreign creditors, after their governments have knuckled under to the
pressure of the IMF to cut back on expenditures, so that the countries face a recession in
which millions of workers lose their jobs, there seems to be no money around when it
comes to finding the far more modest sums to pay subsidies for food or fuel for the poor.
No wonder that there is such anger against the IMF' (Stiglitz, 2002, pp. 209-210).
According to George Soros (2002), those who control the centre of the global
financial system practice financial and economic policies being completely
opposite in orientation from those policies literally forced on poorer countries who
have no choice but to comply with IMF programmes. Despite the evidence only
partially supports the Soros accusations or rather the reality concerning the
functioning of the international economic organisations is more complex (Sergi,
2005b), he states:
'The [global] crisis of 1997-1999 revealed a fundamental flaw in the architecture of the
international system. The countries at the center [US] of the system are in position to
apply countercyclical policies. For instance, in the current downturn [2001-2002], the
United States has aggressively reduced interest rates and cut taxes. But the conditions
imposed by the IMF are pro-cyclical: They push countries into recession by forcing them
to raise interest rates and cut budgetary expenditures - exactly the opposite of what the
United States is doing in similar circumstances ... Since the 1997-1999 crisis, however, the
emperor has no clothes: the IMF programs fail to impress the markets. The afflicted
countries seem to be caught in a downward cycle' (Soros, 2002, pp. 120-121).
From this perspective, the ability of the Washington Consensus to offer ethical
examples of leadership might be negligible. Soros (2002) clearly wants the US to
lead by example, but for actual conduct recommended to poorer countries. But
what should one make out of this? Although it has been called for the adoption of
a new consensus in Europe (i.e. the Bruxelles Consensus , Sergi, 2003a) to replace
the one launched in Washington, D.C., the point, however, is that we must judge
the theories and models with respect to the merits of their outcomes. Some
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answers are most revealing when addressing the use of the early Washington
Consensus in Latin America.
1.3. A Look at Latin America as a Precursor of Europe's Issues
It might be appropriate to begin by addressing the realities of those countries
nearest the US, which directly experienced the policies and results emanating from
the Washington Consensus. It is clearly in the interests of the global business
community and of the European institutions to be aware of such outcomes as well.
To elaborate, we expected Venezuela, for example, to become a global
economic leader, especially after the country became the world's leading oil
exporter in 1928. Surpassed in oil production only by Saudi Arabia and Iran in the
early 1970s, one would think until 1970 economic realities would steadily
improve. Not so as in 1988, the IMF intervened but the results of the IMF
adjustment simply accelerated the already rapid economic decline faced by most
Venezuelans. The Venezuelan example is enlightening also considering the free
market approach of its President Carlos Andrez Perez. Elected in December 1988,
he immediately started restructuring the economy on the bases of free market
principles. Although known as an economic reformer, and after the 1989 further
austerity policies, Perez in fact was forced to accept the entire IMF programme or
nothing at all (see e.g. Chomsky, 1993). This example illustrates that no matter
who the leader of Venezuela was from 1988 to the present, the Washington
Consensus was to be fully accepted and carried out. E3yJanuary 1992, the results
were in major impoverishing the country to the point where the vast majority of
Venezuelans directly experienced a 60 per cent reduction in purchasing power,
while the traditional financial community and the largest business groups clearly
benefited at the expense of everyone else. This could only have been the result
when one sees that Venezuela was another direct recipient of the IMF Washington
Consensus, according to Chomsky (1993).
The so-called good news was there for all to see: an increase in foreign
reserves, very low inflation and the fastest economic growth in all of Latin
America. Good news indeed but the all-important point concerning the massive
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increases in poverty suffered by the vast majority of the population. In the capital
city itself, Caracas, the wealthiest area of Venezuela, witnessed a 44 per cent
decline in the minimum wage, huge declines in nutrition levels and a huge increase
concerning the concentration of wealth (Chomsky, 1993). As if this is not alarming
enough, only three years into the IMF adjustment, only 57 per cent of the entire
populace could afford more than one meal a day with real per capita income
falling by 55 per cent during the same three-year period. We had never witnessed
declines of this size before. Surely, business groups and leaders realise that the so-
called good news, iow inflation, is the direct result of the Washington Consensus:
few people have enough money to spend in Venezuela following IMF structural
adjustment policies. Low inflation is the result.
Note that elsewhere in Latin America, similar patterns emerge. The results of
the Washington Consensus are also found in Guatemala, which since the early
1990s, has had a higher level of child malnutrition than Haiti, a country completely
impoverished and devastated (Chomsky, 1993) and we can observe these
unfortunate consequences from the international television coverage in these days.
Other countries felt the realities of the Washington Consensus, such as the neo-
liberal economic doctrine applied to Guatemala in the very early 1980s, when an
incredible 87 per cent of the population was in complete poverty, which was up
from the 79 per cent total of the late 1970s; this is in contrast to only 2 per cent of
the entire population of Guatemala that owns 70 per cent of all land throughout the
country (Chomsky, 1993).
Again, one must ask the most basic of questions: is this good for business, both
ethically and economically? Low inflation could be there with this kind of reality
growing in depth for the vast majority of the populations in these countries. Is this
the kind of low inflation the business community would like to see elsewhere
before they invest? Can anyone plausibly argue that business is better off in any
purely business sense of the term, much less ethically, when inflation is brought
down and kept down by having side effects like in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Brazil
and many others throughout Central and South America, besides the ones just
discussed, are looking for another consensus, which might respect the ethical
implications for both businessperson and business interests globally.
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1.4 Structure of the Thesis
Although Commission President Barroso tried to tackle potential critics by
underlining that the overarching goal of the Lisbon strategy is sustainable
development, we endeavour to do so in a way to update the original Bruxelles
Consensus and put in the framework of the Social Agenda 2005-2010, to be able to
focus on job and equal opportunities in the new market economies. In fact, the
March 2005 summit has discussed the Commission's midterm review of the
Lisbon strategy for economic, social and environmental renewal. The European
Council and the Commission decided to prepare a midterm review of the Lisbon
process, this after having March 2004 European Council mandated Former Dutch
Prime Minister Wim Kok to lead a group of experts with the objective of
reviewing the Lisbon goals (European Communities, 2004). The Kok report.
Facing the Challenge: The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employment,
concluded in November 2004 that we had made little progress over the first five
years and recommended to refocus the agenda on growth and employment. It also
underlined the need for real ownership by the member states of the reforms
needed.
The EU's enlargement and numerous financial and political supports given to
new member states spur different angles of analysis: all these issues would be the
key analysis of this thesis. Central purpose here is to link this thesis with all our
works, by connecting the general and well-known literature that can relate to the
newly market economies in Central-East Europe. After this introductive chapter,
we construct the thesis around certain aspects of the Bruxelles Consensus:
Chapter 2 explains the few alternative models of transition. The shock therapy, the
gradualist model of transition, the post-Keynesian approach, the Bruxelles
Consensus and the Chinese transition. The shock therapy is a mixture of
neoclassical economic equilibrium joint with pluralistic political structure and
hasty transition, and this stands against the gradualist model of transition, which is
gradual in nature though with much the same pluralistic political structure. The
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post-Keynesian approach makes use of the post-Keynesian economic analysis plus
pluralistic political structure while the Chinese model of transition has being
characterised by non-pluralistic political authorities and gradual transition in the
sphere of agriculture and industrial policy. Chapter 2 also analyses the issue of
investment in information technology and innovation that are regarded as the
principal driving force behind economic development. Moreover, we include an
analysis on unemployment in Slovakia and apply a formal model to attest a
positive relationship of employment to GDP. We find that the responsiveness of
employment deviation from its trend to the deviation of GDP from its trend is
weak and a negative correlation of cyclical development of labour forces on
cyclical development of employed: these facts denote that cyclical unemployment
was not very pronounced in Slovakia. The nature of high unemployment was
rather structural than cyclical and this may have some cogent policy-related to
fighting unemployment in transition economies (World Bank, 2005; Sergi, 2003a).
Chapter 3 gives a forum of discussion concerning the development of the banking
system, ranging from the main economic reforms carried out during the 1990s and
the giving up of the one-tier banking system in favour of the western-type two-tier
system. A strategy was adopted towards an effective functioning of central
banking (Sergi, 1994, 1997a), and the continuing strategy to set up commercial
banks. In it, the inherited bad and nonperforming loans added up to new debts due
to bad banking lending, delayed enterprise restructuring and prolonged economic
crises. This much constrained the ability of commercial banks to act as
protagonists of investments and recovery during the 1990s. We focus on the
experiences in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland that faced the problem of
non-performing loans from the portfolio of the state-owned commercial banks.
These loans would have worsened banks' liquidity and solvency once hard budget
constraints were imposed and banking crises resolutions were therefore essential
measures. Most of these commercial banks were technically insolvent or
chronically undercapitalised and authorities had to recognise and estimate the true
value of inherited non-performing loans in the portfolio of previously state-owned
commercial banks.
1 0
Chapter 4 concerns the role of tax competition. This piece of economic thinking is
regaining strong momentum today in the light of mounting tax competition in
Central-East Europe to the benefit of international investors (Sergi, 2007, 2006b,
2005d). However, on one side, policymakers might think that lowering tax rates
would be a means to reinforce the efficiency of the economy and to incentive
national and international business leaders. On the other side, the linkage between
tax competition and foreign capital inflow in Europe is unambiguous for the
majority of economists, yet its long-term rationale is not when modelling Western
and Central-East Europe as a central versus periphery tax rivalry case. Tax
competition might benefit peripheral regions versus central regions in the short
term. However, peripheral regions' decision makers have incomplete information
on long-term optimal taxes, and this fact routed them to engage in methodical tax
rivalry among themselves and against central regions. This reality would make
short-term tax advantages in the peripheral Europe either disappear in the long-
term or exert negligible weight on investment decision at best (Sergi, 2007,
2006b).
Chapter 5 investigates the relevant issue of globalisation, internationalisation, and
global entrepreneurship it has been partially applied to Central-East Europe (Sergi,
2005b, 2006a; Adekola and Sergi, 2007a, 2007b and 2007c). Multinational
corporations see globalisation as producing a wide spread of democratisation and
development for new market economies. Entrepreneurial enterprises and
competition among them had an important role in fostering economic growth
regionally and globally, providing a significant addition to real GDP growth and
employment opportunities. Surely, globalisation provided more opportunities than
threats for entrepreneurs to expand their business opportunities worldwide. In the
chapter, we offer a view on how international management and global
entrepreneurship have so many opportunities and challenges. Society has quite
often divided the world into north and south, rich and poor, communist and
capitalist and much other convenient stratification. Splitting the international
community once more finds continuity around the process of globalisation and its
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institutions, which is perceived as both positive and negative at the same time.
This study compares these theories in the context of small and medium-sized
technology-based enterprises. Findings suggest that the merits of internalisation
and externalisation vary with market contexts and the resources under the firm's
control. These new market economies in Central-East Europe aim to built recovery
on information technology and the sharing of knowledge and intellectual capital.
This process is also related to the new knowledge economy and it is fundamentally
different from the economic and political contexts of the past decades. In a
knowledge-based economy, a competitive advantage will be achieved by those
countries that have the capacity to deliver quickly and have innovative forms of
work organisations that raise productivity.
Chapter 6 analyses transition in Europe in the light of the social and economic
foundations of the EU and its social model. This traces back to the first Social
Action Programme of 1974 up to the Lisbon Agenda and latest developments. This
term is used very frequently, although most of those who use it, agree that there is
no single European Social Model. The term refers to the specificities of the main
European versions of the welfare state, making them different from developed
countries in other parts of the world. However, while the term covers one of the
major achievements of Europe, the old continent is increasingly concerned by the
problems of preserving it in a changing international economic environment.
Chapter 7 concludes a thesis being built on our previous research output and offer
a tentative explanation of how a new model of socioeconomic growth could be
sustainable in newly market economies in Central-East Europe (Sergi, 19%,
1997b, 1998a, 2003a). Such a model of growth in Europe should evolve enough to
guarantee social equilibrium and ethical outcomes in a context of global actions
and interactions. There is the need to reinterpret the Washington Consensus and
rationalise those supranational institutions that impose economic policies and
socioeconomic standards. While short-term solutions usually have short-term
effects, we suggest economic applications necessary for long-term benefits. We
need to call for a new consensus to apply to the new European vision and reality
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that already helped the transformation of newly market economies in Central-East
Europe.
Consequently, we stand to get a clearer vision of what occurred in former
communist countries, which in turn elevates the current debate over what went
wrong or not to a new level. Understanding occurrences and the role of the
European Union is now more important than ever to assess as accurately as
possible because this process imposes new dynamics on all forms of economic
development. Therefore, it becomes clear that differences between countries in
Central-East Europe regarding transition economics, economic models of
transformation, the role of new technologies and labour markets depend on
inherited capabilities from the previous, socialist period, and the adoption of
diverse economic theories. Next chapter offers a grasp of economic models of
transformation and reforms' unintended and intended consequences that have
permanently altered the development process in Central-East Europe.
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Chapter 2
Economic Models of Transition and Innovation Policies
2.1 Introduction
Political and economic reforms in Central-East Europe caused deep changes in the
overall sphere of market and economic relations. By and large, new policy-making
has been transformed the vertical relationship between central authorities and
enterprises have pushed newly formed enterprises to accept market oriented
principles. We consider alternative policies in several spheres such as international
cooperation, foreign aid, foreign investment and new technologies.
Five alternative models of transition can be considered: the shock therapy, the
gradualist model of transition, the post-Keynesian approach, the so-called
Bruxelles Consensus and the Chinese way to transition. The shock therapy is a
mixture of neoclassical economic equilibrium together with pluralistic political
structure and hasty transition, and this stands against the gradualist model of
transition, which is gradual in nature although with the same pluralistic political
structure. The post-Keynesian approach uses the post-Keynesian economic
analysis and pluralistic political structure. The new model based on the European
financial and social aid is the Bruxelles Consensus (Sergi, 2003a). The gradual
Chinese model started at the end of the 1980s when Deng Xiaoping proposed and
conducted an economic reform. This specific example in Asia is important because
since then China's economy has steadily improved although it was a Marxist-
Maoist model in nature along with non-pluralistic political structure.
2.2 The Shock Therapy and the Gradualist Approach
The shock therapy transition model was initiated in several Central-East
European countries at the beginning of the 1990s. Poland inaugurated this new
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economic strategy on 1 January 1990, Czechoslovakia on 1 January 1991 and
other countries followed (e.g. Bulgaria, Russia, Albania, Estonia and Latvia)
(Sachs, 1991; Sergi, 2003a; World Bank, 2005). The forces that have been driving
this type of economic transition evolved in conjunction with domestic realities but
both Jeffrey Sachs (an adviser to the Polish government) and Anders Aslund (an
adviser to the Russian from November 1991 to January 1994) shared the belief that
the economy was in such a terrible mess that a radical programme would be
needed to introduce any kind of rational order. The supporters of the shock therapy
model argued that the model would ensure growth at full employment with low
inflation and stability, and 'the tasks and instruments of macroeconomic
stabilisation are the same in Russia as elsewhere' (Aslund, 1995, p. 181). As such,
an approximation to competitive capitalism was feasible and there would be fewer
opportunities for corruption and rent seeking (Aslund, 1994), although the
outcomes in Russia have been quite the opposite (Stiglitz, 2002; Sergi, 2004a).
While the general belief was a gradual process would have resulted in the
wastage of the precious reserve of political capital developed after the collapse of
centrally administered socialism, however, the shock therapy caused undesirable
outcomes resulted such as unemployment and high inflation caused social and
political instability. For the shock therapy supporters, the reasons for such negative
outcomes were due to the inadequate response by the mature economies and the
international financial institutions in helping the transition economies or that
transition economies were forced to implement orthodox stabilisation policies
based only on fiscal and monetary policies (Aslund, 1995). Among mature market
economies and international organisations, there was no intellectual understanding
of what to do (Sachs, 1995b), there was an unwillingness to make any substantial
commitment, and there was no political will (Aslund, 1995).
To draw a comparison, China (see section 2.6) has been recognised as a
successful model of implementing a gradual process of transition. The sectors ot
the Chinese economy that responded successfully to the new economic conditions
were agriculture, exports-oriented firms and services. These industries took
advantage of a reform programme that was 'gradual' but rapid in selected sectors
(Woo, 1994). Gradualism in China is not the result of a particular theory of reform
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and economic growth was initiated in the agriculture sector. In contrast, in Central-
East Europe a majority of the labour force was employed in urban industry and
therefore the main transformation had to be in the state sector. They directly linked
the provision of government assistance to the culture and the perceptions of the
people about the exact extent of the state in society and the role state -
businessperson (Lipton and Sachs, 1992; Sergi, 2003a and 2004c).
The liberalisation of international trade and the establishment of a convertible
currency were among the most important prerequisites for a successful transition
to capitalism. Trade liberalisation was essential to a successive trade performance
as it could create positive externalities when coming down to innovation,
efficiency and privatisation (Frydman, Rapaczynski and Earle, 1993). It was
believed that these countries could benefit from rational price systems (Boycko,
1991), foreign trade and aid (Marangos, 2007) and productivity growth. The
exchange rate should have been liberalised at the same time as domestic prices,
which would have reaffirmed both the complementary nature of economic policies
and the need for a shock therapy approach. A flexible exchange rate could be
adjusted to reduce inflation and stimulate competition and the achievement of a
stable foreign exchange market could be possible by maintaining a restrictive
monetary policy. In theory, both fixed and flexible exchange rates were consistent
with the shock therapy, since neither involves government intervention. If a fixed
exchange rate eliminates instability, it is possible to argue that it would have been
beneficial to resort to a pegged exchange rate at the very beginning of any
stabilisation programmes, only to move to flexibility in the exchange rate policy
after a couple of years or so (e.g. Sachs, 1996, 1997a; Aslund, 1995; Sergi, 2003a).
The international experience revealed that successful stabilisation programmes
were based on a pegged exchange rate, such as Bolivia in 1985, Israel in 1985 and
Mexico in 1987 and in Central-East Europe the countries that pegged their
currencies at the beginning - Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary and Poland —
performed better than the floaters in reducing inflation.
Moreover, protectionism was inconsistent with the shock therapy model. As for
foreign direct investment, it could be encouraged through free markets, political
stability and the development of stronger institutional structures. The shock
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therapy also assumes debt cancellations, international transfers, balance of
payments, and budgetary support as a means of overcoming stagnation and
maintaining political support.
Note that Sachs (1995a) wrote that no any single country has undertaken radical
market reforms during this century if not through the help of sizeable foreign aid
and as some of these countries in Central-East Europe were burdened by large
debts, foreign financial support would have reduced the need for the monetary
financing of government deficits and increase the credibility of reforms. Sachs
argued that all external debt should have been frozen and rescheduled and that the
responsibility of advanced and rich economies was to help transition economies,
because 'the world has much to gain from the emerging system and much to lose if
we fail to act decisively to put it in place' (Sachs, 1995b, p. 50). The role of
foreign aid was considerable for the transition economies, since it was intended to
speed and increase the likelihood of the success of the transition reforms. This, of
course, was in the interest of mature market economies. Partial debt forgiveness
was necessary, which was anathema to the IMF and World Bank. The World
Bank's technical assistance and long-term project support would have remained
invaluable, as well as the IMF's role as a short-term international crisis manager.
However, Western aid did not have positive effects and there was excessive
optimism and naive hope placed in the scale of Western economic aid and its
helpful stimulating impact on production. Flad the transition economies followed
the optimum order of liberalisation recommended by neoclassical gradualist
economists, their need for external finance would have been limited, claims
McKinnon (1993).
2.3 The Post-Keynesian Model
Post Keynesians recognised the positive benefits associated with international
trade. Meanwhile, because open economies are more complex than closed
economies, the market outcome would have been even less likely to be a socially
desirable outcome. Active government intervention was essential from the start to
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restructure external trade and payments appropriate to what post-Keynesians
define a 'civilised market economy' (Davidson, 1994; Sergi, 1996, 1998a).
Contrary to the neoclassical view, post-Keynesians argued that an appropriate
level of protection would have been essential for enterprises to survive on an
uneven playing field. The experience of mature market economies revealed that
their development and industrialisation was strongly linked with protectionist
measures. Consequently, globalisation did not automatically result in trade
liberalisation; rather, there seemed to be powerful forces which supported the
construction of trade barriers. According to post-Keynesians, a flexible exchange
rate system encouraged only financial currency speculation and not production,
discouraged forward contracts, and encouraged stagnation in the domestic and
world economy. It prompted countries to solve the problems of unemployment and
inflation by shifting them onto their trading partners (Davidson, 1994).
The comparative advantage theory of international trade was developed in a
specific historical period where natural resource endowments and capital-labour
ratios determined economic location. Today, this has been replaced by an era of
knowledge-intensive industries where comparative advantage is human made.
Natural resources have ceased to dominate economic activity. Long-run economic
growth is the result not only of the country's resource endowments but also, most
importantly, of its capacity to satisfy both domestic and foreign knowledge-
intensive production processes. Differences in production opportunity costs are
due to what each society believes to be acceptable working conditions. The
presence of high and persistent unemployment and of very large transaction costs
contradicts the assumptions of comparative advantage.
For the post-Keynesians, co-ordination of international trade was essential and
the collapse of the trading system increased the complexity of the transformation
(Marangos, 2007). For example, intra-trade between the ex-Soviet Union republics
comprised 80 per cent of their total trade (Sergi, 2003a) and trade diversion would
have been extremely costly and trade restrictions between transition economies
would have reduced output. Moreover, post-Keynesians viewed the
recommendation for the establishment of a payments union by neoclassical
gradualist economists as a positive element in the transition process (Marangos,
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2007). However, they were very critical of the temporary nature of the payments
union in establishing only convertibility, after which it would have ceased to exist
since no other goal justified its existence. The payments union would have
evolved, if it was established, to an Eastern European Clearing Union similar to
the International Clearing Union suggested by Keynes for the international
financial system. Through the clearing union, a fixed exchange system would have
eliminated the instability and negative outcomes caused by the flexible exchange
rate system. There would have been no advantage in engaging in export-led
growth and importing inflation. In this international system, fiscal and monetary
policies would remain the responsibility of the sovereign state. Through the
clearing union, all participants might enjoy a win-win situation (Davidson and
Davidson, 1996; Marangos, 2007).
The free trade initiated by the shock therapy approach was causing a
deindustrialisation (Yavlinsky and Braguinsky, 1994). The post-Keynesian model
recommended an adaptive strategy that combined open but managed trade
whereby a fixed exchange rate regime along with an intelligent internal demand
and incomes management policies could create a beneficial environment to all
(Davidson, 1994). Economic policy co-ordination has, therefore, become a
necessary condition for achieving sustained economic prosperity in the new
globalised economic environment. A concurrent generalised expansion of income
across countries, through a co-ordinated approach, might have helped to mitigate
the problems of trade deficits and capital (light driven by international differences
in inflation and interest rates. This would have enabled countries to stay on an
expansionary course. In the absence of such co-ordination, the adverse policy
incentives that promoted the macroeconomics of austerity and the lowering of the
wage floor would have inevitably asserted themselves.
The financial assistance provided by the mature market economies has been
disappointing. The transition economies had to depend on their own resources. In
addition, due to the relative scarcity of foreign capital and international aid,
transition economies competed only in providing concessions to foreign
investment. This may have enabled them to acquire the necessary financial
resources, post-Keynesians conceded, but it has had irreversible consequences for
19
the future. It has created a heavy reliance on the voluntary movement of capital
and handouts from international organisations, reducing national sovereignty and
jeopardizing the development of the society. The transition economies would have
been able to stand on both feet only after an extensive debt cancellation
programme, together with substantial foreign aid to political support efforts.
Foreign aid benefited the donor economy as well as the recipient transition
economy because it helped to stimulate increased international trade and
strengthened relationships in the international community. A prime example is the
Marshall Plan's large military and economic aid programmes after World War 11.
The European countries received financial aid to buy American products. This
facilitated restructuring in both Europe and the US. The development of any
society requires an international financial system that prohibits the movement of
financial capital for speculative reasons and post-Keynesians conclude that the
transition economies, due to the flexible exchange rate and the international trade
market, were contributing to the international debt problem.
2.4 The Bruxelles Consensus
The Bruxelles Consensus has been put forward by Sergi (2003a). The failure of the
Washington Consensus in the past and the much needed economic dynamics and
changes in Central-East Europe brought the case for new economic strategies and
solutions. New ideas came into life to address the parameters of these changes.
How can we define the current problems and what are the solutions? Sergi (2003a)
proposed a new strategy how to deal with the transformation and transitional
economies. He proposes the multiple-goal strategy and post-Washington
Consensus. Sergi's scenario of multiple-goal and post-Washington Consensus
policies is a new set of political economics which ought to shape new markets in
the old continent, in addition to modernising institutions, economic infrastructures,
and standards of living. This approach helps understanding the policies of the
European Union and its candidate countries.
Sergi's proposal (2003a) named after Bruxelles that houses the government of
Europe concerns a replacement of the role played by the Washington Consensus
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and to rebuilding and strengthening its weaken credibility in some parts of the
globe; to offer a new hope and to strengthen transitional and Central-East
European realities. The new consensus calls for activist state policies, though not
intended as Keynesian per se but as a form of stimulus to the Schumpeterian
entrepreneur, for results that go beyond those of the Washington Consensus; still
Sergi does not deny the importance of the market and neoliberal policies towards
market stability and incentives. To put it in a different way, the Bnixelles
Consensus by Sergi (2003a) aims to shape an innovative political economy
focused at steering the recovery of transitional economies, but also of creating a
simulative economic framework in Western Europe and attempts to define the
European way for the new century and makes it successful. It is an informative
road map of the past, present and future paths to a global economy. Sergi (2003a)
enlightens us with important explanations which define the differences between
the Western and Eastern club economies and the related social perspectives and
politics. This new approach clearly explains the logic of Central-East economic
inefficiencies and what developments have occurred and still need to in such
transitional economies. It offers concrete investment strategies and insight with
examples of backward-looking investment choices prevalent among those not as
forward thinking as Sergi, who prefer to restructure enterprises that were only
successful in a past-distorted economy. The constantly changing scenes of the EU
becomes a confusing commotion of combined national perspectives, regulations
and recommendations, but Sergi helps clarify critical points of interest regarding
the impact on both sides which come with the eastward enlargement.
Additionally, he helps answer a contemporary prodding question of when the
economic transition will be over for the Central-East club and perhaps more
appropriately to stray from popular economists who deliver what we want to hear
in exchange for what we need to know by throwing a temporarily unfavourable
light on the existing reality for Central-East countries, yet suggesting economic
methods to aid them in leaving the Western club's shadow. This new approach
wisely points out that short-term solutions usually have short-term effects but that
long-term outcomes should be based upon short-term strategies as well. We know
all business schools support thinking 'outside of the box', and Sergi does just this
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by forecasting long-term economic effects of applications necessary for long-term
benefits across what he defines as the '4 P-governments'. Sergi cannot only speak
from painfully in-depth research, but also from his own actual related international
experience to support his sound and worthy of adoption theories. Overall, the
Bnixelles Consensus provides great benefits for understanding economics in
Central-East Europe and its new theory viewed from the traditional supply side
perspective is an improvement upon the traditional Washington Consensus, an
outmoded term not least because of its unpopularity in many areas of the world.
The Bnixelles Consensus is a vast improvement upon that of 'Washington' not
least because the approach calls for an activist state role based on a Keynesian,
Schumpeter interpretation of supply-side economics. This is to novelty as the
Washington view misinterprets Keynes-Schumpeter supply side views.
2.5 The Chinese Way
In 1979 in China, trade liberalisation policies were introduced to facilitate exports
and, for the first time, to allow for foreign investment. In essence, these efforts
involved the break-up of the monopoly of foreign trade held by the central
government, transferring this authority to local governments. Special economic
zones were set up to free foreign investors and domestic exporters from red tape.
Real devaluation, comparative advantage and the entrepreneurial energies of a
receptive expatriate community also contributed to China's trade performance.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that trade would have grown in the way that it did it
restrictive national regulations had not been substantially mitigated by local
authorities taking advantage of the possibilities offered by extensive
decentralisation.
It is possible to argue that Chinese reforms of the industrial structure presented
an extreme form of the infant industry argument Nolan (1995). Almost the whole
of the Chinese industrial sector could be considered an infant industry. An infant
industry is not just one, which did not exist in any form and required protection to
start up. An out-of-date and uncompetitive industry on international markets can
be considered to have the same characteristics as an infant industry. It is rational to
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argue that an industry, which today is uncompetitive and would be bankrupted in
open international competition, but which is thought likely to become competitive,
to be given protection.
Extensive state action, through protection, was required to construct a
competitive industrial sector, so that China could shift from a traditional anti-
comparative advantage and heavy industry oriented development to a strategy that
relied on comparative advantage. In this process, one of the key functions of
planning was to identify sectors that were likely to become internationally
competitive and to take measures to assist them. The East Asian experience
demonstrated that government discretionary policy was exercised prior and during
the opening up of the economy to the world markets. In contrast, the typical advice
of the IMF and World Bank to transition economies was to liberalise foreign trade
immediately, which has driven them out into the world competition before their
economies were able to withstand the pressures. The Chinese did not make the
same mistake.
China went to great lengths to attract foreign capital and foreign technology.
Both rapid economic growth and higher incomes increasingly depended on the
input of ever-larger amounts of capital from abroad, and expatriate investors were
a potentially important source of linkage with the world economy. In contrast to
China, transition economies had relied too much, and to some extent even
passively, on foreign aid and foreign advice in carrying out economic reform. In
the Chinese case, foreign advice was accepted only selectively and in fact China's
reform programme was largely shaped despite, not because, of foreign advice
(Nolan, 1995).
The Chinese themselves are caught between their desire to hold on to an
historic independence, which is seen as inseparable from the protection ot national
sovereignty, and their need for foreign investment and trade. In the first place,
whether largely foreign-funded capitalist development, intentionally introduced by
the government, can be controlled, or whether the most powerlul figures in the
current leadership even want to control it, is a fundamental issue today. No doubt a
complete reversion to a capitalist system is the goal ol many within the burgeoning
privatised sector, while some elements within the government, especially those
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most closely tied into foreign ventures and joint enterprises, must share these
ultimate aims. In reality, local governments competing to attract overseas capital
typically bend to investors' demands.
Moreover, many local cadres cultivate good relations with foreign owners in
their own personal interest and the Chinese concept of 'guanxi' or 'personal
relationship' facilitates successful business relationships (Wong and Leung, 2001).
Even though they know perfectly well what the working and living conditions in
foreign owned factories are, they would never intervene to do anything about them
(Qinglian, 2000). In addition, illegal outflow of private funds, amounting to USD
20 billion annually, even before the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, which has
induced further illegal capital flight. In this way, the internal socialist market and
the external capitalist market have been employed to stimulate and accelerate
economic growth, and have become inextricably linked, to the point that they are
not distinguishable.
2.6 Toward Free Trade
A sustained movement towards free trade was crucial for the successful transition
to a market economy, to promote the growth of exports, curb the rise in imports
and improve the trade balance and the balance of payments, as the neoclassical
gradualist economists argued. However, since the economies in Central-East
Europe had inherited obsolete production methods, participation in international
competition was very difficult. The collapse of trading among former Soviet-type
economies had a serious impact on economic sustainability. There was an
argument for maintaining a moderate level of tariffs and transforming quantitative
restrictions into tariffs. This would have provided protection and given time tor the
firms to adjust, while also providing the government with an income. Temporary
protection for some domestic industries had to be determined on the basis of
economic rationality, no pressure from lobby groups, and to be in line with the
prescriptions of World Trade Organisation (WTO) so that it did not lead to
protectionist retaliation by foreign trading partners. International trade would have
also contributed to the process of creative destruction.
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However, closer economic ties of these economies with Western European
markets were the natural consequence of the implosion of the Soviet-type system.
These larger trade linkages with the Western market are made within a non-
distorted framework of comparative advantages, being this in contrast to the
CMEA system when economic distortions implied closer relationships with those
countries that were behaving in a similar distorted fashion. The CMEA's collapse
explains part of the output loss: aggregate demand by domestic consumers,
producers and export sides shrank and affected output as much as a 50 to 60 per
cent contraction (Haddad, 1998), with the lowest estimate at 5 percent according to
Berg (1994). The fall of CMEA alone would have brought about 20 to 30 per cent
of the total output decline. The subsequent and increasing relationship with
Western Europe (Winiecki, 2000; Sergi, 2003a) can be named a process of trade
reorientation in the direction of the European Union's markets (a 'natural 1 trade
linkage, as in Piazolo, 2001) or what Winiecki (2000) explained as a 'return to
normality in foreign trade' by which the enterprises' system started to correct the
inherited microeconomic distortions. As a matter of fact, larger trade ties with the
West produce more microeconomic and macroeconomic efficiency, but also
through the multiplier they affect income too. Besides, a shift in the aggregate
saving schedule could probably take place because the propensity to save might be
larger in the export sector respect to the other sectors, although it may induce the
latter sectors to increase the marginal propensity to save as well.
In contrast, it might have been in the interests of transition economies,
especially the former republics of the Soviet Union, to have co-ordinated
economic reforms. Some economists such as Williamson (1991, 1992), Kregel et
al. (1992) and Dombusch (1993) recommended the establishment of a payments
union between transition economies, because the convertibility of the currency
would not otherwise have been sustainable, due to the inelasticity ot import and
export demand. Permanent current account deficits would have encouraged
depreciation and detracted from the gains in international competitiveness due to
the inflexibility of wages. International financial markets were controlled heavily
and capital account currency exchanges were only allowed in exceptional
circumstances. If convertibility had been initiated immediately, rather than the
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European payment union, European incomes would have been reduced by one to
two per cent, which was the same as the contribution made by the US under the
Marshall plan. This was an all-too-familiar scenario among the transition
economies. Through the Payments Union, transition economies would have been
able to establish current account convertibility more rapidly between member
states and the rest of the world and avoid large depreciation. This could have
helped to achieve currency convertibility, intra-regional economic collaboration,
exploitation of comparative advantage, the development of rational trade and
prices and have prepared transition economies for participation in international
trade. The payments union did not require the removal of financial or fiscal
policies by the sovereign state.
However, the idea was rejected. The international organisations did not permit
this idea to flourish, probably because the newly formed former Soviet republics
and Eastern Europe had to depend on trade with Russia for a substantial number of
years. Such a union might have provided a mechanism to impose centralisation of
trade and restrictions on the free movement of capital, despite the political union
was its major long-term goal (Balaev and South worth, 2007).
2.7 The Role of New Technologies
Another crucial key point to analyse is investment in information technologies.
Innovations, is today widely regarded as the principal driving force in all long-
term socio-economic development. Governments in Central-East Europe should
strengthen links between service firms and public research institutions; improve
worker-training education; direct research to better suit the needs of particular
service industries; and help service firms use technology more effectively (World
Bank, 2005).
OECD countries are taking more seriously the need to invest in research and
development as a means to boost economic performance and remain competitive.
China doubled its spending on research and development between 1995 and 2002,
calculated as a percentage of GDP, from 0.6 per cent to 1.2 per cent ot GDP. Over
the same period, Israel increased its spending from 2.74 per cent to 4.72 per cent
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ot GDP, a ratio higher than that of any OECD country. The European Union
increased their level of R&D in 2002, to 1.17 per cent of GDP up from 1.15 per
cent in 2000. Also, a number of countries have set long-term targets for increasing
R&D spending, with Austria aiming for 2.5 per cent of GDP by 2006, Germany
3.0 per cent by 2010, and the UK 2.5 per cent by 2014 (Eurostat, 2004).
In comparison, the general picture of innovative activities in Central-East
Europe is not well developed and innovation centres and agencies have only
achieved some of the objectives (Radosevic and Walter, 2002; Hogselius, 2007).
In fact, in Slovenia and Russia the first steps concerning these forms of innovative
activities were not well articulated and implemented and this was due to the
conceptual weakness of having them work as network agents (Radosevic and
Walter, 2002). It is well known that business and economy are inextricably linked
with the development and implementation of new technology policies and
innovation processes and there is a clear evidence Internet technology has positive
impact on the economic growth and that technology is becoming an integral part of
today's enterprises. They use technology in a variety of ways and the most
successful enterprises use technology to help gain competitive advantage in their
industry. Companies that provide networking solutions have been impacted greatly
by technology and the information age. The large advances in technology have
made technology more affordable and accessible even to smaller firms. The lower
cost of technology and its ease of use have prompted a new wave of E-commerce
(i.e. business transacted over the Internet) and it is reaching new heights in both
business-to-business and business-to-public consumer sales (e.g. Pohjola, 2000).
A stimulus of the information technology has come through a profound change in
the fields of microelectronics, new and improved hardware and software,
telecommunications and the like. These processes are reinforcing the process ot
globalisation in investment and trade.
That being said, Internet technology and a beginning ot E-commerce have a
positive impact on the business sector in Central Europe very recently and have
increased businesses 1 desire to hire skilled workers and also increasing skills are
driving technological change (as for the US experience, see Lewis, 2006). But the
information revolution aided by the revolution in the telecommunications and
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institutional innovations had initially promised to change the nature of the market
altogether but we are far away from the degrees of penetration of the Internet
technology and the rapid growth of E-commerce as in the US or North and
Western Europe. While it is quite possible that these new technologies might
transform the future of socioeconomic landscape in Central-East Europe soon,
firms invest on average only about half as large a share of their GDP into R&D as
do typical OECD countries.
There are a few encouraging examples of countries that show signs of slowly
catching up with the more advanced economies along this measure. In terms of
innovative outcomes, the difference between Central-East European countries and
the more advanced Western countries is even more dramatic, and this fact signals
inefficiency of R&D for innovation. For example, within the European Union, the
new Central-East European member states are on average only about 4 per cent as
active in patenting new inventions as are the Western member states (measured per
capita) (Dyker, 2001). In other words, for every single patent that a Central-East
Europe firm applies for in the European Patent Office, a corresponding Western
firm applies for no less than 25 patents (Hogselius 2007).
Technologies, organisations and institutions in Central-East Europe have
already acted in this direction and the Slovak Republic, for example, has given
universities more autonomy and made it easier for them to work more closely with
industry (OECD, 2004). Norway and Switzerland recently introduced laws to
make it easier for public research institutions to own and market intellectual
property, and other countries in Central-East Europe are seriously thinking about
preparing similar legislation. Governments are increasingly looking to
public/private partnerships to better link public research to national needs. Several
are taking action to increase supplies ot skilled scientists and engineers (OECD,
2004).
Under a certain angle of view, between 1995 and 2001, the share ot
manufacturing output and employment in foreign affiliates rose in all OECD
countries except Germany and Holland, contributing to productivity growth in
home and host countries. Their share ot R&D is also growing. In 2001 foreign
affiliates accounted for 15 per cent to 20 per cent ot total manufacturing R&D in
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France, Germany and the US; more than 70 per cent in Hungary and Ireland.
Governments take further action to benefit from globalisation, such as by
enhancing their countries' attractiveness to foreign investors and strengthening
links with R&D institutions in other countries (OECD, 2004).
Moreover, investment on technology advances accounts for much of the surge
in productivity growth in the US. But IT-producing sectors are equally productive
in Europe and the US. The real difference lies in the IT-using sectors and the US
advantage can be found in wholesale, retail and financial securities. IT-producing
sectors have made larger contributions to productivity growth in the EU than in the
US (van Ark, Inklaar and McGuckin, 2003). In addition, the difference in output
per person is derived from the fact that US workers work longer hours than the
European employees and the gap could be seen as all about working time.
Moreover, going back to the logic of the 'soft budget constraints' (Kornai,
1990), the threat of bankruptcy was much weaker in Soviet-type systems than in
capitalist economies and was the slow diffusion of innovations through the
economy. The enormous efforts in terms of personnel and financial resources
devoted to scientific discoveries and technical inventions through the different
stages of the innovative process was not matched by any pull from production
enterprises. The latter were often reluctant to change, and the whole way of
thinking about innovation was different from typical capitalist technology-based
firms, deeply devoted to survival and expansion through Schumpeterian
competition (Sergi, 2003a).
In the Soviet industrialisation drive in the 1930s, inspiration from and imitation
of Western technologies played a crucial role as Russia as well as other East
European countries had been far behind in industrial development relatively to
Western Europe, and foreign sources of knowledge and technology thus played
important roles (Sergi, 2004a). While the new states created in Central-East
Europe after World War I built their industrial development largely on more direct
relationships to the West, the Soviet bloc built up a R&D system initially
concerned precisely with screening and copying Western technology (Sergi,
2004a).
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It is clear that the collapse of socialism in the years around 1990 was a radical
turning point with respect to innovative activities. In comparison to the earlier
reforms that were attempted already during the socialist era (Sergi, 2004a), the
transition in the 1990s was a revolution that opened up innovation in a way that it
could act as a driving economic force. This transformation could not conceal the
fact that the transformation of innovation still had to take as its point of departure
the existing socialist systems of innovation. The empirical evidence indicates that
the farewell to socialism has as a rule led to a dramatic collapse of large parts of
the inherited R&D system (e.g. Radosevic, 1997a). Organisations engaged in
applied R&D have as a rule not been able or allowed to adapt to the new situation,
and the base for their funding by the state has usually been withdrawn.
Organisations involved in basic research, i.e. mainly academies and
universities, have also faced a lack of financial resources and employment has
decreased considerably. After 1989, hopes were raised about possibilities of
strengthening Central-East Europe university-industry links, but with the almost
total disappearance of organisations in the spectrum between basic research and
production enterprises, and therefore a problematic lack of important bridging
actors, this is obviously contradictory to the actual prospects.
The R&D complex in Central-East European countries has thus been radically
downsized but while in most Western countries it is typical for the public sector to
contribute with around one-third of total R&D expenditures, with private firms
contributing with the remaining two-thirds, the situation is sometimes the reversed
in Central-East Europe where governments financed up to two-thirds of the total
R&D expenditures. And the interesting aspect of development is that there are no
clear indications that the pattern has not changed during the 1990s and early
2000s.
As a matter of fact, the public research sector in Central-East Europe is
typically of a comparable size to that of Western countries. Thus, for example, a
country such as Poland has actually a higher number of university researchers per
capita than Germany (OECD, 2004). However, the most important challenge
rather relates to the relevance and competitiveness of the research carried out from
the perspective of the system of innovation as a whole. This issue is directly linked
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to the relationships between R&D organisations and the business seetor. Similarly,
the links between R&D organisations and other publie bodies are likely to be of
key importance. The overall challenge is to integrate the inherited R&D complex
into the context of market-based economies.
For example, competencies in R&D generated under central planning were
obsolete when compared with the standards prevailing in Western Europe and the
US (Pavitt, 1997; Sergi, 2004a). However, there are a number of cases where
Soviet-type competencies have been successfully exploited in the post-Soviet
period because individuals who have accumulated far-reaching competencies have
very often come to play important roles in the post-socialist system of innovation.
Under a certain perspective, when the capitalist experiment erupted in the
newly democratic countries of Central-East Europe in the late 1980s, the relevance
of this experiment has soon become a privileged subject of research. The spirit of
this second society and of the dissident intellectuals was to steer the domestic
system towards capitalism without capitalists (Sergi, 2004b; Eyal, Szelenyi and
Townsley, 2000. This could have been possible by lending more importance to
civil society and the economic managerial rationalism that had permeated the
system even before 1989 (Sergi, 2004b). A permanent bureaucratic-capitalist class
dampened the emergence of a middle class, says Sergi (2004b), which was the
peculiar aspect in Western societies. As things were developing, these economies
were searching for a new social rationale and this could be seen in new elites of
capitalists and in the application of the strongest measures of capitalist regulation,
which imposed stability in the 1990s through either currency boards or tight
monetary policy, rather than with planning. The technocratic component of the
new elite was only partially accustomed to western-type practices and to plan
bargains. As it happened, some of the powerful people lost favour to a group ot
young communist technocrats, which had created a form ol managerial capitalism
using state property and bureaucracy. They obtained the means ol power through
political and cultural dominance, preserving some SO to 90 per cent ot their
positions in economic and land management (Tsyganov, 1999). Simply, they have
not squandered their political and economic gains and found enough power to
manoeuvre themselves to control important resources, and maintain support within
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the political establishment. That is, a new class of capitalists able to implement the
decisive monetarist strategy, despite the distress caused by stringency of reforms.
The formation of a class of state managers and a class of young entrepreneurs
trace their origins to the previous paternalistic structure. This class of new
managers forms a vital component in the society of today, though the chaotic
situation may have transformed political and managerial capital into a hegemonic
oligarchy in Russia. A major source of such important individuals, who possess
important competencies accumulated under communism, appear to be R&D
organisations of various kinds. Even more important, however, is the availability
of socialist-era graduates from technical and other universities; these people show
up nearly everywhere where creative innovation occurs.
At the level of organisations, the power of inherited competencies is not at all
as obvious in the post-socialist context as at the individual level. Through the
collapse of old enterprises and applications-oriented R&D organisations, in
particular, great deals of competencies were lost at the organisational level. These
lost competencies may in many cases have been obsolete, while in other cases they
may have been potentially useful in the post-socialist era. It may also be seen that
the formal or informal reintegration of inherited socialist networks following their
legal split-up may in fact play important roles in stimulating innovation
(Radosevic, 1997b).
With respect to inherited universities, post-socialist universities have suffered
from a loss of teachers and researchers, mainly because of compressed financial
resources. This line of reasoning can be generalised to include the entire
educational infrastructure. In particular, secondary schools are probably an
underestimated source of competencies and absorptive capacities in Central-East
Europe. Compared to Western Europe, Central-East European countries are placed
much more favourably with respect to the number of graduates from secondary
schools. Thus the share of adult population with at least secondary education was
64.6 per cent for the Western part of the EU, while the corresponding figure for
Estonia was 87.5 per cent, for Latvia 82.6 per cent, for Lithuania 84.8 per cent, tor
Poland 80.8 per cent, for Slovakia 85.8 per cent, for the Czech Republic 87.8 per
cent and for Hungary 71.4 per cent (see Ny Teknik, 28 April 2004).
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In addition, Central-East Europe inherited from the past a European tradition of
seeing science and technology as integral parts of society at large and the
introduction of a capitalist system with decentralised decision-making implied that
innovation was not anymore something that was enforced from outside. Even
though privatisation was going slow in some countries due to political pressures
and difficulties in dealing with big enterprises and military complexes, enterprises
were free to choose their suppliers and partners and a powerful change in inter-
organisational linkages occurred in connection to privatisation, especially when
the buyers were foreign investors. This view is supported by the observation that
privatised firms are in general more strongly networked internationally than the
remaining state-owned firms (Radosevic, 1999).
Great hopes have been raised in Central-East Europe in the 1990s concerning
the potential roles that firms and other actors from more advanced countries can
play in the rebuilding of the economy. In theory, foreign direct investment has
thereby been seen as a powerful vehicle also for rebuilding innovative capabilities
under post-socialism. Foreign investors are expected to bring with them modern
technologies that increase productivity and inspire further innovation. The impact
could be substantial if the use of new technologies simplifies a broad collection of
complementary innovations within firms and the benefits of computers becomes
apparent when we combine new technologies with organisational aspects. In
reality, empirical research indicates that foreign investment is as a rule not
associated with any rebuilding of technological and innovative capabilities in
Central-East Europe. The only exceptions are the new R&D centres have been
established directly by multinational firms and this has had a strong impact on
small domestic firms. Several analysts suspect that small and medium-sized firms
in Central Europe have a much too low level of technological competency and are
too static technologically for contributing in any significant way to building
innovative strength in the region (Gabor, 1997; Radosevic and Walter, 2002).
Other research has shown that small firms in reality often play key roles in
many innovative projects, especially companies with foreign ownership (both in
joint ventures and even more in fully owned subsidiaries) significant
improvements in productivity, products quality, modernisation ot equipment and
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technology has occurred (Radosevic, Majcen and Rojec, 2003). This was
connected with changes in management style and reshaping organisation culture.
Foreign subsidiaries are in average better prepared to compete at the EU market
than purely local firms. When foreign investors buy a local firm, they usually start
with changing the organisation structure and training of top and medium-level
managers. New training and organisational changes are a precondition to effective
employment of new technology and subsequent productivity growth. As the
privatisation process is almost completed in all analysed countries, the importance
of greenfield investments will probably increase in the future. In such cases, there
will be no need of organisational restructuring or adjusting existing plants to
foreign investors requirements and standards. However, even in the case of
greenfield investment, training of employees will be important and new foreign
investors will probably try to adjust work organisation, work ethics and the whole
culture in new firms to the parent company's standards. An advantage of new
foreign entrants is that they can find labour force either directly trained by
established foreign investors or indirectly prepared to meet high demands of
foreign investors. Business environment is more favourable now and this can be
true regarding possibilities to use local suppliers network. Local companies today
are more aware of high demands on quality at the EU market, more reliable and
more flexible.
Of course, not all companies become global in the same way and different
companies start their globalising process in different ways. In order for technology
to become successful internationally, the current mindset has to be changed and
configuration of resources and management practices. There is no doubt that
interaction with foreign actors and foreign systems of innovation has the potential
to contribute to innovation. However, it is also clear that this potential is not at all
utilised to the extent that it could be. Most promising in cross-border relationships
are clearly the relations with culturally and/or geographically close countries.
Notably, Central and East European countries can in this sense be argued to have
an advantage over other catch-up countries in more remote parts ot the world, to
the extent that most of the Central and East European countries have a multitude of
historical, linguistic, demographic and cultural linkages to Western European
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countries. While India has the best reputation as an outsourcing destination among
top US companies (Adekola and Sergi, 2007c) a potential challenger is the
Philippines, which has a large pool of English speakers thanks to its American
occupation in the 20th century. However, despite the language handicap, Central-
East European countries such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Russia and
Slovakia also have potential, particularly for outsourcing from Western European
countries like Germany and France.
To conclude, with the growing complexity of the economic world, particularly
with the economies of India and China growing so dramatically, it is important
that one recognises the key factors which determine economic growth. These
factors help to explain why some countries are much more successful than others
in raising income levels and opportunities for their citizens. Therefore, the
dynamics of innovation must not be thought of primarily as a transfer of Western
technologies. Instead, one has to point at the opportunity for Central-East Europe
to use inspirations from and interactions with culturally and geographically close
neighbours in the West to boost domestic innovation in accordance with local
markets and inherited scientific and organisational capabilities. This, however,
might lead to different scenarios where new systems of innovation may continue
building on the availability of low-cost environments. Central-East Europe would
thus continue to be a conveniently business location of relatively simple
manufacturing services for large Western multinationals.
When wages rise, this style risks being eroded through relocation ot production
to other low-cost countries, and this is likely to result in increasing unemployment
and dramatic declines in exports. The only thing which could rescue this
development path on the long term would be to imitate the East Asian experience
of climbing the ladder towards increasing involvement in innovation.
In this era of globalisation, rapid technological changes and significant shift in
wealth creation, Central-East Europe might become an important region for new
developments, which would often surpass Western countries through the still much
more loosely defined institutional landscapes in the Central-East countries. Global
competition would then also encourage the formation ot East-West joint
corporations and conglomerates which would gradually learn to use the continuous
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flows ot knowledge across countries and differing systems of innovation in order
to boost the whole process ot innovative development (Sergi, 2006a; Adekola and
Sergi, 2007c). Western support helps Central-East countries revive their advanced
and unemployment is reduced in connection to the appearance of new
technological advances.
2.8 The Case of Slovak Labour Markets: An Econometric Analysis
Labour market frictions and severe unemployment dynamics have always
exerted a strong impact on economies around the world. A general concern rests
on labour market distortions that might result in a high unemployment and the
resulting social costs. On one side, unemployment negatively affects the economy
and the population's well-being. On the other, most governments embark upon
countering unemployment, but these policies should draw on judicious principles
before becoming valuable pillars in policy agendas. Given that the causes of these
circumstances merit appropriate assessment, scholars have been involved quite
extensively in this field of research (see e.g. Abbring et al., 2002).
Enquiring into the Slovak case it is important to take to account three aspects.
First, this economy has been the most industrialised among those designed by
communist nations in east central Europe during preceding decades. This
definitive passage may disclose exclusive effects and broaden our learning
concerning Slovak transformation, once we are able to put a comprehensive
understanding in appropriate context. Second, we would like to expand the
economic literature with regard to what we define as post-structural economic
policy carried out in a small open economy. Third, Slovakia has experienced a
cumulated real GDP fall of approximately 25 per cent and approximately 35 per
cent of real industrial output drop before starting recovery in 1993 (Sergi et al.,
2005).
The relevance of studying Slovakia to the overall understanding ot economic
transformation is that this country has been one ot the most dynamic economies in
Central-East Europe since the late 1990s, but showing scant effects on labour
markets during the early 2000s. The very opening ot the transformation path
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during the 1990s gave rise to destructive impact on Slovakia's real economy and
labour market. There were detected major failure in preserving real GDP and full
paternalistic employment, from early transformation in 1989 through 1993.
Beyond 1993, however, unemployment kept escalating and real output turned to
growth as well. While one may expect unemployment rates to decline in the light
ot significant economy recovery, as in the widely used terminology applied to
transition countries, labour and real economy variables disclosed conflicting
developments. Transformation recession occurrences found thorough
rationalisation in a transformation-type recession and the new industry structure.
Most of the rationale for this outcome, traces back to industrialisation beliefs
that have dominated post World War II central planning, aimed at prioritising
heavy industry and high military production; this was highly concentrated in the
former Czechoslovakia. The paternalistic system favoured industry over tertiary
sectors and industry in the GDP ratio reached roughly 59 per cent at the end of the
1980s. Indeed, it was the highest (together with Bulgaria) among the former Soviet
bloc member countries, recording for the economy 23 per cent of over-
industrialisation in 1990 - calculated as the difference between actual and
predicted industrialisation, as a percentage of GDP by de Mclo et al. (2001).
Hence, in the new Central-East European context, authorities had to move away
from previous over-employment and over-industrialisation towards market type
approaches capable of stimulating productivity and efficiency (Estrin, 2002; Sergi,
2003a; Stockhammer, 2004). In fact, the primary factor explaining the evolution of
outflows for the labour force was the prerequisite to start and conclude output
restructuring, not economic growth; otherwise the worsening of unemployment
would have stopped. However, the need for industry to undergo profound reforms
was prevalent everywhere. The population and policymakers were conscious ot
this inevitability, even though they had to suffer some cost.
The transformation recession ended by 1993, when the economy recorded the
last year of a drop in economic output (i.e. -3.7 per cent). The outcome has been a
constant shrinking of industrial employment, along with moderate growth ot
industrial output since 1994. As a result of reforms undertaken during the second
part of the 1990s, the shifting away from previous priorities brought about a
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further boost: the percentage share of industry in GDP shrank to 26 per cent in
2001, down from 30 per cent in 1994.
A possible foundation of the new economic rationale has been the impact with
foreign investment inflows. The phenomenon of recovery on the side of real GDP
occurred while the economy recorded major reform (more efficiency) and
profound restructuring (less industry and more services for GDP). Efficiency and
productivity came through the privatisation of old state-owned enterprise and
emergence of new private firms, with a private sector, for example, accounting for
approximately 90 per cent of GDP nowadays, up from almost nothing during the
communist era. In general, it is possible to state that foreign investors have boosted
productivity (e.g. Barrell and Holland, 2000; Seheve and Slaughter, 2003) and
hasted domestic tendencies closer to business attitudes, thinking and practice.
Policies aimed at searching for expanded efficiency and structural convergence
along western productivity standards, have caused the structure of GDP to alter,
while output and employment in industry diverge during the 1990s. The abating of
total employment in industry also made reality the flow of workers from one
productive sector to the next. Nowadays, the Slovak economy has overcome most
of its initial problems and created a pattern of economic growth, though it is still
desirable to end the last stage of transformation policies. However, what have been
the primary effects of transition restructuring and GDP development on the labour
market?
Excellent economic growth and overall promising Slovak outlook is being at
odds with troublesome unemployment rates, the plague of long-term
unemployment and regional disparities. Total employment slightly increased
between 1994 and 1996, but the gap between real GDP and unemployment rates
stretched. Beyond this, total employment has declined during the period 1997-
2000, losing 0.9 per cent, 0.3 per cent, 3 per cent and 1.4 per cent, respectively.
Part of the labour force originally being prepared to work in heavy industry
factories became one of the main groups of unemployed, generating part ot today's
long-term unemployment. High unemployment rates appear in Slovak labour
market during whole 1990s and rose at the beginning of this decade. While at the
end of the year 1994 unemployment rate reached 13.7 per cent and was stable until
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1999, since the year 2000 it has been increasing and at the end of the years 2003
and 2004 it reached 17.5 per cent and 18.1 per cent respectively. According to the
OECD's data on the standardised unemployment rates, unemployment rate in
Slovakia ot 17.3 per cent in 2003 was the second highest among OECD countries.
Data on unemployment by duration shows that long-term unemployment
prevails in the Slovak labour market. The unemployment exceeding 12 has been
prevailing. Concerning unemployment by age, unemployed are mostly
economically active persons at the age of 25-49 followed by group of young
persons up to the age of 24. According to the Labour Force Survey (2004) the
most frequent cause ot unemployment of persons who were ever employed in the
first quarter of 2004 was 'release due redundancy'. At the same time, proportion of
persons who lost their job due redundancy was 24.8 per cent with inter-year
increase by 3.1 per cent. One fifth of all unemployed worked in their last job as
auxiliary and unskilled workers (19.7 per cent), craftsmen and qualified producers,
processors and repairers (14.8 per cent), operational workers in services and retail
(10.9 per cent), and operators of machines and technologies (9.4 per cent). In
addition, the country has been suffering regional disparities in unemployment.
There are disparities among regions as concerns level of unemployment rate as
well as disparities concerning dynamics of unemployment rate. While Bratislava
region shows unemployment rate at 4.0 per cent in the first quarter of 2005 with 4-
months dynamics at -40 per cent, the region of Kosice in East Slovakia shows
much higher unemployment rate of 21 per cent with 4-month dynamics ot -20 per
cent.
It is common in economic literature to investigate economic cycles and labour
markets to understand the exact nature of unemployment (e.g. Blanchard and
Wolfers, 2000). This has a large impact on policy-related issues and labour
policies to implement. Whilst cyclical component ot unemployment is linked with
economic cycles and short-run movement ot output, long-term economic and
institutional changes account for structural unemployment (Schnabel, 2002).
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2.8.1 Testing for Cyclical Responsiveness of Unemployment
To shed light on the labour market, and how to end transformation while
benefiting working groups, we scrutinise the Okun Law econometrically. A
milestone in the development of labour markets is the empirical regularity found
by Okun (1970) - the chairman of the US Council of Economic Advisors under
President Lyndon Johnson - who scrutinised the American economy through the
fifties and sixties. Following Okun's notion acknowledged as Okun Law,
empirical regularities found that whenever real GDP grows 2 per cent above its
potential (i.e. the output gap), the unemployment rate decreases by 1 per cent.
Note, however, Okun originally estimated a relationship to be -3 (or 3 to 1) on the
unemployment gap's coefficient for the US economy. This would signify that a 1
point change in the unemployment rate has an impact two times larger (three times
in his early work) on real output. Put differently, one percentage point of the
unemployment rate below the natural rate, leads to 2 per cent in the output gap. In
addition, it is worth noting that impact larger than one is due to changes in
unemployment being associated with changes in labour force participation, labour
hours and capital utilisation (explained by unemployed searching tor jobs
discourages them from continuing searching as new workers are being fired; plant
and equipment tends to be used less intensively; and hidden unemployment causes
workers to tend to work less intensively).
In practice, most specifications assume a symmetrical relationship between
changes in unemployment and real output, which, however, may be an incorrect
assumption along with a relationship that may fluctuate over time or among
different institutional contexts. This mismatch between current and potential
output might bring about the design of effective non-inflationary expansionary
counter unemployment policies, as long as GDP is below its potential (Sergi,
1998b)4.
4 Critics of a permanent trade-off between unemployment and inflation rates suggest governments
cannot rely on this trade-off and therefore they do not have to engineer any expansionary policy
(e.g. Friedman, 1968; Phelps, 1967).
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Although the Friedman and Phelps tenets are now widely shared among
experts, the fashion ot countering political economy permeated some economic
schools, and experts began to think in terms of responsiveness of labour markets to
domestic production. To this end, we test the cyclical responsiveness of
employment and unemployment to GDP cycle. Cyclical volatility of
unemployment leans on economic cycles (i.e. the short-run fluctuation around the
trend), and the structural component of unemployment on the long-term
transformation of the economy, which is anchored to institutional design. A broad
approach that keeps apart the two components helps secure a better insight into
Slovak transition, offering better judgment concerning more effective economic
policy (Sergi and Kubicova, 2005e).
We calculate the cyclical responsiveness of Slovakia's labour market to the
evolution of real GDP growth. Okun's approach may be searched for unravelling
cyclical and structural aspects of unemployment. Recalling the OkuiTs notion it is
possible to write:
U , - U ; = - y ( Y , - Y l ' ) ( 1 )
where U is the actual rate of unemployment, U' is the unobserved rate of
structural unemployment, Yt is actual real GDP, Yt - Y* is the measure of output
gap (OG), the gap between actual and potential GDP, and y is Okun coefficient.
By rearranging of the equation (1) we obtain:
U, =U] - y x OG, (2)
And taking first difference of the equation (2), we obtain:
U , - U , , = U *- U ] , - r ( O G , - OG , _,) (3)
where OG is the output gap. The change in unemployment rate features a
structural change in unemployment and cyclical change in the output gap.
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An estimate tor Okun s y can be derived in a mechanical sense: cyclical
fluctuations in output may lead to changes in employment. Accordingly, changes
in employment may generate different reaction of labour force and consequently of
unemployment. Using this logic, it is possible to estimate two coefficients: the first
for the cyclical responsiveness of employment to GDP, the second coefficient for
responsiveness of labour force to GDP. Thus, Okun's y coefficient is calculated as
(1) * [l-(2)], where (1) and (2) are the two coefficients from the two regressions.
Okun's y coefficient may be interpreted as implying the transmission of the
cyclical output fluctuations into cyclical variations in the unemployment rate
(Sergi and Kubicova, 2005e).
At first, by applying OLS method we estimate regression of the deviation of
employment from its trend on the deviation of real GDP from its trend. Similarly,
by using OLS method we estimate responsiveness of the labour force to
employment. It is estimated by regressing the trend deviation of the labour force
on the trend deviation of employment. To detrend time series of labour force,
employed and GDP we adopted the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter. The
Hodrick-Prescott filter was presented as a working paper in 1981 and published
only in 1997. It extracts a trend from a time series. The filter minimises the
weighted sum of two components, the squared deviations of the filtered series
from the unfiltered series and the curvature of the filtered series. The procedure
involves finding the cyclical component of the variable, and this is calculated as
the current value of the variable less a trend of the variable, where the latter is a
weighted average of past, current and future observations. This method yields a
series that is reasonably close to the unfiltered data (first component), reasonably
smooth (second component), while residuals form the cyclical component. For
more details concerning the properties of macroeconomic time series and linear
filtering, see Stock and Watson (1999). Data are collected on quarterly basis.
This approach relaxes the widely spread though that GDP growth is sufficient
to decrease unemployment, and it could prove adequate to evaluate the
responsiveness of employment to GDP and to make effective suggestions.
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Tabic 2.1 - Definition of the Variables in Final Regression
Variable Description Source
GDPREAL Gross domestic product, constant 1995 prices,
millions Slovak koruna.
Statistical Office of
the Slovak Republic.
GDPREALDEV Deviation of gross domestic product from its trend.
GDP trend was calculated by using Hodrick-Prescott
filtering with the smoothing parameter of 1600.
Own calculations.
LABFORCE Labour forces, thousands persons. Labour forces
represent part of population total and accounts for
economically active persons. It is sum of total
employed and total unemployed persons.
Statistical Office of
the Slovak Republic.
LABDEV Deviation of labour forces from its trend. Labour
force trend was calculated by using Hodrick-Prescott
filtering with the smoothing parameter of 1600.
Own calculation.
EMPL Employed, thousands persons. Employed persons
represent subgroup of economically active persons.
Statistical Office of
the Slovak Republic.
EMPDEV Deviation of employed from its trend. Trend was
calculated by using Hodrick-Prescott filtering with the
smoothing parameter of 1600.
Own calculation.
UNEMPL Unemployed, thousands persons. Statistical Office of
the Slovak Republic.
The regression coefficient of employment deviation from its trend on deviation
of GDP from its trend has positive sign, and attests positive relationship of
employment to GDP. The coefficient is low (0.011573), suggesting that the
responsiveness of employment deviation from its trend to the deviation ot GDP
from its trend is weak. In contrast, results suggest negative correlation of cyclical
development of labour forces on cyclical development ot employed. Simply,
findings suggest that a negative output gap of 1 per cent has drawn up
unemployment by 0.00027 percentage points. This denotes that cyclical
unemployment was not very pronounced in Slovakia. The nature ot high
unemployment was rather structural than cyclical, resulting from structural
changes. These facts may have some cogent policy-related implications
concerning the adoption of new policies aimed to counteract a growth without new
jobs or jobless growth.
Findings are important because the country has experienced a strong recovery
on the side of productivity, and entrepreneurs do not seem to behave as in Holt and
David's (1966) view, where firms would create vacancies in anticipation of future
needs. The recent increase in GDP did not pay off in terms of less unemployment
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- even though the share of employed on the economically active population moved
from 80.92 per cent in 2002 to 82.16 per cent in 2003.
2.2 - Cyclical Responsiveness of the Slovak Labour Market - Calculation of
Okun's y
(Da
EMPDEV on
GDPREALDEV
(2) b
L.ABDEV on EMPDEV
(3) c
Okun's y
coefficient 0.011573 -0.011753 0,00026995180
standard error 0,001883 0,069897
t-statistic 6,144656 -0,168154
R-squared 0,467537 0,000657
Durbin-Watson stat 0,950038 1,136359
Notes: a Deviation of employment from its trend on the deviation of GDP from its trend. Trend
deviation in the labour force on the trend deviation on employment. c y is calculated using the
formula (1) * [1-(2)].
Slovak government counteracted unemployment by adopting active labour
policies (Slovak National Action Plan for Employment, 2002). After the general
elections held in 2002, in April of that year its has been adopted the 'National
Action Employment Plan', which took the country closer to the European strategy
of employment, the so-called 'Principles of Employment Policy', adopted at the
Luxembourg Summit in November 1997. This European way to boost employment
builds around four pillars: improvement of employability, expansion ot
entertainment, support adjustment of companies and their employees, and
strengthening equal opportunity policies.
Nevertheless, even before 1997, the issue was of concern to the EU's
leadership: during a Madrid Summit in 1995, it was recognised that the need tor
fighting long-term unemployment through improved jobless skills and reducing
the non-wage costs of employment, makes it more attractive to hire new workers.
2.9 Conclusion
To conclude, economic transformation in Central-East Europe was intended to
keep pace with extremely competitive environment in the EU. On one side,
macroeconomic stability has been introduced over time. On the other side, these
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economies must improve the educational system to favour increasing demands for
high skilled workers and invest on technological advancement beyond a critical
degree ot penetration. Tailoring policies to specific regional and long-term
unemployed in order to avoid deepening regional discrepancies and social
instability is another objective. Pragmatic fiscal policies of the type described by
(Sergi, 1996, 1997b) and different financial incentives that may affect
unemployment duration and smoother bureaucratic practices could be pillars.
Attracting more investment and promoting exports to push domestic savings up as
in Maizels' hypothesis (Maizels advanced this hypothesis in 1968 as for the
developing countries and the hypothesis relates a boost to savings from export).
Sergi (2003c and 2004d), has been the first to test the relationship between saving
and export in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. He found support for the Maizels
hypothesis and this condition will prove an additional step for the benefit of the
economy in Central-East Europe.
As for the specific Slovak case, the Slovak government must not simply leave
this issue to market forces. If the 'National Action Employment Plan1 has been a
good starting point, more must be accomplished than simply what envisaged in
official plans. Market principles are important in the long-term restructuring
strategy, and further public initiatives to bypass current obstacles and long-term
unemployed must mould new policy strategies as well.
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Chapter 3
Commercial Banks towards European Standards
3.1 Introduction
Since the beginning of transition, the banking market has been undergoing
constant consolidation. The approach taken towards developing a viable banking
sector has varied amongst countries and was dependent on several internal
macroeconomic and microeconomic factors. The research interest here are the
most advanced transition economies during the 1990s and early 2000s - i.e. the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland - that like other transition countries, faced
the problem of non-performing loans (NPLs) from the portfolio of the state-owned
commercial banks (SOBs). These loans worsened banks' liquidity and solvency
once hard budget constraints were imposed. Moreover, during the late 1990s and
this decade, the structural transformation has accelerated through mergers,
takeovers and other restructuring measures.
Nevertheless, specific banking crises resolutions were therefore essential
measures (Sevic, 2002; Matousek and Sergi, 2005). Authorities had to calculate
the true value of inherited non-performing loans and in fact, most state-owned
banks were technically insolvent or chronically undercapitalised. The tundamental
changes of banking sector consolidation were performed in a legislative
environment tailored to the command economy and not into line with EU
legislation. There was not only an underdeveloped institutional framework, but
also a legislative framework as, for example, the bankruptcy law, corporate law,
laws protecting creditors as well as debtors, accounting standards and reliable
auditor firms.
During the last decade, there has been considerable literature on banking sector
crises and restructuring overall (Hoggarth et at., 2004) and particularly in
transitional countries (Hemes and Lensink, 2000; Matousek and Sergi, 2005).
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However, there is still a lack ot research explaining the differences in progress
among the transitional countries.
Here we attempt to provide evidence and a critical analysis of the best practice
ot handling banking crises in three transitional countries: the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland. In fact, a critical analysis is offered of the various methods in
resolving banking crises estimating what would have been the optimal way of
resolving crises in SOBs and small and medium sized commercial banks (SMBs)
in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
3.2 The Economic Environment and Banking Systems
Looking at the development of banking sectors across Central-East Europe, some
differences are observable. Hungary, for example, already initiated banking
reforms in the early 1980s. The other factor, which had an impact on the future
development of banking systems, was whether transition countries followed the
so-called rehabilitation or the new entry approach. The rehabilitation approach is
based on recapitalisation and consolidation of state banks, including their
incomplete privatisation and limited openness of the banking system for new
banks mostly domestic ones (Matousek, 2002). This was carried out, for example,
in Hungary, Poland and, to some extent, the Czech Republic. The second approach
applied mostly in the countries of former Soviet Union which had been based on a
kind of liberal entry of new banks including rapid privatisation.
The replacement of the earlier monopolistic banking system (one-tier banking
system) in favour of a two-tier one (central bank and commercial banks) was one
of the basic preconditions for making the banking sector functioning on
commercial principles and sound financial flows (Sergi, 1994). Given the low
starting capital strength of the banking sector as a whole, the resulting profitability
was also low. With banks building their infrastructure, this brought about a major
increase in their fixed assets while starting and consequently an increase in the
operational leverage. This imposed both increased demands on banking
supervision and a gradual build-up of control mechanisms, which would provide
prudential banking activities. The entry of the foreign capital and technical
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expertise were additional factors which considerably affected the development of
the banking sector through accelerating structural changes, production innovation
and a wider range ot products and services. In Central Europe (specifically
Hungary), in aggregate foreign entry may even have been associated with
expanded credits to small and medium-size enterprises when the domestic banks
had to search for a broader clientele for lending (Bonin and Abel, 2000) and
contributed to the overall soundness of local banking systems by screening and
treating problem loans more aggressively (Goldberg, 2007). At the time, this
process was not perceived as an instrument decreasing the average lending rates,
as the resulting profitability of the majority of debtors did not achieve the level
which would provide the leverage effect. The profitability was lower than the
interest rates on loans. It was decisive, however, that the new banks ensured the
reproduction of loan flows while insisting on the fulfilment of the credit exposure
parameters. Another significant factor influencing the economic position of the
banking sector was the radical process of restructuring which was aimed at the
recovery of the loan portfolio.
More strategies to make effective the functioning of the new central banks
(Sergi, 1997a) and the network of commercial banks followed. The mono-bank
system featured the lack of an institutional separation between monetary policy
and commercial banking. Therefore, a separation of central and commercial
banking was identical for most of the former communist countries undergoing
banking sector transformation. Specific efforts were made to reinforce the
independence of central banks (Sergi, 1994) and to continue a strategy to set up
commercial banks. As well to offer evidence for deeper macroeconomic stability,
better governance structures and additional institutional developments (e.g. Sevic,
2002).
Therefore, in the past has never existed a central bank as such, and it conveys
two implications during the early phase of transition: the inexistence ot a system ot
commercial banks and the missing banking culture. State banks acted as lenders ot
last resort and commercial banks. After the break up of the socialist economy, the
two-tier banking system was privileged^. This new approach stresses the autonomy
5 Note that the two-tier banking system has been set up in Yugoslavia by the nud 1960s.
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ot domestic central bankers as a way to keep inflationary pressures under check
(Sergi, 1998b), as well as to assure the minimum feasible strategy of overall
banking supervision. In addition, we shed light on the comparative models of
recapitalisation and restructuring the banking system by the means of centralised
(e.g. in Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania) and
decentralised (pro-market) approach models (Croatia, Poland and Slovenia).
Commercial banking operations in command economies were closely linked to
line ministries and their main objective was to fulfil the credit plan, which was in
integral part of the production central plan. The mono-bank and its asset and
liabilities were transferred to newly created commercial banks. This process went
along with further expansion and openness of banking systems. However, several
shortcomings can be identified in applied measures (e.g. Sevic, 2002).
When transition economies began to establish a two-tier banking system, it was
believed that the more banks operating within the financial market the better and
the banking system as a whole becomes more competitive and efficient. The rapid
growth of new commercial banks in the first stage of transition brought a certain
degree of competition into the financial market but afterward the financial position
of the new established banks was considerably impaired (Matousek, 2002;
Hoggarth et al., 2004).
Building an efficient banking system requires, among other, two policies to be
carried out simultaneously - i.e. liberalisation of the sector and the prudentially
regulated entry of new banks. One can observe that newly created banking systems
in transition countries faced several disturbances. In the Czech Republic, a
deterioration of the portfolios within the group of state-owned banks that inherited
loans from the Central Bank needed to be resolved in the early stage of transition.
SOBs were either technically or actually insolvent. The liberalisation ot entry for
small and medium sized banks (SMBs) that were significantly undercapitalised in
the first half of the 1990s created additional problems within the banking sector,
testifying further risks.
All three transition countries have been undergoing a complex process of
liberalisation similar, but more radical, to those in the EU countries in the 1970s
and 1980s. The authorities set the basic regulatory and supervisory framework,
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new operational guidelines and principles for banks' prudential behaviour.
However, regulatory and supervisory capacity was severely limited and banks
lacked, among other things, the basic credit skills.
Central-East countries had a unique opportunity to build a two-tier banking
system almost from scratch. There are several questions regarding the expansion
and openness ot the banking system in transition economies. The way of how
banking systems were set up had also implications on the extent of rescue
operations by governments and central banks (Sergi, 1994, 1997a). In the first
stage, commercial banks were created out of a mono-bank. This step seemed to be
identical for most of the former communist countries undergoing banking sector
transformation. However, there are significant differences as for a market
segmentation of state owned banks. In Poland, nine state-owned regional banks
were established instead of one or two large banks (Balcerowicz and Bratkowski,
2001). The advantage of such a policy is to avoid creating 'capture banks' that
served mainly the business activities of their shareholders in the absence of
adequate banking regulation. Decentralisation led to covering all major regions in
the country and the allocation of credit was better monitored. However, the
experience shows that a regional break-up limits the competitiveness within a
given market since one bank plays a dominant position in that market.
In contrast, in the Czech Republic, five state-owned commercial banks were
created at the beginning of 1990. All five banks were highly concentrated,
centralised and specialised banks. Since these banks had only a few branches
across the Czech Republic except Ceska spofitelna (Savings Bank), there was a
lack of financial services in the regions outside of Prague. A similar strategy was
adopted in Hungary where four banks had an oligopolistic position within the
Hungarian market (Abel, 2002). These banks were created from the commercial
banking departments of the mono-bank.
3.3 Banking Crises Resolution Strategies
The pace of macroeconomic stability and further banking reforms determined the
degree of the future development (stagnation) within the banking sector. The two-
50
tier banking system was not established at the same time in all three countries and
by no means had the countries identical starting conditions. The state-owned
commercial banks, which inherited loans from the monopolistic banking system,
were either technically or actually insolvent. The liberalisation of entry for small
and medium sized commercial banks later further deteriorated the stability of
banking sectors.
It the governments and central banks wanted to have a competitive, efficient
and credible environment in the banking sector, then to clean up the portfolio of
undercapitalised state-owned commercial banks was an essential condition. Since
the origin of the banking crises was, at the beginning of the transition, an
inheritance from the planned economies government and central bank support was
not surprising. Banks were fully or partially owned by governments and options of
banking crisis resolutions through private involvement were limited. The fast and
significant restructuring of both SOBs and SOEs was crucial. Authorities did not
have to search for new specific methods of dealing with NPLs and distressed
banks. However, they had to decide which strategy should be appropriate for the
banking system in question. With the benefit of hindsight, this was indisputably an
uneasy task for most transition economies.
It was opted for either a centralised or decentralised government liquidity
support (Matousek, 1995). In the first stage of the transition, the Czech Republic
and Hungary applied a centralised government support within a framework of the
banking sector consolidation programme. Non-performing loans were transferred
to a centralised asset management company (AMC) or so-called 'hospital bank'
that was set up to deal with NPLs transferred from the portfolio of the financially
distressed SOBs. Simultaneously the banks that participated in the consolidation
programme had discretion to write-off remaining non-performing loans when the
likelihood of recovery was low or its burden could cause the bankruptcy ot viable
firms.
The centralised loan consolidation programmes applied in the Czech Republic
and Hungary improved to some extent commercial banks' portfolios. Nevertheless,
these banks remained undercapitalised and additional measures had to be taken
later on. This method created a problem of double moral hazard and required
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higher financial injection into banks with troubles. In Hungary, it was only
recognised later, unlike in the Czech Republic, that the high concentration of
assets in one institution would impose a severe constraint on an efficient recovery
ot NPLs. Klingebiel (2000) and Hoggarth et al. (2004) argue that the centralised
approach has the advantage ot economies of scale but there was not such evidence
in the Czech and Hungarian cases. On the contrary, an accumulation of a large
amount ot the heterogeneous NPLs in one institution, as in the Czech case,
rendered the asset management a technically impossible task.
In the case ot the decentralised approach, as applied in Poland and later adopted
in Hungary, the government did not carve out NPLs from the banks' portfolio but
left them with banks. Banks had to take own responsibility for restructuring
portfolio. Two alternatives were applied. Banks could either sell NPLs to an AMC
at a discount or recuperate them by establishing subsidiaries that had the form of
the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). Although the restructuring process was time
consuming and the outcome uncertain, this regime left banks with the possibility to
restore their business activities without the imposition of any conditionality. Polish
commercial banks set up special departments within banks in question that were
directly accountable for the resolution of NPLs. This method was apparently more
efficient since regional banks had a good knowledge of local markets and could
target assistance on a selected basis to companies with a restructuring potential.
The Hungarian government recognised the bottlenecks of the centralised
method in 1992. The new bankruptcy law, which resulted in companies being
declared bankrupt, reinforced the urgency of applying the decentralised approach.
The new consolidation programme was introduced in December 1993. It was
phased in three steps and aimed at increasing capital adequacy ratios to reach the
regulatory required level - i.e. 8 per cent. The main limitations of these
programmes were the lack of transparency and the application of discretionary
policies, which left incumbent managers with no incentive to recover NPLs.
The tlaws of the centralised method, applied in the Czech Republic, laid above
all, in the unresolved issue of insufficiently restructured SOEs. By creating
Konsolidacni banka, the authorities disposed NPLs from banks1 balance sheets that
enabled commercial banks in continuing to provide financial services. However,
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banks in many cases faced a recurring problem of new NPLs. In fact, that needed
repeated rescue operations by the authorities in the second half of the 1990s caused
by extensive credit expansion of SOBs to SOEs. These operations postponed a
further restructuring process of SOEs.
The Czech and Hungarian case clearly confirmed that the centralised method is
not an optimal solution in the case ot transitional economies. It materialised soon
that the government did not prevent newly created NPLs that occurred in the
second halt ot the 1990s. The government overemphasised a resolution of NPLs
originated under a command economy and problems of newly created NPLs were
overshadowed.
The lack of transparency and a clear message about no future interventions by
the government, coupled with the too-big-to fail issue for large banks, gave rise to
banks' expectation of a future government bail out. Indeed, the presence of a moral
hazard problem became evident in the early stage of banks' consolidation. This
had the direct consequences on the business behaviour of the incumbent
management. Particularly dangerous was the double moral hazard problem when
SOBs and SOEs formed, unfortunately, correct expectations about future
governments' bailouts. An example of this effect occurred in the Czech Republic.
The Czech government cleaned up the state-owned or partial state commercial
banks' portfolios during 1991-1993. However, the ratio of new NPLs had
increased in SOBs immediately after this consolidation process ended. An
essential explanation of this situation was unimproved corporate governance and
cross-ownership among SOBs, SOEs and private firms (Balcerowicz and
Bratkowski, 2001; Matousek, 2002; Matousek and Sergi, 2005).
A cross-ownership structure between SOBs and SOEs or even private
companies had generated a vicious circle of credit tlows particularly in the Czech
case. In order to avoid writing off these loans, SOBs started providing new loans
for paying off old claims, which led, in essence, to the classical case ot Ponzi
finance, that is, a scheme that offers high short-term returns in order to entice new
investors but that is doomed to collapse because there are in fact no underlying
earnings (see Zuckoff, 2005). The presence of soft budget constraints and the
unbusinesslike behaviour of SOBs were strengthened by the implicit state
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guarantee in the form of financial support for covering any financial difficulties
that the banks might have. State owned banks expectations about future
governments capital injections relied on two doctrines. The bank is too big to fail
or too important to fail, including other factors that provided, if not assurance, and
then at least hope for financial support. In the second half of the 1990s, the
idiosyncratic behaviour of partially state-owned banks started to be labelled as
financial socialism.
The Polish authorities focused attention not only on NPLs from the central
planned economy but also took into consideration preventing repeating problems.
The Act on the Financial Restructuring of Enterprises and Banks set the legal
framework in which SOBs and SOEs could operate. The Polish method so-called
Bank Reconciliation Procedure was considered the most promising approach to
loan restructuring, and moral hazard issue was present also there (Chudzik, 1999;
Balcerowicz and Bratkowski, 2001). The Polish programme allowed banks to
reschedule their loans according to individual conditionally partial debt write-off
or even debt-equity swap for borrowers. Banks then had to outline and implement
a rescue programme for firms that have thought to have adaptive potential to the
market environment. However, political considerations played an important role in
deciding the extent to which banks wrote off companies' debt.
3.4 Bank Privatisation and the New Market Model in Central Europe
Privatisation of SOBs was an alternative solution to government bail out. This
method, however, incorporates some difficulties and may fail to achieve the
objective of stabilisation. The co-existence of cross-ownership between SOBs and
SOEs induces conflict of interest. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
applied three different privatisation techniques. Poland applied the initial public
offering (IPO) and the privatisation programme for the nine commercial banks was
based on selling 40-50 per cent of total shares of the state-owned banks to
domestic investors through IPOs on the Warsaw Stock Exchange; 10-20 per cent
of total shares to bank employees and 10-20 per cent of total shares to foreign
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investors, reserving 30 per cent tor the state. Bank privatisation in Poland was
intensified from 1998 after rules were relaxed on ownership.
Hungary adopted two ditterent methods ot bank privatisation. The first method
was the sale ot shares by public ottering to a dispersed group of foreign and
domestic investors similar to the Polish way (Balcerowicz and Bratkowski, 2001).
The second method was the sale ot a large stake to strategic investors. Making
portfolios attractive by the loan and bank consolidation programmes, the
government intended to search for strategic financial investors for each bank with
the exception ot OTP, the National Saving Institution. In the case of Postabank,
the third largest bank in Hungary, a special combination of the two methods was
adopted: the public offering followed four years after the initial sale of minority
shares to foreign professional investors. Hungary can be taken as a textbook
example of bank privatisation in Central-East Europe. In all cases, foreign strategic
owners received the majority of the shares. By the end of the privatisation process
in 1997, the market share of state-owned banks had fallen to 20 per cent.
The Czech experience was principally based on voucher privatisation
(Matousek, 2002). The majority of large state-owned banks went through voucher
privatisation: the state kept 26-67 per cent of the shares of the largest banks and
the other shares were sold by vouchers. Since the large banks collected the major
stake of vouchers through the investment privatisation funds founded by them,
significant cross-ownership evolved between the banks and their clients and
amongst the banks. In 2000 the Czech government completed the privatisation of
four SOBs, following a clean up of these banks' portfolios through government
intervention or guarantees.
The fast and efficient privatisation of the state-owned commercial banks would
have gained momentum in transition economies since state control over the
banking sector exerted long-term effects by distortion the economy through non-
commercially based lending. Four main shortcomings ot the government
intervention can be identified: delaying restructuring, restricting competition,
allowing bad loans to accumulate and postponing bankruptcy particularly of the
largest companies. In order to avoid the political consequences ot widespread
bankruptcies and consequently unemployment, government has had an interest in
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saving tailing politically important firms. Therefore, strong political pressure has
been put over state-owned banks to subsidise loans to such firms. The bank-state
relationship is not explicit. Personal relationships and unexpressed understandings
between bankers and government agencies are factors that are difficult to evaluate.
The bank management and the government have been involved in a sort of
preliminary game: they interact in a game whose outcome is the set of rules under
which they subsequently play another game whose outcomes are economic
payoffs.
The relationship between banks and the government has been complicated by
persisting expectations about the government bail out if banks face financial
distress in the future. The probability of government bail out is in many cases
positively correlated with the banks' lending policy. If banks provide new credits
according to what it is perceived by government to be national interest rather than
based on a commercial decision, it leads to a situation where no large company
facing real difficulties, becomes bankrupt. Therefore, state ownership control or
past government interference in the banking sector increases the moral hazard
problem. The expectations of bank managers are critical for the bank lending
decision. A sound capital base that countries tried to create to solve the inherited
bad loans problem is a necessary but not sufficient condition to ensure that banks
have incentives to make good investments. If bank managers believe that poor
performance will trigger a government bailout in the future with little or no
consequences for themselves, then their incentive to take difficult decisions on
existing borrowers and to screen carefully potential borrowers are not durable.
Moreover, to the extent that these bailouts are expected, their existence is taken
into account when the bank plans are made. If banks cannot expect such
government assistance, then the incentive for good performance is much stronger.
In December 1998, the Czech government carved out the nonperforming loans
of CZK 10 billion (around USD 300 million) of Ceska Sporitelna. In August 1999,
the Czech government increased the capital of Komercni Banka, by CZK 9.5
billion from which the state ownership in the bank was increased from 49 to 74 per
cent. In the case of Hungary, the situation was similar. In January 1999, the
Hungarian government bailed out Postabank, injected Ft 152 billion (some USD
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706 million), and saved the bank from big losses. Although two Polish banks - the
Savings Bank PKO and Agricultural Bank BGZ - were bailed out in 1994, they
suffered heavily from the subsidised loans given to housing credit and strong
agricultural lobby respectively. The privatisation of these banks was accompanied
by a further government bail out.
3.5 Crises Resolution of Small and Medium Sized Commercial Banks
When the segment of small and medium sized commercial banks faced solvency
problems, different authorities applied rescue strategies. Newly established
banking systems exhibited, among other problems, low competitive pressures,
relatively high concentration, and an inadequate supply of financial services. SOBs
had a dominant position in the market and the increase in the demand for financial
services could not be satisfied.
In the early stages of transition, the main weakness in this segment of small and
medium banks was a generalised undercapitalisation of the banking sector. A
further issue was the lack of primary deposits. Newly established small and
medium banks had a few branches to collect primary deposits and they had to
compete with the large established savings banks, which traditionally collected
customer deposits. The shareholders structure of banks was non-transparent and
executive management was only a veil over the real structure of corporate
governance. Further, during the period of high inflation in the early 1990s (Sergi,
1998b), even banks that wanted to pursue true business activities faced a dilemma
of adverse selection and moral hazard. In an environment where thousands of new
businesses were created without any credit history, the banks faced a difficult
decision of how to ration credit, this of course also applied for SOBs. In addition,
creditor rights have been limited by non-effective debt workout; laws on collateral
and foreclosure were unenforceable without the consent of debtors, which
increased a moral hazard problem.
A sharp increase in new entrants small and medium-sized domestic banks was
the root cause of the banking crises in this segment of the banking system from
1994 onwards. The rapid growth of new commercial banks in the period 1989-
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1991 in Hungary, as well in the Czech Republic and Poland during 1991-1993,
brought a certain degree of competition into the banking market but later the
financial position of these banks was considerably impaired. An unrestricted entry
into the banking sector adopted because ot the perceived benefits of competition
has in fact been detrimental. All three countries stopped providing new banking
licenses after problems were identified.
One argument that has justified ceasing to provide banking licenses was largely
grounded in the fact that the banking system proved overbanked and that there
were elements ot instability at several banks. Therefore, when establishing a
banking environment, stricter selection criteria for granting banking licenses
should be used. In addition, first class foreign commercial banks should be
allowed to set up greenfield sites or merged with domestic banks if they have an
interest.
fhe number of SMBs in the Czech Republic expanded rapidly after 1991 and it
was evident later that the owners and management of most of these banks
primarily provided loans to their shareholders' and a likelihood of future
repayments was significantly low. The Hungarian experience was different since
some of financially distressed small and medium sized commercial banks were
state-owned and operated during the previous regime in the 1980s. In Poland, the
crisis occurred at the cooperative banking level, where one state-cooperative bank
and a network of 1,663 small, local cooperative banks, , 'mg financial services
lor communities in villages and small towns that lacked the local presence ot
commercial banks. The sector of the Polish SMBs also faced difficulties but to less
extent.
Central banks responded to the fragile segment of SMBs by imposing strict
licensing policy on new entrants including foreign banks. Foreign investors would
be allowed to access the market only via acquisitions of financially distressed
banks. Only in the Polish case the authorities were able to attract foreign investors
to take over some of these banks. Polish authorities may have successfully applied
moral persuasion in these cases, because there was no other economic rational for
these take-overs. Although Poland proved successful in avoiding a systemic crisis
in the segment of SMBs, real difficulties in the cooperative banks sector emerged.
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Hungary was partly successful in selling distressed small banks to foreign
investors. The small and medium size banks' problem was more pronounced in the
Czech Republic where takeovers by foreign banks did not materialise. Therefore,
the authorities had to find a fast and credible solution to prevent a systemic crisis
in this sector. The authorities opted for a merger of these small banks with other
domestic banks. However, this solution did not improve to be viable. Although the
share of all small sized banks in the Czech banking market was around 5 per cent
in terms of total assets in 1993, continuing bankruptcies within this sector
undermined gradually public confidence in the banking system as a whole. Rescue
operations though mergers and acquisition had to be assisted by government
financing in order to avoid a systemic crisis.
The CNB requested financially distressed banks to increase their capital in
order to cover NPLs. If they were not able to do so, the CNB put these banks under
forced (special) administration and looked for a strategic partner. During this
period, the authorities tried to find bridge banks that would maintain the banking
activities of the failed banks. Such a method was, for example, applied when
Barings failed in 1995 and its activities were transferred to another bank.
These standard instruments for banking crisis resolution, however, only
postponed the closure of many banks and substantially raised the fiscal cost of
transition. The CNB decided to run the so-called (Consolidation Programme II)
and later the government announced a further programme helping medium and
small sized commercial banks through a Stabilisation Programme.
It should be emphasised that the regulatory and supervision activities in these
three transition countries under analysis were limited not only because ot an
insufficient legislative framework, but also by the lack ot experience ot regulators
and supervisors. Therefore, the authorities had to opt for measures that alleviated
this obstacle. The implementation of subordinated debt or subordinated deposit
might be a powerful regulatory device. Another measure that might reduce the
likelihood of a crisis would be to increase the minimum capital requirement for
banks - i.e. a measure that has a relatively fast and positive impact on the banking
structure. However, a side effect of rising capital requirements is that a few of
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small banks, which do not have any difficulties, would also have to either increase
their capital or merge with a larger bank.
The last, but not necessarily worst, way of dealing with failed institutions is to
revoke the banking license of the bank in question. Such a step avoids a further
deterioration ot the situation. On the other hand, liquidations can have negative
consequences for the credibility of the banking sector as a whole. In addition, this
solution can be costly particularly it a deposit insurance scheme is not established.
3.6 Effects of Banking Crises Management
In transition countries, the resolution of banking crises had three basic objectives.
First, to reintroduce the intermediation function of commercial banks. Second, to
mitigate the risk of systemic crises. Third, to accelerate the institutional and
legislative changes supporting a market oriented economy. The method of
achieving these tasks in practice has varied across countries and time. A crucial
question is how to measure an optimal solution of banking crises. Dziobek and
Pazarabasioglu (1997) make a decision based on improvements in banks'
performance, overall economic performance and intermediation capacity. The
effect of banking crises resolution has a significant lag and it is problematical to
compare banks' performance when the systems face continuing disruptions.
If profitability ratios are used as a performance criterion then all three banking
systems have performed poorly. The sudden fall in profitability in Hungary in
1998 is probably due to the impact of new strategic investors consolidating banks
through provisions and reserves. The pre-tax return on assets (ROA) ratio is
surprisingly low in all three countries, given a relatively high inflation
environment. Higher inflation may also explain the better profit performance in
Poland than the Czech Republic notwithstanding the more competitive
environment in the latter case.
Intermediation capacity of the banking sector measured in terms of financial
deepening has also limitation. This indicator shows only the dependence of an
economy on credits but does not explain the impact ot banking crisis resolution on
the system. An extension ot these indicators is therefore desirable for transition
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countries. The cumulative total fiscal costs of banking crisis resolution to GDP
might explain not only the extension of the crisis resolution (relative to GDP), but
also the efficiency ot the rescue operations in individual countries. In the Czech
Republic the cumulative costs ot banking restructuring for the government and
central bank were 25.2 per cent of GDP in 1998 (Matousek and Sergi, 2005). This
is twice as high as in Hungary (12.9 per cent) and two and half times higher than
in Poland (8.7 per cent). It has been clearly shown that incomplete and partial
resolution in banking and corporate sectors required additional actions as in the
Czech Republic and Hungary in the early 1990s. In contrary, it may be argued that
this measure is biased since the scale of problems varies across countries
depending on the heritage of the past.
Another indicator such as the ratio of NPLs to total loans (assets) might help us
with indicating whether rescue operations were sufficient. The trajectory of NPLs
is a more specific indicator of banking sector performance. Only the Hungarian
banking system showed a continuous decline in NPLs. The increase of NPLs in
Poland, mainly in the late 1990s, could be explained by foreign investors either
overestimating true proportions of NPLs or by disclosing a true value of NPLs
after privatisation.
3.7 Conclusion
Reforming the banking system proved one of the first problems for the economies
in Central-East Europe. Although this issue was present in all transition countries,
we have focused on the experience of the three largest countries in Central Europe.
After having launched a powerful restructuring drive and also electronic banking is
starting to take off, the banking market in Central-East Europe shows a much
better shape than it had during the 1990s as well as a high level of convergence
with current EU market; still foreign banks and capital will continue to play a key
role when it comes to integrate these new commercial banks into the wider
European financial market.
We saw that the indicator of non-performing loans when combined with the
applied privatisation methods was the primary explanatory power in analysing an
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optimal banking crisis resolution. Hungary demonstrates the lowest proportion of
non-performing loans and it was the first country that finished the privatisation
process ot the banking sector. Based on the Hungarian current situation in the
banking sector, it may be concluded that the timing and the way of privatisation
proved to be an essential element of banking crisis resolution. In addition, we state
that the decentralised approach of banking crisis resolution combined with rapid
privatisation to strategic foreign banks can represent the best solution available to
domestic banking authorities.
After having reinvigorating financial and banking systems, domestic authorities
in Central-East Europe started focusing on boosting the efficiency of national
economies by resorting to 'friendly' tax policy, which became an additional tool of
domestic economic policy in order to attract foreign investors and improve
domestic business and labour competitiveness. This is the issue we analyse in the
next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Tax Policy and Saving in the Ongoing Process of
Integration
4.1 Introduction
For the past decades, decision-makers and economists have been discussing on
fiscal policy as a means of reviving economic growth and accomplishing social
fairness. This piece of economic thinking is regaining strong momentum today in
the EU countries and Central-East Europe as well, especially in the light of
increasingly competitive economic strategies of small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs), multinationals and governments. Two alternate options show
up at the expenses of either market efficiency (i.e. the more a government steps
into the economy the larger the inefficiencies would be) or a government's ability
to redistribute income and provide a broader array of services (i.e. low revenue
lessens a government's expenditure capability). A trade-off between a
government's involvement in the economy and a higher visibility for
businesspeople explains these difficulties, perhaps the absence of complete
information to decision-makers to observe an optimal balance.
The tendency towards higher tax rates and brackets enabled governments to
finance growing expenditures on the welfare sector and labour markets have been
widespread in the advanced countries during the previous century. Nevertheless,
major changes with these tendencies have been taken in the US when as part ot the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, the US cut the CIT from 46 per cent to 34 per cent, move
that happened nearly concurrently with rate reductions in the UK and Canada.
Such choices of the US President Ronald Reagan and the UK Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher to reduce tax bands and tax rates in the mid 1980s were in line
with the well-known Arthur Latter curve (he was a member ot Reagan's
Economic Policy Advisory Board) that there exists an optimum rate ot tax at
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which the government revenue is maximised (see Canto, Joines and Laffer, 1982).
Contenders, however, point the finger at the risk for the state not to be able to offer
adequate economic infrastructures tor attracting investors and competing
internationally. On balance, experts and decision-makers straddle between the
risks ot weakening government policies and the benefits that the system can draw
from efficiency and incentives (Oates, 1972).
One possible reason to resort to this tax strategy is to discourage tax evasion.
Second, it can persuade unemployed to find a job or for whom are already at work
to work harder. These two rationales would promote the marketplace's efficiency.
A third reason behind this round of innovative tax policies is these can intercept
international flows of investments and this is the novelty in market economies in
Central-East Europe, as well as in the Balkan region. Following recent waves of
interest on tax strategies (Sergi, 2005a, 2006b, 2007), we wish to explore this
crucial theme by calling attention to the importance of overall competitiveness
policies.
On one side, policymakers might think that lowering tax rates would be a
means to reinforce the efficiency of Central-East European economy and to
incentive national and international businesspersons as well. On the other side,
policymakers have incomplete information over optimal taxation policy and this
fact may inspire one country to initiate cutting tax rates while prompting other
countries to respond similarly (Sergi, 2006). In the first case, we should be able to
explain the causal relationship between tax policy and the economic system; in the
second case, a dynamic tax policy response would cause methodical tax rivalry
and the long-term effect of this is uncertain, however.
The widely held idea that governments should introduce businessperson
oriented tax reforms has been regaining strong momentum in the light ot mounting
tax competition in Central-East Europe to the benefit of international investors.
These economies are experiencing a tendency towards reducing tax rates on
personal income and profits - the direction of changes is homogenous among all
countries when it comes to taxes of profits - and this fact should be interpreted as
a central versus peripheral tax competition game (Sergi, 2006b, 2007).
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As there is no doubt that tax incentives might tuel locational decisions in the
short-term, it is not less important to evaluate the long-term effectiveness of tax
slashes as remedy for attracting foreign investors and the concept of tax rivalry.
Such a remedy builds around mounting beliets that a country may record large
foreign investment inflows by competing on taxes. Still we have no definitive
answer on how this kind of tax policy fits a country's long-term policy choice.
Historically, governments have long financed growing expenditures on the
welfare sector through the use of progressive income taxes. Major ruptures with
these tendencies have been taken in the LIS when as part of the Tax Reform Act of
1986, the US cut the C1T from 46 per cent to 34 per cent, a move that happened
nearly concurrently with rate reductions in the UK and Canada. After the
aforementioned Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher who became the paladins
of tax bands and tax rates smash in the 1980s then spurring a worldwide reduction,
several other countries followed. As reported by the UNCTAD (2001), nearly 95
per cent of the almost 1,200 changes in national foreign direct investment
legislation from 1991 through 2000 were favourable to foreign investors, taking
the form of special incentives such as lower income taxes, income tax holidays,
and import duty exemptions for foreign enterprises as well as subsidies for
infrastructures. Two special examples arc Saudi Arabia that reformed the tax
system in 2004 and Switzerland, where 1<Sof the 26 Swiss cantons lowered their
taxes in 2006 to attract wealthy residents gains momentum and there is a strategic
tax setting by cantonal governments.
No doubt, supply-side economists influenced new tax strategies on private
incentives and pre-empt inflation (Wanniski, 1978; Fink, 1984; Henderson, 1989;
Sergi, 1998b). This occurred in the US, where a large part of taxpayers moved
from high inflation into higher marginal tax brackets due to mounting inflationary
pressures in the late 1970s. Note that the Keynesian view suggests that tax changes
influence output and revenue primarily by changing the demand for goods and
services: higher tax rates might amplify revenue in theory but when tax rates are
above certain levels revenue may fall whereas lower taxes would spur production,
which in turn reflects in a positive revenue response. I he idea that a friendly tax
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system introduces fairness and an efficient use of resources is the other main tenet
of this tax approach.
Those who were opponents during the tax debate in the US in 1975-1986,
argued that expecting an increase in tax revenues on lower tax rates was unrealistic
apart from a large elasticity ot labour supply (i.e. an increase in hours worked due
to higher after-tax wages). Empirically, however, tax cuts in the US in the 1920s
(inspired by the Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon) and in the 1960s (the
Kennedy-Johnson tax cuts) supported the supply-side position: tax revenue
collected from low-income taxpayers decreased while revenues collected from
high-income taxpayers increased.
Apart from the occurrences in the US and supply-siders views, the key issue
here is why several decision-makers and experts favour innovative tax policies in
Europe. In theory, this approach can discourage tax evasion, persuade unemployed
to find a job or for those who are already at work to work harder, thus promoting
the marketplace's efficiency and acting as a break on corruption. All transition
European countries are sticking to all of these rationales although the novelty is to
turn a new tax strategy into an effective tool for luring international investment.
Particularly the countries that need to revive their economies are at the forefront of
the new fiscal strategy. Overall, new tax policies have been meeting with success.
Firms tend to establish operation centres abroad and move investments and profits
to low-producing cost countries, low-taxes havens; however, a country's long-term
tax strategy has to be built with awareness. All these aspects come together here in
Central-East European economies and serve to interpret the direction of economic
reforms and future strategies.
4.2 Tax Rivalry in the Literature
We strive to relate to two strands of the literature: one ot these focuses on the
impact of changes in taxes on foreign investments; the other strands concentrate on
the relationship between taxation and economic freedom. Firms discriminate
against location advantages and disadvantages and foreign investors resort to a
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country's tax advantages or move away from highly taxed location (for an
empirical literature survey, see de Mooij and Ederveen, 2006).
Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) found that both direct and indirect taxes exert
strong impact on location investment by multinationals, and that the tax rate
elasticity found is 7.7 concerning Europe and 2.3 for other countries for the direct
taxes. Under a different perspective, the tendency to fiscal policy induced
investment decision might escalate over time (e.g. Kubicova, 2004) due to high
capital mobility. Experts believe intergovernmental tax competition is
advantageous to enhance domestic efficiency; though it is not clear whether
distortions from fiscal competition do arise and eventually to what extent they do,
they exist in the case of asymmetric competition between small and large
countries.
This latter case known as the hypothesis central - peripheral regions which is
advanced by Baldwin and Krugman (2004), suggests that central regions tend to
agglomerate, thereby having the chance to levy higher taxes with no risk of losing
investment in the direction of peripheral regions, seeing that agglomeration might
compensate for the tax advantages peripheral countries offer to investors (Baldwin
and Krugman, 2004).
Egger and Winner (2004) find a link between economic freedom and taxation; a
large part of the literature has already suggested with positive arguments that
economic freedom fosters growth. Egger and Winner estimated the impact of
economic freedom on the national tax policy (corporate tax revenues to GNP) for
forty-six developed and less developed countries between 1980 and 1997: firms
would be willing to pay more in exchange for economic freedom. Economic
freedom would attract investors and this would enable governments to levy higher
business taxes. Egger and Winner's work reveals that changes in economic
freedom have equalised the international distribution of corporate tax revenues to
GNP. Huizinga and Nicodeme (2003) have shown that the countries that witness
foreign investment tend to have higher corporate taxes than other countries.
Moreover, increasing economic integration among countries may lead to
strategic statutory tax setting. This has been found by Devereux et al. (2002a) in
selected OECD countries in the 1980s and 1990s, and would have similar effects
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on corporate income tax ratios in GDP. Devereux et al. (2002a) have found
decreasing taxation rates. Statutory corporate tax rates and ettective tax rates (note
that the statutory tax rate does not mirror the effective tax rate) fell for the two last
decades. Grubert and Mutti (2000) observed that average effective tax rates shrank
by ten percentage points between 1984 and 1992 in a sample of 60 countries.
Devereux et al. (2002b) experiment with tax competition with each other to
attract investment and calculate a fiscal reaction function for twenty-one OECD
countries in 1983-1999. 1hey develop two models with firm mobility and capital
mobility; countries would compete only over the statutory tax rate or the effective
average tax rate in the first case, while countries compete only over the effective
marginal tax rate in the other case with capital mobility. Devereux et al. (2002b)
estimate the parameters of 'fiscal reaction functions' and prove that countries
compete over all the three measures, particularly over the statutory tax rate and the
effective average tax rate. In contrast to the aforementioned perspective, Grubert
(2001) maintained that tax rates shrank over time but tax rates did not converge;
this implies that tax competition has been absent.
Also, when governments compete against each other for FD1, profits from the
investments may shift from the host country to multinational enterprises (Oman,
2000) and according to Blomstrom and Kokko (2003), the types of long-term
benefits generated by FDI may not justify the short-term costs because perceived
benefits are easily observable while some costs (tax breaks and fiscal incentives)
are distributed over the long-term and hard to measure.
However, Sergi (2006a, 2007) offers another explanation of recent realities in
Europe. While the linkage between tax competition and foreign capital inflow in
Europe has been unambiguous for the majority of economists, yet its long-term
rationale was not when modelling this part of Europe as a central versus periphery
tax rivalry case, lax competition might benefit peripheral regions versus central
regions in the short term. However, peripheral regions' decision makers have
incomplete information on long-term optimal taxes, and this fact routed them to
engage in methodical tax rivalry among themselves and against central regions.
This reality would make short-term tax advantages in the peripheral Europe, and in
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our case Southeast, either disappear in the long-term or exert negligible weight on
investment decision at best, writes Sergi (2006a, 2007).
In this context, some suggest that the EU should harmonise corporate income
taxes. However, it is claimed that tax competition requiring corporate tax rate
harmonisation is not yet compelling or that peripheral regions have to compensate
tor missing agglomeration that is present in the central regions and harmonisation
would aggravate the central - peripheral relationship (Baldwin and Krugman,
2004). When facing the trade-otts between tax autonomy and fiscal neutrality in
coordinating taxes on consumption, labour, and capital, the EU member states' tax
reforms should precede tax harmonisation, because the costs of distortions within
member states may be greater than the gains from reducing intergovernmental tax
competition, states Cnossen (2003).
This literature generates main issues: the long-term sustainability of tax
competition and its degree of fairness in the wider European Union.
4.3 Dynamic Tax Policy Strategies
Central-East European countries have campaigned for lashing taxes since the
1990s, particularly implementing national level flat type tax rate. This was
understood to reduce red tape and discrimination among taxpayers, to
counterbalance tax dodging and cheating, to create more incentives to work, save
and invest. The success of the tlat tax type depends on the actual level of the tax
rate: the lower it is, the more efficient it will become to swell tax revenue and
spark off economic growth.
The first country to implement a uniform tlat tax for personal incomes and
corporate profits (26 per cent) was Estonia in 1994, although a decisive step
towards lower rates was adopted since 1991. This country started a highly
favourable attitude towards foreign investment, which was governed by new
legislation striving to maintain liberal policies in order to attract investments.
Estonia set further tax reduction in stages to be introduced by 2007, but surely
important has been the Estonia decision to eliminate the tax on retained earning in
2000. Latvia followed and together with Lithuania, both have a corporate tax of 15
69
per cent, and tax rates on personal income at 25 per cent and 33 per cent,
respectively. The three Baltic States have embarked on this fresh tax strategy in
early 1990s (see Structures of the Taxation Systems in the European Union , 2006;
as for corporate tax rates and indirect taxes, see KPMG, 2006a and 2006b,
respectively).
Russia launched the kind of truly radical tax effective by of January 1, 2001.
President Putin s first step was to introduce a 13 per cent personal income flat tax
rate, which replaced three-bracket tax with a top rate ot 30 per cent. Effective
January 1, 2002, also introduced a 24 per cent corporate tlat rate down from 35 per
cent. Since January 1, 2003, small business enterprises have been granted either a
20 per cent tlat tax on profits or an 8 per cent tlat tax on revenues. Small business
enterprises have also been exempted from value-added-tax, sales tax, property tax
and social insurance tax.
Table 4.1 —PIT, C11 and VAT Trends in Eight EU's Central European Countries
(the 1990s and 2000s)
Country PIT CIT VAT
Czech Republic 1994: 6 rates 15, 20,
25, 32, 40, 44%
1996: abolition of
40%
1997: abolition of
44% rate, restoring of
40% rate
2000: abolition of
40% rate
1991: 55%
1993: 45%
1994-1998: gradual
reduction of the rate
to 35%
2000: another
reduction of the rate
to 31%
2004: 28% rate
1998: standard rate
23%, reduced rate 5%
1995: standard rate
reduced to 22%
2004: single 19% rate,
lowering of
registration threshold
Estonia 1993: 3 rates 16, 24
and 33%
1994: flat rate 26%
1991: 3 rates 15, 23
and 39%
1992: single 35% rate
1994: rate lowered to
26%
2000: abolition of the
tax, if profits are
invested
1991: 10% rate
1992 standard rate
18%,
1994: limiting of
exemptions
2000: reduced rate 5%
Hungary 1988: 10 rates: 20,
25, 30, 35, 39, 44, 48,
52, 56 and 60 %
1990: 4 rates 15, 30,
40, 50%
1992: 3 rates: 25, 35
and 40%,
1994: 2 rates added:
20 and 44%
1997: 6 rates: 20, 22,
31, 35, 39 and 42%
1989: 40 and 50%
rates
1990: rates reduced to
35 and 40%
1991: 40% rate
1994: 36%
1995: 18% rate
2002: limiting of
investment deductions
(according to EU
rules), and
1988: 3 rates 0, 15 and
25%
1993: standard rate
25%, reduced rate first
6, then 10%
1995: reduced rate
raised to 12%
70
1999: 3 rates 20, 30
and 40%
1991: 5 rates from 15
to 35%
1997: fiat rate 25%
introduction of
simplified system for
companies (including
individuals running
businesses) with
turnover up to 15
million HUF, 15%
rate
2004: 16% rate
Latvia
Lithuania
1991: 3 rates 15, 25,
and 35%
1993: basic rate 25%
and higher rates for
financial sector and
trade
1995: single 25%
rates
2001: rate reduced to
1992: 10% turnover
tax
1992-1993: rate raised
to 12% and 18%
1995: VAT standard
rate 18%
2003: reduced rate 9%
1991: rates from 18 to
33%
1994: single 33% rate
1991: basic rate 29%
2000: rate lowered to
24%
1994: VAT basic rate
18%, reduced rate 9%
2000: reduced rate 5%
2001: second reduced
rate 9%
Poland 1991 - 3 rates 20, 30
and 40%
1994 rates raised to
21, 33 and 45%
1997-1998: top rate
reduced to 44% and
40%
1999: 3 rates 19, 30
and 40%
1992: 40% rate
1998-2002: gradual
reduction of the rate
to 27%
2004: rate lowered to
19%
1993: standard rate
22%, reduced rate 7%
and numerous
exemptions,
1994-2002: gradual
curtailing of
exemptions
Slovakia
Slovenia
1993: 6 rates from 15
to 47%
lc>94: top rate
reduced to 42%
1999: 7 rates from 15
to 47%
2001: top rate
reduced to 42%
2002: 5 rates from 10
to 38%
2004: fiat 19% rate
1993: 6 rates 17, 35,
37, 40. 45 and 50%
1993: 45% rate
1994: rate reduced
40%
2000: rate reduced
29%
2001: rate reduced1 <\°/ZJ / O
2004: rate reduced
19%
to
to
to
to
1994: 30%
1996: 25%
1993: standard rate
23%, reduced rate 6%
1999: reduced rate
raised to 10%
2003: standard rate
20%, reduced rate
14%
2004: single 19% rate
1999: standard rate
19% reduced rate 8%
2002: reduced rate
8,5%
Sources Various governments' statistics.
Ukraine has implemented in 2003 a 13 per eent tax on personal income
(replacing five brackets 10-40 per cent) and a 25 per cent tax on profits (down
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from 30 per cent). Moldova is bringing its corporate tax rate down to 20 per cent
from 25 per cent and lowering top tax rate on personal income to 22 per cent from
32 per cent. Poland cut taxes on profits from the 40 per cent in 1992 gradually to
27 per cent in 2002 and again a further reduction of 8 percentage points to 19 per
cent as of 1994.
Slovakia reduced CIT 29 per cent in 2000 to 25 per cent in 2002 and 19 per
cent effective January 1, 2004. Slovenia, unveiled a plan to reduction taxes on
profits from the current 25 per cent (introduced in 1996) to 23 per cent in 2007 and
to 20 per cent by 2010. In 2005, comprehensive tax reforms took effect in Georgia
and a 12 per cent flat tax on personal income has been inaugurated by parliament.
In other countries, tax burdens are already low though a definitive move
towards a flat tax and tax burdens much lower than those in place in Western
Europe and North America is advocated. Former Poland's Finance Minister,
Mirosaw Gronicki, has suggested a flat tax rate of 18 per cent on personal income,
business profits and value-added-tax attempting to win back voters in September
2005 and overcome the proposal made by the Civic Platform party to introduce a
15 per cent flat tax on personal income and profits (note that Poland is still now
applying a top 40 per cent tax on personal incomes and a top 19 per cent tax on
profits). Since the general elections took place and two major right-wing coalition
parties won the majority, we should expect a major change in Poland's tax policy
in the future. The Czech Civic Democratic Party proposed a 15 per cent flat tax on
individuals' and corporations' incomes, down from the actual top 32 per cent and
24 per cent rates, respectively (note that the Czech Republic is applying a top 32
per cent tax on personal incomes and a top 24 per cent tax on profits).
4.4 Recent Tax Strategies and Unveil Tax Plans in Western Europe
The Irish experience and decisive steps in rearranging tax systems throughout
Europe have received large attention. The most radical feature in Central-East
Europe is the adoption of the typical tax strategy for a market economy (i.e.
personal income tax, corporate income tax, and value added tax) starting at the end
of the 1980s and in the 1990s. Given the importance of the issue, these reforms are
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of great importance and interest tor their own sake. However, after this new tax
approach has been started, national policymakers tighten up the experiment in a
way to not only modernise their economies, and make the system more efficient
and transparent, but especially with the promise to be highly attractive for foreign
investment. The trend towards lowering taxes on personal income, which began in
the 1990s, and the passage from the turnover tax to the value added tax, has
attracted attention. Also, the direction of change in corporate income taxes and the
associated tendency to engage in a tax game between peripheral and central
regions in Europe, which started in the 1990s and reinforced in 2000s, was and is a
remarkable event in itself and has inspired some to believe that this tax practice is
'harmful'.
A campaign against the so-called 'harmful tax practices' began in May 1998,
when the OECD published Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue,
still the main logic behind the report deserves a coherent analysis. This is
particularly true in Europe, which is characterised by poor and advanced areas, or
rather central and peripheral regions.
We confront with this issue here by starting with Ireland. Ireland had adopted
friendly tax regimes in the 1980s and since that time, other countries have
significantly cut their tax rates. This resulted - with other investment incentives to
investors - in a foundation stone of an economic success, the creation of one of the
wealthiest countries in the EU. The overall tax burden in Ireland is now one of the
lowest in Europe, and its 12.5 per cent corporate tax rate has been cited as a major
ingredient in Ireland's economic growth in recent years. This rate has been
conforming to the European Commission's plan to replace the 10 per cent tax rate
on manufacturing profits in place since 1981. A phasing out regime applies to
industrial manufacturing until 2010, licensed Shannon operations approved on or
before 31 May 1998 and other services operations (Structures of the Taxation
Systems in the European Union , 2006; K.PMG, 2006a).
As Ireland has been the first country in Europe to embark on a comprehensive
new tax strategy as a main instrument of economic recovery, does current tax
competition in Europe resemble Ireland's policy? In actuality, the debate that
followed the Irish experience concerned tax policy and several countries in
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Central-East Europe have adopted a similar competing approach, as we have seen
in the previous section.
Statistical figures substantiate occurrences in other Western European
countries. Austria cut the tax rate on corporation profits from 34 per cent in 2003
to 25 per cent in 2005; Portugal from 33 per cent to 27.5 per cent; Belgium
reduced its corporate income tax from 40.2 per cent to 33 per cent in 2003.
Denmark agreed upon slashing coiporate income taxes from 32 per cent in 2000 to
30 per cent in 2001; Greece a cut to 35 per cent in 2003 from 40 per cent in 2000
and the country announced further cut tax rates. Iceland cut corporate tax rates to
18 per cent in 2002 from 33 per cent; Luxembourg to 30.4 per cent from 37.5 per
cent.
Fig. 4.1 Development of Adjusted Top Statutory Tax Rate on Corporate Income
(1995 to 2005, in per cent)
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Also the Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero has considered the adoption of a fiat
tax rate on incomes in that, following the recommendations of Miguel Sebastian,
one of the government s advisors (i.e. 30 per cent instead ol the current tax bands,
which tops out at 45 per cent; the corporate top rate is 40 per cent). To lace
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unemployment now, over 6 per cent of the workforce, the Dutch government
wants to otter tax breaks and boost spending for education and the environment.
The Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende attempting to face low approval rating
ahead of general elections in 2007, planned to reduce taxes at middle-income
families with children and reduce corporate taxes. In addition, the Swedish Social
Democratic government is facing high unemployment and the government wants
to reduce taxes on lower- and middle-income workers, lower payroll tax on new
hires by small, one-person firms.
However, Germany is a very enlightening example being the largest European
economy suffering from companies that are shifting production to countries in
Central Europe where corporate taxes and labour costs are comparatively
competitive. Germany's unemployment rates hit a post-war high in March 2005,
with a 12 unemployment (according to seasonally adjusted figures), compared
with about 5 per cent in the UK and the US (seasonally unadjusted figures are even
worse). Schroder announced in March 2005 an extension of the labour market
reform known as 'Agenda 2010' in such a way that he would push through tax
reforms and drop federal tax on profits from 25 per cent to 19 per cent. Note,
however, that this slashes the 38.3 per cent to roughly 32 per cent when taking into
account local business taxes and the solidarity tax; closing tax loopholes and
raising taxes on dividends will mostly offset Germany's tax cut rate, and this fact
represents a key issue to debate next. In spite of announcements before general
election in 2005, the new German government will not push for tax slashes.
Recently, Switzerland is an example of strategic tax setting. The country has
some of the lowest corporate tax rates in the world, attracting multinational
companies to set up holdings in one of its 26 cantons. A recent survey showed that
18 cantons intend to lower their taxes in 2006, to slash the levy on wealth and
share dividends to attract wealthy residents and businesses. This gains momentum
in cantons such as Zug, Schwyz, Nidwalden and Obwalden, to attract wealthy
people and international investors with the lure of low taxes heated up on January
1, 2006, when Obwalden introduced the lowest corporate rates among cantons, and
to introduce a regressive income tax system that reduces rates as income rises
(especially for those earning over USD 233,000 a year). Empirical evidence shows
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that Swiss taxpayers reside where income taxes are low and that there is a strategic
tax setting by cantonal governments: the result is that the income tax rates in
cantons are lower, lower tax rates than neighbours (see Feld and Reulier, 2005).
To summarise, the unweighted average tor corporate income taxes decreased
from 33.6 per cent in 2000 to 30.8 per cent in 2003 in OECD countries, from 35.1
per cent to 31.7 per cent in the EU-15 and figure 4.1 depicts this tendency in the
EU-15 and the ten new member states over the prior ten years, showing a decline
in both sides of the EU though more marked appears the decline in the new
member states. Note, however, when engaging in tax competition, OECD
decision-makers should bear in mind that taxes on corporate income provide some
8 per cent of their countries' overall tax revenues and that the average ratio of
corporate income taxes to GDP has been constant over the past twenty-five years.
Moreover, this might not be changed abruptly in non-peripheral regions and there
are difficulties about how to set an unvarying optimal tax policy in theory as well.
Finally, we cannot even rule out the hypothesis that decision-makers cannot
observe the optimal trade-off because of incomplete information or rather that they
plan to interpret tax policy demagogically ahead of a general election.
Last but not least, a brief look at the competition between Europe and the US is
noteworthy. The US combined (i.e. federal plus state level) corporate tax rate is at
39.4 per cent, that is, a 34 per cent CIT introduced in 1986, which in fact rose by 1
percentage point to 35 per cent in 1993, plus roughly 4.5 per cent state CIT (after
accounting for the deductibility of state income taxes against federal income
taxes). The Wall Street Journal Europe (28-30 January 2005, p. A9) reported that
the effective tax rate for US companies operating in Europe in 2002 would have
been 9 per cent in Portugal and in the Netherlands, 12 per cent in Belgium and 13
per cent in Spain, according to Martin A. Sullivan (2005). By way of comparison,
the effective tax rate in the US has been calculated at some 32 per cent in 2001 by
Jane Gravelle of the US Congressional Research Service, or approximately 10
percentage points higher in the US than the European average, as calculated by
Margie Rollinson at Ernst & Young (Gravelle's and Rollinson s studies are quoted
in The Wall Street Journal Europe , 28-30 January 2005, p. A9).
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Nevertheless, a comparison between statutory corporate tax and the average
eftective tax rate across the Atlantic is not straightforward. This is a result of the
American system that taxes less labour and consumption than the practice in vogue
in Europe. Second, the distribution of tax revenue among major taxes explains
differences between the two sides of the Atlantic. While Europe relies more on
social security contribution, the US collect more money from personal income and
property taxes. Third, the tax-to GDP ratio was 25.4 per cent in the US while 40.6
per cent in the EU-15 in 2003. Therefore, the US tax base is narrowly defined and
our reported figures and tax policies should be judged with more care when
making comparison (see also Weiner, 2006).
4.4.1 Recent Experience in Southeast Europe
In Southeast Europe, the reform of tax systems is largely enhanced due to a more
stable political climate in the region. Yet, however, the reforms are being
implemented at a varying degree of intensity and in different modes and ways.
Serbia launched a new tax codes in 2003, by resorting to a comprehensive 14 per
cent flat tax on personal income and corporate profits, though the country has been
setting up a 10 per cent flat tax for most forms of personal income. In an attempt to
lure further resources and compete more strongly with other neighbouring markets,
Hungary lowered corporate taxes to 16 per cent from 18 per cent and dropped the
top tax rate on personal income to 38 per cent from the previous 41.5 per cent
(although recent difficulties in meeting public finance equilibrium prompted a sort
of U-turn in tax policy).
In 2005, tax reforms took effect in Romania: Prime Minister Calin Popescu
Tariceanu implemented a flat income tax rate of 16 per cent and adopted a flat
corporate income tax rate of 16 per cent to be enforced starting 1 January 2005,
which aims at preventing tax evasion, time corruption and at attracting foreign
investment. The new system enforced with a special ordinance on 29 December
2004, replaced the previous personal income tax, which consisted of five brackets
(top of 40 per cent), and top business profits rate of 25 per cent.
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Table 4.2 - Personal Income Tax (PIT), Corporate Income Tax (C77) and VA T
Trends in Southeast Europe (the 1990s and early 2
Country PIT % CIT % VAT %
Albania 6 rates from 5% to 30% 30% rate 1996: 20% rate
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Flat rate of 10% for
income from work, other
income covered by rates
from 30% to 50%
In Republika Srpska: 9%
rate on income from
work and 4 rates, from
0% to 25%
30% rate
In Republika Srpska
20%, 15%, 12% and
10% rates (regressive
schedule)
Sales tax: 24% and
10%, food: 0%
In Republika Srpska:
20% and 10%, and
0%
Bulgaria 1992: 6 rates 20%, 24%,
28%, 32%, 36% and
40% and 4 rates from
20% to 40%
2002: rates from 0% to
29%
2000: 25% rate, 20%
for small businesses
2002: 23.5% rate
1994: 22% rate
1999: reduced to
20%; exemptions
Croatia 1994: 00:00
2001: 3 rates from 15%,
25%, 35%
2003: additional rate of
45%
1994: 20% rate 1998: 22% rate, 0%
on books, basic food,
medicines, municipal
and financial services
exempt
Kosovo (UNMIK:
(United Nations
Mission in
Kosovo)
2002: 3 rates 0%, 5%
and 10%
2002: 20% rate for
big companies and
simplified for small
businesses
2001: VAT rate 15%,
few exemptions
2002: reduction of
turnover registration
threshold to EUR
50,000
Macedonia 2 rates: 15% and 18%
(previously: 3 rates from
23% to 35%)
15% rate (previously
30%)
2000: 19% rate,
reduced rate 5% on
electricity,
agricultural products
Montenegro 2006: 4 rates: 0% (up to
EUR 65), 16% (+0 EUR
on income from EUR 65
to 218), 20% (+24.40
EUR on income from
218 to 381), 24% (+57
EUR on income over
381 EUR).
2006: 15% rate 2006: 17%
Romania 2003: 5 rates: 18%, 23%,
28%, 34% and 40%
2003: 25% rate
(previously 38%)
1993: 22% rate and
11% reduced rate
2003: 19% rate and
9% reduced rate,
exemptions: financial
and public utility
services
Serbia 14% Hat rate on income
from work; from other
income rates of 10%,
15% and 20%
Rates: 20%-30%
2003: 14%
Sales tax: 20% rate,
exemptions: public
utility services, some
food products
2005: VAT rate 15%,
8 and 18% rates
Sources: Various governments' statistics.
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Bulgarian Parliament has unanimously passed a law by which the corporate tax
rate is cut from 15 per cent down to 10 per cent from 1 January 2007. Macedonia
enjoys a 12 per cent tlat tax on profits and personal income will cut both to 10 per
cent as of January 2008.
Table 4.3 —Current Tax Rates in Southeast Europe (flat or top)
PIT CIT
Albania 20 Top 20 Flat
Bosnia-Herzegovina 5 30
Bulgaria 10 10
Croatia 1 5 - 4 5 20
Hungary 1 8 - 3 8 16 Top
Kosovo (UNMIK: 15 20
(United Nations Mission
in Kosovo)
Macedonia 1 2 * 12*
Montenegro 1 6 - 2 4 15
Romania 16 Flat 16 Flat
Serbia 14 14
Slovenia | o 25
Notes: *) 10% from January 2008; tax exemption on reinvested profits. **) 10% for most ot
personal income.
Sources. Various governments' statistics.
Under a different angle, value added tax (VAT) has been introduced in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and in Serbia in 2006 (KPMG, 2006b). Kosovo (UNMIK: United
Nations Mission in Kosovo) introduced a new tax system, which presents a unique
case of a system created in absence of internal pressures or political dialogue
(Grabowski, 2001). The new tax system has been kept simple and taxpayer-
friendly. In this respect, it should be noted that the VAT has a single rate ot 15 per
cent, whereas a reduced rate ot 0 per cent applies to agricultural production inputs.
Tariff rates on imports are 10 per cent. A reduced rate of 0 per cent is also
applicable, and it applies to imports of certain capital and intermediary goods. As
regards personal income tax rates, they vary from 0-20 per cent. In any event, the
general trends regarding the taxation of income in Southeast Europe show a
considerable degree of similarity with the trends observed in many EU countries.
In all Balkan countries, the rates of both corporate income tax and personal income
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tax are very low, sometimes even lower than in several t i l l countries. Taxes on
profits are also very low in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia.
4.5 Peripheral Versus Central Regions l ax Competition in Europe
The tax ratio has fallen below the levels in advanced market economies. Indeed
Central-East Europe is jumping on the flat tax bandwagon. This strategy could be
a magnet for investment and economic growth, this has led to the accusation of
'unfair tax competition' and 'tax dumping', and simply that some governments are
strategising their tax rates at the expenses of other countries' attractiveness. In the
light of previously mentioned figures, statutory corporate income tax rates in the
EU-15 declined from 35.1 per cent in 2000 to 31.7 per cent in 2003, partially to
face tax rate competition and to avoid losing further business activities because of
'an unequal corporate-tax burden in Europe'. Germany is the largest European
economy that is suffering from the fact that many companies are shifting
production to countries in Central-East Europe where corporate taxes and labour
costs are comparatively lower.
Fears of negative effects on labour markets are scattering in Europe, as new
EU-member states could lure companies, jobs and investment flows. To thwart
risky tax competition, a tax corridor has been proposed through which minimum
and maximum corporate tax rates could be put in place. In addition, during the
hearing of Laszlo Kovacs, the then designated European Commissioner for
Taxation, he expressed in favour of the creation of a common consolidated
corporate taxation base (European Parliament, 2004). Recently, Kovacs told a
gathering of the Irish Business and Employers Federation, the Irish Bankers'
Federation and members of the European Parliament that formal plans for a
common EIJ corporate tax base will be unveiled soon and the Commission will
present revised proposals on a Common Consolidated Corporate lax Base ; this
would be in line with the suggestions made in the Bolkstein Report and published
6 <http://www.tax-
ncws.com/asp/storv/lrcland I'rcparcs l )cteiR:cs_Againsl_l uiopcan_ Iax_l Iannonisation_xxxx270
87.hlml>.
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by the European Commission in 2001 aimed to skip unfair competition for foreign
investment and prevent uneven foreign investment distribution. Commissioner
Kovacs hopes the proposals would be in place by the end of 2008. This move is
intended to bring transparency and simplification and a significant reduction in
compliance costs for businesses operating within the EU ad this idea is favoured
by France and Germany 7. In fact, some complain that their contributions to the EU
budget to support structural and cohesion funds in favour of new members could
end up paying for tax cuts and Western European leaders expressed fears that
transition economies cut taxes because any lost revenue would have been more
than compensated by subsidies from Brussels, this leading to 'unfair tax
competition' or 'dangerous tax-dumping 1, luring investment away from higher tax
countries. For example, Gerhard Schroeder even accused some Central-East
European countries of filling the hole left by the low tax income with their high
EU payouts and 'it would surely not be conceivable that through the EU budget we
end up effectively financing an unfettered internal tax battle', Schroeder said in
2004 . The transition states that could undergo negative effects have repeatedly
refuted this argument.
Our discussion of the key issue will be in three main points. The first point is
whether 'tax dumping' is at work in the EU. Undeniably, Central Europe has lower
corporate tax rates, and tax burdens on corporate profits are approximately 15-20
per cent, much lower than in Western Europe, and the East proffers several
investment incentives too. All the same, this reveals nothing about the effective tax
burden and how the tax base is formed (i.e. a company's debt, machinery
depreciation, etc.). This approach can be deceiving when comparing countries.
First, the statutory corporate income tax rates have fallen in the EU countries
during the 1990s, but have been accompanied by a broadening of the base rate.
Second, several European governments grant deductions, exceptions and kinds of
tax relief (e.g. R&D, investment in poor areas). As a result, effective tax rates vary
from statutory tax rates and for instance tax systems are so thorny in some
7 Note that initiatives towards tax harmonisation in Europe date back to the early 1960s at the time
of the Neumark Report in 1962.
h <http://www.eupolitix.eom/l.N/News/200405/4763d60t-eb7c-4a8a-81a4-9b6ed29fb441 ,htm>.
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countries that the effective corporate tax rate can be estimated much lower than the
statutory rate, and some larger companies enjoy so many tax breaks that their
effective tax rate is very low somewhere in Europe.
The second point is about whether the EU is actually financing peripheral
Europe s tax cuts through its common budget. The EU has put aside approximately
€40 billion for enlargement in 2004-2006, while the newcomers also have to pay
their dues into the EU budget, leaving them notionally with a net balance closer to
€25 billion. I he EU financial support is earmarked for regional development and
farmers, which means that it will only help to keep Central-East European taxes
low as long as it can still replace national budget spending. Therefore, this
criticism goes too far also in the light of the current tendency to harmonise tax
base in Europe. The European Commission just adopted several common rules
about tax base, and this policy is expected to continue. One study that simulates
the effects of tax coordination Sorensen (2001) concludes that the welfare gains
from such coordination would be modest in the EU, between 0.16 per cent and
0.35 per cent of GDP. This is true particularly in the case that this sort of
coordination should remain within the EU. On the other hand, only regional tax
coordination can end with advantages for non-participant countries, as they may
become even more attractive for investors. Nevertheless, the EU cannot oblige
member states to design a specific tax system (apart from common rules for those
taxes that shape the functioning of the single market, such as value-added tax,
excise duties, and some aspects of direct taxes), except fighting against what it is
perceived as a harmful tax competition. In doing so, the EU has asked the
newcomers from Central-East Europe to phase out all discriminatory tax
incentives, and have cut overall statutory tax rates for both domestic and foreign
investors in the run-up to membership.
The third point relates to the question of how much of a country's
competitiveness and investment decision is tax-driven in the peripheral regions in
Europe? How much of FDI and thereby economic growth achieved in Central-East
Europe was realised through tax slashes? Concerning the first question, we do not
want to deny the importance of tax incentives on economic growth, yet the
economic growth in Central Europe and the first wave of foreign investment flows
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have been rooted in the economic reforms and positive economic expectations
(Sergi, 2003b and 2006). Foreign capitals have helped to carry out privatisations
largely but no one can deny that tax competition was not generalised in Europe in
the 1990s. Granted a new tax system with precedent economic growth in Central-
East Europe is not entirely truthful: the economic growth could happen in the
1990s on positive expectations of further economic expansion; still the positive
impact ot changes in the tax systems has been one of the factors contributing to
buoyant foreign investment in the 2000s.
4.6 Rejuvenating Central-East Europe
It is well known that effective tax rates on corporate profits have been a significant
tool to attract foreign investors and this fact will be equally important over coming
years. Investors and policymakers focus on the importance of the overall
investment climate, as several other factors besides taxes determine a country's
competitiveness over the long-term. In actuality, competitiveness in an interacting
and multifaceted international business environment which asks for continuous
efforts to keep costs in labour markets pace with workers' productivity growth, to
eliminate regulatory restrictions whenever possible, to reduce the high tax wedge
and payroll taxes in order to cut the cost of hiring.
These changes could have consequences for many aspects of the economy and
for investors' long-term strategies. By way of example, Hungary's experience is
very revealing: the country has witnessed close to ten foreign investors, such as
IBM and Philips, moving some or all of their Hungarian operations to cheaper
locations further East and South in Europe.
Perhaps less valued is the fact that international and regional competition
depends on the strength of several factors that drive the business process. As fierce
competition is growing increasingly important, decision-makers in Europe
introduced the cutting of tax rates (and other incentives such as cash grants, fixed-
term tax relief, and labour subsidies) to keep attracting investors. Moreover,
policymakers do not have complete information on optimal tax rates and cutting
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tax rates could have become a systematic policy in Europe where a country's first
move is followed by another country's reaction.
However, the combined implication ot this action-reaction tax policy has been
less considered. Although authors have calculated that FDI are also elastic to tax
changes and we can conclude that taxation incentives can play an important role in
the investment decision in a country, the tax competition argument is central when
confined to a short-term horizon; much less when we shift the analysis from the
short-term to the long-term. Decision-makers in peripheral regions keep competing
against each other because they emphasise tax breaks as a long-term panacea, or
rather, they simply fail to spot the optimal tax rate: both these facts push them to
initiate an endless tax game. That is, long-term effects from tax competition have
been emphasised (although Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003, state that perceived
benefits are easily observable while some costs are distributed over the long-term
and hard to measure), but the rationale behind these occurrences could steer the
business environment towards a convergence of investment opportunities when
they are based on tax advantages only. That is, starting a tax competition between
central and peripheral countries in Europe could likely manoeuvre national
business environments towards tax equalisation. In the long-term, resorting to
systematic tax slashes necessarily makes peripheral EU regions work with a fiscal
tool that would exert no impact on investors' international strategic decisions in
the long-term simply because effective tax rates would converge on the same level
(Sergi, 2005a, 2006b, 2007). Therefore, if taxation incentives are important in the
short-run, other factors can contribute to investment decisions. This aspect needs
another piece of information. Buoyant economic growth in peripheral regions is
helping maintain state revenues adequate for a budget in equilibrium; nevertheless,
what would happen to public finance should the economic growth slow down
sometime in the future without a serious restructuring of policy priorities and
public revenues? Therefore, the debate has to be firmly based on the long-term
wisdom of tax strategy among peripheral and central regions, without overlooking
competitiveness taken as a whole. If competition in Europe calls for innovative
policies, rejuvenating peripheral regions in Europe rests also on technological
innovation, less rigid labour regulations, and the smallest tax wedge. It it seems
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that the most important challenge for the European Commission is to introduce a
definitive tax policy harmonisation, tax competition race could hit a new level.
Should the latter be the case, short-term fiscal policy advantages would become
vague among peripheral regions in the medium- and long-term.
If, on one side, lower effective corporate tax rates are partially conducive to
attracting foreign investors and there is no theoretical doubt about that, observers
should focus more on the importance of the overall investment climate. It is
possible to call attention to the tact that a number of other factors besides taxes
determine a country's competitiveness. For instance, a peculiar reason that has
pushed wholesale and retail investors towards Central-East Europe could have
been an expected rising income, as found by consultancy firm A.T. Karney (2004).
The report expresses good confidence by ranking Hungary 2nd, Poland 4th, Russia
5th, the Czech Republic 7th, and the Baltic States 13th. Competitiveness in an
interacting and multifaceted international business environment ask for continuous
efforts to keep labour costs under control, to eliminate regulatory restrictions
whenever possible, and further overhauls.
Turning now to foreign investment, the point is, what most serious risk to
competitiveness goes first, labour costs, tax rates, political instability or other
factors? It is worth resorting to the 'FDI Confidence Index' survey for 2004
published by consultancy firm A.T. Kearny, based upon CEOs, CFOs, and other
top managers of world's largest 1,000 firms concerning their standpoints ot best
FDI destinations. While China maintained its position as the best and most
attractive FDI location and India jumped from sixth to third most convenient place
(note that almost all Asian economies jumped in the highest position in the index);
the top Central-East European countries are Russia and Poland, which however
lost grounds as Russia ranks 11th most attractive market globally but moving
down from the 8th place in 2003; and Poland 12th from the 4th place. The survey
shows some fading confidence in terms of investors' attractiveness and expected
profitability. While the Czech economy ranks 14th from the 13th, Flungary ranks
19th down from the 17th post. And 'With the novelty of EU membership fading,
corporate investors are anxious to see how these markets perform given the
challenges that the EU accession poses' (A.T. Kearney, 2004, p. 21).
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This same survey pinpoints the most important risks to the competitiveness of
the new ten new EU member states. Analysts vary in scoring these risks and
perhaps a blend of factors would affect competitiveness. Despite business-friendly
tax policy, a large part of this debate is focusing on having a business-friendly tax
system, investors would like a 'business-friendly marketplace', which should be
characterised by low taxes, low labour costs and low regulatory restrictions,
among others. To back up fast growth rates and improve business, the overall
business environment is at least as important as low-wage, high-skilled workers
and business oriented tax system. The two most important risks are poor
infrastructures and corruption. A role for a broad tax policy could partially be seen
in a tew cases (e.g. erosion of low cost advantage, labour market rigidities, low
purchasing power, phasing out special investment zones), but tax competition is
not directly reported in the survey and seem not to be crucial to investors.
Tabic 4.4 - Most Serious Risks to Competitiveness in the New European Union
Member States, (2004)
Percentage of total
respondents
Poor infrastructures 67
Corruption/lack of transparency 60
Erosion of low cost advantage 53
Macroeconomic instability 41
Inefficient supply chain 35
Poor labour skills/education 28
Managing market reform 28
Labour market rigidity 27
Political instability 27
Low purchasing power 20
Phasing out special
investment zones
13
Limited offshore/outsourcing opportunities 13
Completion of privatisation
programmes
11
Source: Kearney (2004), p. 21, Fig. 9.
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One appealing feature of any tax system to be the major factor contributing to
significant increase in FDI is that tax advantages are 'generous' and 'persist over
time, these two characteristics secure the attention from foreign investors. While it
is difficult to get a precise measure of the relative contribution of tax advantages to
FDI, recent statistical figures indicate that changes in the tax system in European
emerging markets may have been one of the key factors contributing to this
outcome. However, as long as tax competition hits a new level in Europe, the
interest of international investors in one particular country or another tends to
vanish. That is, tax elasticity could equalise among these peripheral regions and a
tendency towards equalisation in turn would happen between peripheral and
central regions. The probability that a multinational enterprise prefers one country
or another within the same peripheral area upon mere tax advantages fades away.
If tax advantages could have been advantageous in the recent past, unit labour
costs, other financial incentives, and geographical locations are equally important,
and laying emphasis on tax advantages would be an oversight in the long-term. In
addition, shifting profits to tax havens is another way to skip national tax
disadvantages; this could induce big corporations to have plants in several
countries. It follows that tax advantages may not be enough to attract FDI in the
end because big corporations could still exploit a specific country's tax legislation
while having a plant somewhere else at the same time. Simply, the phenomenon of
FDI, outsourcing (what Bhagwati, 1984, termed the 'long-distance' purchase of
services abroad) and international business in Europe requires a comprehensive
rather than a narrow tax-policy scrutiny in the end.
Governments in Central-East Europe introduced and developed one-size-fits-all
tax regimes and new labour market regulations during the transition from
paternalistic economics to the market. No doubt, new tax policies had very
different implications for the behaviour of economic agents and international
business competitiveness, as explained by the economic theory. Low taxes on
corporate profits augmented these countries' chances to receive larger awareness
from international investors. In addition, this unique tax policy encouraged better
governance, increased the willingness of people to work and magnified the
positive effects of entrepreneurship in a number of respects.
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Yet, the economies that initiated this kind of tax competition policy must be
able to conceive long-term business policies. Policymakers overemphasised the
all-cure virtues arising from tax reduction and we believe there are no questions
concerning the effectiveness of this kind of strategy to shape and incense short-
term investment decisions. However, triggering international tax competition in
order to energise national economies carries several implications as well. European
peripheral regions underwent tax rebates in order to entice foreign investors and
incurred no major budget deficit issues. Although one possible answer to this
dilemma is that these economies are still experiencing sustained economic growth
rates, we find that a country's competitiveness engineered by the way of tax
slashes, pushes a concurrent country to systematically neutralise its tax
disadvantages by systematic waves of tax reduction. However, when tax
competition increases, concurrent countries are more than willing to offset national
economic disadvantages by way of tax reduction. It follows that statutory and
effective tax rate differences among countries trim shrink over time and converge
to equilibrium; this contradicts any tax system that aims to be a major factor to
FD1 if tax advantages are not 'generous' and 'persistent over time.
Therefore, focusing on short- and long-term strategy under a coherent and
unique business strategy is crucial towards a successful strategy in Central-East
Europe. As we are apt to accept the Sergi (2007) reading of Europe as a central
versus periphery tax rivalry case, tax competition might benefit peripheral regions
versus central regions in the short term but winning international investment
inflows should shift from mere national tax advantage approach, which is short-
term based, to overall business competitiveness. Foreign investment may fill an
unsatisfactory endogenous capital supply in the short-run, but an effective business
climate should become the unavoidable national policymakers' long-term plan.
4.7 Conclusion
In an attempt to lure further resources and to compete more strongly with other
neighbouring markets, Central-East European economies implemented new tax
policies of the type already introduced in Ireland in the 1980s. Tax policy became
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a moans lo revive nat ional economics inula a suppl \ snlc point ol view aiul to
make these economics moie eff ic ient aiul open to foreign businesses While
foreign investment aiul the presenee of foreign enterpr ises both in f inancial aiul
manufactur ing sectors has become quite relevant , the issue ol internat ional
interact ions with other markets aiul internat ional competi t iveness ol these
economies. I l iac is no countrv in the world todav that is ccononucal lv sel l
suff ic ient without some sort of interdependence with ot l ic i countr ies The
internat ional community once more luuls cont inui ty around the process ol
global isat ion and i ts inst i tut ions, which is perceived as both posi t ive and negat ive
at the same tunc. Because global isat ion is becoming highly competi t ive, the
l uropean and internat ional environment have created enormous chal lenges loi
( 'cntral- l as t European economics and t ins issue is analysed in the next chaptci
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Chapter 5
Towards Globalisation and Economic and Cultural
T ransformation
5.1 Introduction
Globalisation, internationalisation and global entrepreneurship have never been of
such significance as they are today and it is indeed paradoxical that such a
phenomenon could be so revered by some while dispersed by others. In many of
his works, Streeten (2001) recorded up to thirty-five definitions of globalisation;
multinational corporations see globalisation as producing a wide spread of
democratisation and development for underdeveloped nations, and, of course, is
good for business. Antiglobalists purport that globalisation manifests famines,
wars, diseases, and to them, the only good thing about it is boosting profits for
transnational corporations (TCs) who are indeed undemocratic. In contrast to this
view, entrepreneurial enterprises and competition among them had an important
role in fostering economic growth regionally and globally, providing a significant
addition to real GDP growth and employment opportunities (OECD, 2002).
Surely, globalisation provided more opportunities than threats for entrepreneurs to
expand their business opportunities worldwide.
Globalisation is the comprehensive solution that many companies are now
exploring. Many of the world's largest firms are truly global, and even their
smaller counterparts increasingly participate in cross-border activities by
subcontracting - having customers and joint venture partners collaborate with
them around the globe. The arena of international management and global
entrepreneurship has never offered so many opportunities and challenges to
individual managers, businesses, governments, and the academic community alike.
The expansion of the global market has created a need for managers who are
familiar with the problems of international trade such as culture, political structure,
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foreign exchange, geographical terrain, time, food, and technology, which indeed
is a paradox in itself. Hence, the paradox of something perceived to be so
beneficial could be problematic in terms of obtaining the necessary skills to
manage while maintaining cultural and national identity. More importantly,
international management demands a contingency approach to the ever-changing
environment. This means the choice of management system and style depends on
the nature of the country and the people involved. So, is a Lithuanian or Nigerian
Manager, for an example, ready to sacrifice cultural and national identity in the
interest of globalisation? On the other hand, has an American or Japanese Manager
relinquished his or her identity in pursuit of globalisation?
Globalisation is problematic to small and medium-sized firms who are planning
to enter the international market. They face a difficult decision with regard to the
choice of governance methods. Existing theories contradict each other about the
strategic benefits of these options. We must compare these theories in the context
of small and medium-sized technology-based enterprises (as developed in section
2.7) and findings suggest that the merits of internalisation and externalisation vary
with market contexts and the resources under the firm's control and this is of
extreme importance for Central-East Europe also (Sergi, 2006a; Sergi and
Adekola, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). In fact, the trend towards a single global economy
is expanding markets and providing unlimited opportunities for international
managers. To remain parallel and compatible to other technologies, for example,
countries need to work together as more of a global economy. The course of the
globalisation paradox could not have been very far-fetched from the impact of
culture and ethical issues. Culture, as observed, is the sum total of beliefs, rules,
techniques, institutions and artefacts that characterise human populations. When
considering the ethics of a company, one can view the conduct of an international
organisation to determine if they neglect the correct procedures in order to gain an
ethical consensus on the mainstream programmes they realise in less advantageous
economies (Sergi, 2004, 2006a).
The new economy is built on information technology and the sharing of
knowledge and intellectual capital. This process of globalisation and international
agencies is also related to the new knowledge economy, though it is fundamentally
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different from the social and economic contexts of the past two centuries. In a
knowledge-based economy, a competitive advantage will be achieved by those
countries that have the capacity to deliver quickly and have innovative forms of
work organisations that raise productivity. In such an environment, SMEs have
tremendous opportunities. To be a player in this competitive arena, a large
investment in personnel and infrastructure is required. Technological,
organisational, and marketing hurdles are also making it more difficult for SMEs
to succeed in knowledge-based economies.
5.2 Process of Globalisation
The process of globalisation that is shaping all Central-East European economies
has been a gradual evolution over time; hence, merchants who traded
internationally in the early 19th century saw themselves as agents of the
progressive revolution. After World War I, attempts were made to establish global
institutions to aid post-war reconstruction: increasing trade interdependence and
the need of preventing conflicts exhorted political leaders despite discordances
over the extent of national economic and political interests (Besley and Burgess,
2003; Bhalla 2002). The ability of these institutions to direct and control the global
economy that developed over the next half-century were, largely, extensions of
American political-economic power, writes Preet (2003).
From a financial perspective on the process, a triad of the IMF, the World Bank
and the WTO became the order of globalisation, but global is synonymous with
multinational, intra-national, transnational, and cross-national, however, for the
purpose of this discussion, the word globalisation will mostly be used. It is any
activity of an organisation conducted beyond its national boundaries.
Theoretically, globalisation involves factors of production such as land, labour,
capital, technology, and entrepreneurship across ones sovereign national boundary.
However, in practice, especially in the 21st century, globalisation has defied some
of the theoretical frameworks that place restrictions on geographical boundaries.
One theory of globalisation that the authors of this paper feel is still constant is that
a managerial approach that works in one country does not necessarily work in
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another due to environmental, cultural, political, legal, economic and climatic
differences across countries.
Continuing with the process discussion, it should first be stated that a trend
towards global interplay is not the outcome of modem times. Consider now
ancient trade routes - the Amber Road or the Silk Road, which were linking
various regions of the world spreading from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean,
Central Asia and China. Trade routes were implying international trade as well as
culture and civilisation linkages. Global trends have always existed, and what is
occurring today is nothing different from what took place during ancient times.
Over the last centuries, trade, finance, and technology flew from one side of the
globe to the next, with the Internet and high technology not yet existing in that
history. In the case of small firms, they typically lack the necessary resources, such
as money, information, and expertise, to upgrade their operations, resulting in low
innovation rates, missed opportunities, and underinvestment in productive
technologies and best practices. In today's hyper-competitive marketplace, it is
pivotal for firms to master the art of integrating disparate sources of knowledge.
Consumers' wealth is much higher today than it was even decades ago. Consumers
number more than six billion and they are increasingly demanding more in terms
of quality, supply availability, and so forth. Nevertheless, the market sells and
purchases what is available at any given point in time. Globalisation is quite
different in qualitative and quantitative terms today, but the microeconomic
principles remain constant.
Second, the rationale and logic of these events did not change radically, but
simply evolved with the world. Thus, globalisation is the outcome neither of
regulatory international organisations nor of transnational corporations (TCs) as
many believe; it is an evolutionary process that changed over time, which has the
tendency to adjust to new conditions such as domestic economic policies,
institutional constraints, consumers' preferences, and technology advances.
Third, global institutions and TCs are expanding because the world requires
regulation, thus the world will increasingly rely on them. As concerns TCs, they
find their opportunity in a broader market. In sum, therefore, many observers lose
sight of the correct causality regarding these processes. Production and efficiency
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expanded, with the quality and process ot production helping to keep prices down
to the advantage ot the general well-being of many. Nevertheless, despite current
success that is notable in China, India and Central Europe, corruption could
endanger economic growth and force countries into economic troubles, as it is the
case ot some African countries where national leaders have stockpiled personal
fortune abroad (Boyce and Ndikumana, 2001). Boyce and Ndikumana (2001) have
calculated the accumulated stock of capital flight for twenty-five sub-Saharan
African countries over the period 1970-1996. It would have amounted to 19.2 per
cent of Angola's GDP and 12.2 per cent for that of Mozambique; 3.8 per cent for
the twenty-five countries on average. Moreover, many small states have had a lack
of financing, enough of which to diversify their economies, link with world trade,
and obtain technologies, which directs us to the following fourth point.
Fourth, globalisation trade-offs exist in a closed society as well. The overall
impact from globalisation could be a positive sum game for all, in spite of a
negative impact which may show up for some participants in the short run. We
cannot deny the long-term positive effects for all. With this being said, the other
side of the coin is about political choices. Were progress on trade liberalisation
achieved for those countries that face rich country's protectionism in the
agriculture sector, the tlows of final aid would have been better allocated,
meaningful national policies would have started, and current sub-Saharan African
countries and others that are experiencing low per capita income would have
grown at higher rates. Market reforms, democracy, less corruption, and the ability
to attain the opportunities of the global economy are the way torward without
losing sight of the fact that no issues individually are a panacea. For example,
holding partially responsible regulatory institutions amid poor economic outcomes
is certainly valid, yet one cannot neglect the most basic and positive torms ot
causality and direction of actual events since we live in a multitaceted world
system.
In this new setting, the IMF should be concerned about short-term stabilisation
programmes and the World Bank on long-term structural adjustment lending.
Macroeconomic policy stabilisation and balance ot payments adjustments
followed a strong, rightist market-oriented approach after 1981. In addition, the
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debt crisis in the 1980s and the increasing World Bank loans given contingently on
policy reforms led to more extensive conditionality (often to fifty or more
measures) with respect to the ten or even fewer policy measures requested by the
IMF.
A change in the World Bank's attitude and a renewed emphasis on poverty
issues was spurred on from within its own management and by the appointment of
Barber Conable as president in 1986. Furthermore, it has been under James D.
Wolfensohn (from 1997 to 2005) that the World Bank supported an integrated
approach to development in closer relationship with other institutions. The World
Bank was trying to circle the criticisms and it has appeared receptive to criticism
(Peet, 2003), more so than the IMF and the WTO. Recently, William Easterly
(2006) asserts that the Western world has failed to accomplish its ill-formed plans
because it assumes it knows what the best strategy and policy choices are for
everyone. Although the impact of aid on growth diminishes as aid increases, and
countries having stronger institutions may absorb aid more effectively (Clemens,
Radelet and Bhavnani, 2004), a big aid, per-se, is not the sole answer, assert Berg
and Qureshi (2005). Surely, scaling up development efforts at the country level
must be conceived in a way that inspires country-owned poverty reduction
strategies. That being said, current aid strategies provide neither accountability nor
response, Easterly stresses. Yet we most often succeed against poverty through
ground level planning, listening to people other than corrupt dictators and 'self-
congratulatory bureaucrats' in judging international-aid projects (Easterly, 2006).
A most controversial aspect of the IMF's choices was the adoption of multiple
exchange rates made by Latin America countries, and later by the Third World as
well, although it was accepted on a case-by-case basis. This aspect resulted in the
conditionality policy, that is, a power of surveillance granted under Article IV and
expressed by the letter on multiple currency practices, and the letters ot intent.
Until the mid-1970s, the IMF acted as a 'kind of global Keynesian club' (Peet,
2003). However, following the IMF's loans to the United Kingdom in the mid-
1970s, the Third World and Central-East European countries recently switched to
the facilities provided by the IMF as well. The oil crisis during the mid-1970s
augmented deficits in the I hird World and exacerbated the role ot oil in the world
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economy. Additionally, the debt crises in Latin America during the 1980s and in
Asia during the 1990s were severe enough that the IMF-World Bank supervised
three-quarters ot the Latin American states and two-thirds of the African states by
the mid-1980s. In Peet's words, 'Alter 1977 the role of the IMF effectively
changed from being a means ot collaboration on exchange rates and payments,
mainly among industrial countries, to being a means of First World control over
Third World economic policy' (Peet, 2003, p. 71). Overall, freedom of trade,
international flows ot investment, fiscal and monetary discipline, and exchange
rate devaluations became the pillars of the IMF.
In reality, the necessity to reform the IMF and a new emergency loans facility
for crisis which hit emerging markets is mounting. The proposal for a short-term
lending mechanism for emerging markets was a reform of the IMF and its
operations set out by the IIF (Duncan 2006) or for the IMF to do a better job
policing the policies of the systematically important countries (Truman, 2006).
However, there is a growing international debate over IMF reforms to be able to
work more closely with private sector financial institutions in the markets and in
partnership with capital markets and nations, stated also Charles Dallara, a
managing director at the World Bank Group (Duncan, 2006). These approaches
are in line with what in reality we are suggesting to transform international
organisations in more efficient agencies of socioeconomic growth and worldwide
financial stability. If Easterly (2006) is a very critical voice of international
organisations that assume to be aware of best strategies and policy choices for
everyone, Rodrigo de Rato, the IMF's managing director, having recently set out a
very preliminary draft proposal to overhaul countries' voting rights and
rearranging chairs, and simplify the quota formula in the running of the Fund
(Truman, 2006), the institute threw its weight behind reforms that would give
greater influence to emerging economies, reflecting their growing importance in
the global economy today.
In his Capital and Collusion (2005), Hilton Root argued that institutions lessen
everyday economic risks to levels low enough to make people receptive to
opportunities for profit, stimulating developments in technology and science, but
not so in developing countries. In these countries, institutions that specialise in
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sharing risk arc scarce. These arc countries where citizens hide their savings under
mattresses and in teapots, creating a gap between a poor nation's savings and its
investment. As a result, the developing world taccs a growing disconnect between
the value of its resources and the availability of finance.
5.3 The Specific Case of the Failure of the Communist Economic
System
The October Revolution in 1917, the Marxist-Leninist model, and Stalin's
totalitarian dictatorship was easily observed by many, however, the main cause of
the failure of communism economic attempts towards market forces lay in the
basic notion of communism, for having been an antihuman social and economic
system, exerting a negative impact on economic culture, causing inefficiencies,
and affecting cultural developments among workers and nomenclature.
Distinguishing between the bureaucracy in the West and in the East, while
bureaucrats are accountable in the West, Communist bureaucrats created rules
themselves without any legal responsibility. While increasing productivity and
introducing ineffective incentives have been a constant during communism, facing
today's transformation in Central-East European countries based on simplistic
theories, is difficult.
Communist thinking exerted an impact on modern neo-liberal tendencies by
becoming aware of the irrationalities of the Communist economics that would
eventually be critical in adjusting the trajectory of transition economics, and
includes these in the world context calling upon the function of international
regulatory bodies. Some failure in transition economics and the need to have
effective global institutions offer a route to scrutinise in-house failures of the
Communist economics and to compare beliefs in a way to reinterpret economic
affairs.
Antiglobalists find fault with neo-liberal economics concerning Central-East
Europe as well, whereby neo-liberal ism would surely be the cause of failure
concerning economic transformation. Antiglobalisation tinkers and activists deem
confidence of having had exhaustive knowledge of present days, certainty over the
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culpability ot those economic institutions, and ot chimerical alternative economic
systems.
In neutrality, the world community should have tried introducing effective ways
to hold all players accountable. For example, it has been argued by the proponents
ot globalisation that antiglobalists lack feasible alternatives to the market, while
pro-market notions hold up the world economy. Economic organisations and neo-
liberal corporate capitalism should have been perceived under the aim of
regulating world linkages and sidestepping regional lack of economic growth, and
economic events that are neither global or country specific, but undoubtedly not
enforceable to yield the expected result for all sides. Meanwhile, right after the
collapse of Russian communism in 1991, the Russian people were very eager to
move towards democracy, and had Russian reformers had effective western
support from the US in particular, which would have been easy to offer, the
reformers had a string possibility of transforming Russia. Instead, the exact
opposite occurred, according to Sachs (2005).
Regional economic organisations could also be blamed for the inefficiency of
these international bodies, or the failure to prevent further state aid to less
developed countries. However, we must become aware of two facts. First,
international organisations have understood their operational mistakes and
oversights, thus they began reforming themselves. For instance, it is good that the
IMF recognised that the conditionality policy needed to be revised, so the
Executive Board revised guidelines in September 2002 (firstly introduced in 1979,
not in 1944). Even before that, the IMF had set up a permanent Independent
Evaluation Office in 2001, and its new focal point shifted to distinguishing
between what is relevant but not critical to the objectives of a programme, and also
to improve the division of operations between the IMF and World Bank in ways
that both would share conditionality policy when possible (Caballero, 2003; Sergi,
2003a).
It is possible to say that the failure in Central-East Europe during the early
1990s did not tell the whole story, as these countries underwent a new economic
approach with over expectations of quick painless reforms when it should have
been known that productivity and reallocation ot resources take time to have
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positive effects. The failure should also be laid at the doorsteps of national leaders
who should hold the Bank or the WTO responsible for outcomes. Reform output
has been quite disappointing in the former Soviet system because of infelicitous
sequencing of policy reforms. Simply, policy sequencing takes time and one
cannot judge the reforms impulsively like in other reforming countries in Latin
America during the 1980s and 1990s.
Rather than attempting to counteract globalisation and dismiss the IMF and the
other international economic institutions, a better approach is to develop linkages
with the world economy, have stable national institutions, create an IT base, and
let regulatory institutions be accountable and to work 'shoulder-to-shoulder with
clients' (Stem 2003, p. 49). IT raises standards of living and creates new jobs and
it cannot disown the view that central banks1 institutional design and independence
have increased the level of competition, increased globalisation deregulation, and
prompted a political economy of low inflation (Sergi, 1994, 1997a, 1998b). This
tight policy brought about lower inflation in transition economies, decreasing to 10
per cent in 2003 from 363.2 per cent during 1990-1994. All these are standard
prescriptions of market ideology and the attempt of inhibiting them would be
costly, at the least, taking into account our scarce economic knowledge concerning
an alternative system.
One of the primary realities being realised concerns a prevailing misreading of
global economics and consequently of global institutions. Globalisation is not a
recent phenomenon; therefore, the world needs regulatory institutions. Instead of
suspending these institutions as some have suggested, the world should have
additional ones such as a world tax organisation. Secondly, saying these
institutions alone are responsible for disappointing achievements in certain regions
of the World is being over simplistic in the analysis, along with the fact these
overly simplistic criticisms apply avant-garde economic notions imposed by the
Washington Consensus of Williamson (1990), it is also superficial because most
economists around the world share free market notions (i.e. free trade, economic
stability, etc.). Third, it is a failure not to recognise that the World Bank first and
the IMF later, started a process of rethinking their modus operandi , with the very
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first policy decision to revise guiding principles coming from presidents of the
World Bank who have always been US citizens.
5.4 Effect of Culture
It is commonly thought that cultural differences influence the competitive
environment of international operations (Adekola and Sergi, 2007c). These
cultural differences have been changing because of social changes. For example,
the impact of these social changes could be viewed from unsuspected cultural shift
such as cigarette smoking, which could have an impact on an organisation's
performance. Consider a country where cigarette smoking is very prevalent -
Greece and Lithuania or other Central-East European countries. With many
employees who may smoke, the business might have to allow additional smoke
breaks to keep their employees happy.
If an employee from Lithuania or Greece for example moves to Norway, for
instance, where cigarette smoking is not as common, or to the US where the rules
have changed drastically in many cities who have implemented rules against
cigarette smoking in the work place, that employee might not be happy with the
rules. This is because smoking is addictive and he or she may not be able to handle
going all day without having access to fulfil the nicotine urge. The businesses may
find that such employee will try to sneak out for smoke breaks when the employee
feels a cigarette is needed and consequently affecting productivity and the
company's bottom line.
Hofstede proposed in 1983 four dimensions of culture. Using these dimensions,
it is possible to identify differences in management styles, organisational
preferences, and motivation patterns. These dimensions explain how differences
can affect the way in which managers from different cultures behave and perform
individually and in a team. Often, multinationals sec the cultural diversity within
their operations as an area of difficulty rather than as an opportunity to build
competitive advantage. For example, Japanese and African societies are collective,
making decisions as a group, whereas most of Europe and the US are more
individualistic. These examples demonstrate how differences between countries,
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their values and customs, are ultimately their society's ideas of what is right and
acceptable in their culture and environment which sometimes create the
complexities and paradox of globalisation.
This leads us to the issue of global paradox and national cultural identity. As
with any development, there will in time, emerge a paradox. For example, often
what at times began as a global business and social benefits, results in detriment or
negative outcomes. In examining how a new view of globalisation is slowly
appearing, we should consider how the values of globalisation such as the free
flow ot trade, competition, productivity, and investment across borders, can
actually impose a conflicting relation with the social values in underdeveloped
countries. The ongoing changes that occur on the international scene in the
political, economic, cultural, and social levels at times can almost give rise to
inconsistent relations with the traditional and contemporary values in some
societies.
As an example, recently on the US National Public Radio station (Wilson,
2005), there was a discussion on how some developing countries are experiencing
chronic health care shortage. Tn the sense that when they most need the health
care personnel, their physicians and nurses leave for green pasture to practice in
Canada and the US after being educated in those less developed countries'. A
study published recently in the New England Journal of Medicine discovered that
immigrants from India, the Philippines and Nigeria account for the largest number
of foreign doctors working in the Western countries ot UK, the US and Canada
(Wilson, 2005).
That being said, the undeveloped nation of Africa, with their resource of oil, is
becoming a very lucrative sight for China. China has realised that energy is an
instrumental product for their continued economic growth and there is a large
quantity of oil in Africa. Hence, China in its search for energy sources has its eye
set on Africa. This realisation is causing some marked concern in the US and
Europe as to China's growing economic power. China business is not only with oil
in Africa. They have railways in Angola, roads in Rwanda, a port in Gabon and a
dam in Sudan, all of which has tripled Chinas trade with Africa in the last 5 years.
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Business with Nigeria and South Africa has been on the upswing, and this year
China is expected to overtake the UK.as Africa's third largest trading partner.
For the past decade, the US and other Western countries have stayed clear of
Africa when it conies to serious business such as FD1 or manufacturing high level
products as they once referred to it as the 'Dark Continent' due to its leaders'
corrupt practices and, religious/political conflicts. Interestingly, the Chinese see
enormous symbiotic opportunities in this same continent. The dichotomy or
contradictions here are evident - in fact, there are two:
Western indifference towards Africa and its corruption and conflict, may,
ironically, be a gift to China. African governments tend to appreciate China's
ability and practice ot maintaining its communist attitude and keeping distant from
Africa's domestic affairs. In contrast with the demands for transparency that
accompany loans from international bodies such as IMF, Chinese help comes on a
strictly no questions asked basis. The irony here is that culture as totally different
as they are between these two nations may join them - China with their secretive,
'mind my own business attitude' and Africa with its oil riches and ingrained
corrupt practices of doing business and disregard for human rights.
Human rights activists warn that this forward moving expansionism simply
offers assistance to rogue leaders and adds fuel to the fire of Africa's most
disreputable governments. Earlier this year, Angola's president, Jose Eduardo dos
Santos, head of a famously oil-rich but poverty-stricken country, received a 1.1
billion dollar line of credit from Beijing (Sergi and Adekola, 2007c). Beijing also
came to the rescue of Zimbabwe's embattled president, Robert Mugabe, presenting
him with ornamental tiles for the root ol his palace and an honorary degree in
recognition of his remarkable contribution in the work ol diplomacy and
international relations.
Many, including the UK and the South Africans worry that communist China or
other formerly communist countries in Central-East Europe are not the right
partners, since their culture might fuel bribery and corruption. However, there is
speculation that this perception is shifting, since ( hina and other formerly
communist countries have recently deployed peacekeepers to UN missions around
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the world (Chinese peacekeepers are deployed in Liberia and Congo), suggesting
that the Chinese and other countries are becoming more aware of their images.
Worlds Apart , written by Milanovic (2005), addressed the inequality between
all citizens ot the world. Complex forces often working in different directions
shape inequality. Milanovic, a lead-economist at the World Bank's research
department, looks at income distribution throughout the World using household
survey data from over 100 countries. His study measure inequality among
individuals, and discusses the relevant policies ot first-world countries and
nongovernmental organisations. As is shown, inequality has increased between
nations over the last half century, that is richer countries have generally grown
faster than poorer countries. Yet the two most populous nations, China and India,
have grown fast. While a few poor countries are catching up with the rich world,
the differences between the richest and poorest individuals around the globe are
huge and likely growing (Milanovic, 2005).
On a smaller scale, consider the Internet. With the inception of this super-
highway of international communication systems, people all over the world
revelled in its following miracles: It allow its users to keep in closer touch with
distant family members and friends, and to find information in a fraction of a
second. It provides opportunities to access rich educational and cultural resources
that are otherwise unavailable to most people or may take much longer to locate at
the library. It allows its users to obtain current and up-to-the-minute information,
sometimes before the facts are even corroborated and it allow us to break the
boundaries of time and distance. Paradoxically, the following could be said ot this
same factor of globalisation.
In September 2001, Chinese police arrested the country's first Internet hacker in
a Wuhan hotel. The 19-year-old had been spending weeks attacking government-
run websites. Ironically, the hacker, whose alias is Yu Hua, posted his contact
details on a website, and police used those details to then track him down (Chinese
Hacker Captured, 2005). Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, high school seniors and
killers of 12 students, one teacher and themselves in the US Columbine High
School massacre in 1999, used the Internet to find recipes to make pipe bombs and
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other explosives and the intent was to kill hundreds of fellow students (Columbine
High School Massacre, 2005). This is the ultimate paradox.
Business globalisation represents advancement and progression, but in
attempting to level the playing field to many countries through it, we may instead
be creating a contradiction of exactly what it is we want to achieve for those less
fortunate. In studying this further, although globalisation refers mainly to stronger
economic, political, and cultural ties among many countries, it is becoming evident
that globalisation is not universal in its appeal to all people of every nation and
definitely not embraced by many people in the less developed countries.
The current model, which to this point has been highly embraced, defines a
fairly collective way of doing business globally, with some regard to different
countries cultures and less regard to their stages of development. For instance,
operators of financial institutions in Vilnius-Lithuania, Delhi-India, or Accra-
Ghana will have to comply with the rules imposed by those people in London,
Paris, or New York if they want to access international financial markets. As a
result, it may be argued that the world will become one big market place
dominated by the most powerful multinationals. There are important cultural
differences between countries that shape the existing multinational corporations
themselves and the question is, whose interest should they serve? In the US, for
example, there is consensus that it is the shareholders. However, in Japan it is
considered irresponsible to run companies exclusively in the interest of
shareholders; other stakeholders and societies at large have to be considered as
well. This supports Hofstede's cultural differences of collectivistic and
individualistic.
In the underdeveloped countries, foreign factors of production such as capital
and technology have become the main determinants of economic progress and
socio-political life. While the same world market promoted the expansion of
development in Europe and America, it has a tendency to limit development in the
dependent countries by restricting the flows of such factors, which in itself is a
paradox. To sustain that, with competitors coming from China, competitors
coming from India, where more than half the computer software in the world is
made now, we have to find more customers. We have to have more partners. This
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buttresses the tact that there is no country in the world today, including the US,
which is economically self-sufficient without some sort of interdependence with
other countries.
5.5 Conclusion
When considering Central-East Europe and the issues of globalisation and global
entrepreneurship, there are many questions to ponder as well as paradoxes: Should
the balance between the freedom to operate and the accountability to shareholders
and international community be the same everywhere? Alternatively, should
managers be allowed more leeway in less efficient markets? Should we insist on
compliance with international best practices or does this delay economic growth in
selected transition countries? The international community is slowly becoming
divided regarding the benefits of globalisation. Should there be universal rules or
is it more important to preserve national and cultural values? A single global
model may be inappropriate due to differences in cultural, social, and economic
levels of development in the developed countries versus those in less developed
countries. As the concept of globalisation and global entrepreneurship impresses
on the choices of a society and alternatives between domestic values and the
values of globalisation policies, the difficulties can swing from developing
dynamism to absolute inconsistency that leads to economic stagnation, social
dysfunction and less cultural value in some parts of the world.
Herein lays the challenge of participating with an international system while
keeping one's national interests at heart while developing and expanding a
country's social model. In growing and challenging complex environments,
leaders are forced to be decisive, making decisions that have far-reaching
consequences. Effective leadership requires a broad base ot knowledge concerning
the impact of culture of newly market economies in Central-East Europe that
cannot be ignored while dealing with EU membership and the wider globalisation
since it drives the concept and the process of building up a new social and political
consensus. This is the primary issue in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6
The European Social Model
6.1 Introduction
Most Western European members ot the EU are envied by many in the World
because of their high level of economic and social development. This level of
development is also one ot the main attractions for countries that are actually in
difterent stages of their negotiations on joining the EU. While there are cross-
country differences, generally, in a number of social aspects, Western European
countries provide much more than Europe's main competitors in the world
economy (Rifkin, 2004). This extra performance is often expressed by the term
'European Social Model1.
This term is used very frequently, although most of those who use it, agree that
there is no single European Social Model. The term refers to the specificities of the
main European versions of the welfare state, making them different from
developed countries in other parts of the world. However, while the term covers
one of the major achievements of Europe, Western Europe is increasingly
concerned at the problems of preserving it in a dramatically changing international
economic environment.
The unsatisfactory reactions to the changes in the last decades have also led
some analysts to question the chance of getting to a meaningful European Social
Model. Slow growth, high unemployment and long-term unemployment figures in
some countries can be evaluated as unsatisfactory results, but they are at the same
time two of the most important factors, which make the system unsustainable. This
is especially true in the era of globalisation, where competition is stronger than
ever: the challenge can, in principle, also lead to important systemic reforms
(which can be an important positive impact), but most European welfare states
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have not yet reached this point of breakthrough. With the time passing by without
successful responses, the challenge becomes more and more difficult.
This difficulty is clearly reflected in the actual tendencies in the public opinion
about the European integration process. The French and the Dutch kno' to the
Constitutional Treaty meant very probably also a protest against a Europe which is
not able to respond to the challenges it faces, and thus, not able to defend its
citizens from these challenges. In most new member states having joined the EU in
2004, public opinion about the EU also show scepticism but it is also true,
however, that purely national aspects influence largely the public opinion about
the EU.
This last point is a very important reason why the issue of the European Social
Model needs a carcful analysis. In order to summarise the main features, problems
and possible options, the chapters proceeds in four points. First, it provides a
background and different interpretations of the notion 'European Social Model'.
Second, it shows the main challenges to this model in Western Europe. Third, it
tackles the specific issue of reforming the welfare state in Central-East Europe.
Fourth, it provides an overview of the possible proposed solutions of the present
problems. Finally, some of the main ideas are summarised as concluding remarks.
6.2 An European Social Model
The history of the Welfare state has begun in the second half of the 19th century.
The institutions created then in some leading European countries served for
correcting some of the undesirable consequences of the highly industrialised
capitalist system. While these early traditions are still important, the present
versions of the European welfare state are much more sophisticated both in their
objectives and in their functioning.
The Beveridge Report (1944) first formulated the foundations of the modern
welfare state during World War II. The document listed the main conditions in
which welfare states can function. Regarding the age structure, a society, where
less than 10 per cent of the population is older than 65 years, is conform to the one
analysed in the Bevcridge Report (see Janssen, 2006). After World War II,
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Western Europe developed examples of welfare state, and we might distinguish
four models: (i) the Nordic countries model; (ii) the Anglo-Saxon countries; (iii) a
continental model, (iv) the Mediterranean model. Resorting to traditional analysis
regarding their achievements in the reduction of income inequality and poverty,
protection against labour market risk, and incentives to labour market
participation, the Nordic model shows high efficiency and high equity, the Anglo-
Saxon model shows high efficiency, but low equity, the continental model shows
low efficiency, but high equity, and the Mediterranean model is characterised by
low efficiency and low equity. From the point of view of sustainability, only the
Nordic and the Anglo-Saxon models can be seen as promising in their actual form.
It also equity is considered to be important, the Nordic model can be seen as the
optimal solution.
Although these different models are rooted in different national traditions, the
features of these models all might be important elements towards a European
Social Model. Of course, in the light of this complex background, it is not easy to
find a clear definition of the European Social Model. In the literature, there are
very different opinions about the existence of such a model, and even those who
agree that such a model does exist, differ very much in their opinion about the
main objectives and key features of such a model. The objective here can only be
to find a definition being concrete enough to shed some light on the main
specificities of the European Social Model, while being also general enough to be
able to play the role of the highest common denominator between the different
views and interpretations. We can define the European Social Model as a system
that offers a high level of social protection and enough social dialogue in order to
cover activities vital for social cohesion. If one wants to discover what the EU
wants to achieve under the slogan European Social Model, and where the problems
hide, it can be a good solution to depart from an official and relatively recent EU
definition.
Welfare states in general, their most sophisticated Western European species in
particular must face a number of challenges. These challenges are due to important
demographic, social and economic changes. These changes mean that the initial
conditions are not met any more by the societies of most developed countries,
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causing deteriorating dependency ratios (see Carone et al., 2005). This means that
the share ot people in their active age continuously decreases, while the share of
the elderly increases and this has a strong impact on average productivity and the
capability ot elder workers to adapt to new technologies and challenges. This is a
well-known phenomenon in the developed economies for a long time, but it is only
in the last years that it has become a tactor menacing the sustainability of the
welfare states in Europe.
Developed welfare states cost a lot. Between 1945-1975, characterised by rapid
economic growth, this did not constitute a problem. However, with the changes in
the early 1970s, this favourable situation has changed, as well; the demographic
and social changes referred to above contributed to deepening the problem,
increasing financial needs of welfare states.
Beyond demographic factors, the financial cost and the question of the
efficiency of the system are not less important factors. It is that not only the share
ot people in active age decreases, but also that the share of people within this
group being active is very low in international comparison. The high
unemployment rate worsens the situation further.
Among social changes, family models as well as employment patterns are
different from those fifty years ago. In the present situation, the increasing
importance of atomised families means also new tasks for the welfare states.
Unemployment is in many countries high, even with relatively low activity rates,
which has also important consequences both for society and economy and as a
reaction, in many countries new forms of employment (in addition to full-time
employment) appeared. The growing share of employment forms that have earlier
been often called atypical also can be interpreted as a challenge for the European
Social Model. The main reason to consider these new forms of employment as a
challenge is not their consequence on the financing of the welfare state, but in the
fact that different country experiences with these new forms show very clearly the
differences within the EU, and thus put national characteristics ot the welfare state
into the foreground.
Rates of economic growth in the most developed countries of Western Europe
have become very low, while Europe s traditional main competitors perform
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clearly better in this field, and also new rivals (e .g. China and India) appear with
extremely high growth rates and extremely low production costs although as a
study by Ernst and Young (quoted in Janssen, 2006) and based on interviews with
650 global business leaders, it concludes that Western Europe is beating off
competition from China and the US and it is the most attractive investment
location. This result would be explained, among others, by the flexibility and
diversity of many Western European markets as well as the availability of highly
trained workers. To substantiate this, nearly two decades into India's phenomenal
growth as a centre for high technology, the industry is running out of workers.
Although Indian schools churn out 400,000 new engineers every year, as few as
100,000 are actually ready to join the job world (Sergi and Adekola, 2007c). The
high-tech industry is expanding so fast that the country cannot keep up with the
demand for high-end workers and despite this immense English-speaking
population might appear to keep up; India has a potential shortfall of 500,000
technology professionals by 2010, according to the National Association of
Software Services Companies.
In this international context, we must be aware of the fact that the basic
principles of globalisation are not about countries competing with each other for
the lowest social standards or the highest profits for shareowners, but it should be
understood as countries that specialise in the areas for which they are most suited
while serving the interest of workers, consumers and social standards overall. The
objectives of the Single Market included enhanced competition within the EU and
enhanced competitiveness of Central-East European enterprises. The Single
Market is still far from being perfect, and its main deficiencies concern the free
movement of services (although this sector represents today about 70 per cent ot
the EU economy and that of labour. Recent cases of obstacles for M&A in the EU
also show that capital movements are still not entirely tree. All these deficiencies
of the Single Market weaken its expected positive effects on growth, employment
and European competitiveness.
The EU must face all these deficiencies of economic integration in a period ot
rapidly intensifying global competition. Competitors enjoy low production costs,
lost transportation costs, and another challenge is that these economies are
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modernising very rapidly, and they are already highly competitive in sectors where
wages are not the decisive factor. At the European level, despite ambitious plans
concretised in the Lisbon strategy (see Watt and Janssen, 2006), Europe is still far
in many respects (rates of giowth, activity and employment, innovation) behind its
traditional main reference point, the US. This, together with the challenge coming
from Asia means that the position of Europe in the competition of the development
poles of the world economy is continuing to weaken. In reality, European
countries can only preserve their achievements in the social field, it they stand
better in global competition; this, in turn, requires a reform of the welfare state on
the national level, and, if one aims at a social Europe, also steps on the EU level.
6.3 Welfare Economics
Central-East Europe can be treated as one of the external challenges for European
welfare states, but the accession of eight Central-East European countries to the
EU have deeper consequences for the European Social Model. Despite their
relative economic backwardness, by the end of the 1980s, these countries spent a
very large share (in some cases around 25-30 per cent of their GDP, similarly to
Northern European countries) on social policy. After the systemic change, their
welfare systems have rapidly been transformed, following generally one of the
Western European welfare state models and sometimes moving even beyond
Western welfare models and paradigms. The challenge of financing developed
welfare systems pushed them to keep expenses low and many of these countries
followed a very liberal approach regarding social issues and their approach was
much more liberal than in the case of established Western European welfare states.
As we have seen, after their accession, these countries are also concerned by the
deficiencies of the Single Market. In the case of some transformation countries, the
need to comply with the Maastricht criteria can further limit the room for welfare
responsibilities to be taken on by the state (Sergi, 1997a). On the other hand, while
there is a Lisbon Agenda on the EU level, conflicts between complying with the
Maastricht Criteria and Lisbon objectives are likely in some of these countries due
to overlapping priorities and financial bottlenecks (Sergi, 1997a).
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With the EU-accession ot eight Central European countries in 2004, this issue
has become part ot the debates on the European Social Model. Although the
ditterence in economic development does not necessarily threaten with social
dumping for the case ot Spain and Greece, it can be more difficult to reach
important agreements on developing economic integration and strengthen the
common core ot values ot the European Social Model. It on one side, central to the
analysis ot the OECD s Jobs Study (1994) was the classical statement that
Keynesian demand management proves self-deteating in structural weaknesses in
the economy mean that inflations pressures appear as soon as this technique is
used; more coherent macroeconomic and social policy should be configured to
respond effectively to new realities. Therefore, the long story of the services
directive or other directives and plans are very clear indicators of this increasing
difficulty. To the problems listed above, no satisfactory solution has been
elaborated until now. There are, however, proposals, which can contribute to the
improvement of the present situation concerning growth and employment, and thus
to the sustainability of the main achievements understood under the notion
European Social Model.
One of the main tasks of Europe is to complete the Single Market. This could
strengthen European competitiveness in the world, thus the economic foundations
of the European Social Model. The free movement of services (all services from
all member states in the whole EU) is of key importance in this respect. Despite
cultural and language barriers, cross-country labour mobility (a way ot reaction
partly replacing the general European choice between being employed or
unemployed in the home country) could also be increased in a less imperfect
Single Market; for this, regulations concerning intra-EU labour mobility should be
further simplified.
Another driving force ot the required changes could be the (renewed) Lisbon
strategy. Opinions about its chances differ to a large extent, especially with regard
to the open method ot coordination. While there is no realistic chance tor a rapid
step ahead by binding European legislation regarding the European Social Model,
alternative (or complementary) approaches, and also using the experiences ot best
practice and effective responses need policy and institutional reform.
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From the above analysis of the European Social Model, we the European Social
Model may seem as a virtual notion. National traditions are important; while
European action is limited, it is necessary to separate national problems from
problems stemming from the integration process and complete the Single Market
and the Economic and Monetary Union. Moreover, it is ot crucial importance to
reconcile global with social competitiveness ot Europe. Strategies should be
realistic and clear in their objectives and mechanisms, including national and EU
responsibilities as well as financing. The mistakes of the first years of the Lisbon
strategy should be bypassed and only flexible solutions seem to have chances on
the EU level in social issues. It the role ot the EU can become stronger in this
field, any strategy should take into account that the European Union is a player in
the larger global context and this is not only as a danger but also as an opportunity.
If the controversial elements of the jobs strategy model are absent from the Lisbon
Agenda, as there is nothing about collective bargaining, employment protection
legislation etc (the European Union has competences about working time to the
extent that working hours are a health ad safety issue), the mid-term review of the
Lisbon strategy put forward very interesting issues such as more flexibility and
investment in technology.
The adoption of employment rate targets that were characterising the Lisbon
Agenda (which also incorporated the European Employment Strategy launched in
1997) were welcome by trade unions across Europe, more must be done to
reinvigorate the European economy. It can be seen that while there are no miracle
remedies for the problems of Europe in general, and ot the European Social Model
in particular, the consistent implementation of already agreed policies can bring
positive results. These positive results can lead to increasing credibility of both
national and European actions, which is crucial for accomplishing comprehensive
reforms, which arc to be carried out jointly on national and supranational level.
6.4 The Quest for a Definitive Bruxelles Consensus
The collapse of the centrally planned economies in Central-East Europe caused
new market relations between the state and enterprises. For example, the new
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system transformed the decision-making process that was characterised by a
vertical link from central authorities to enterprises, to one in which horizontal
relation between enterprises became prevalent. For that reason, the innovative
form of relationship substantially reduced the relative value of vertical
relationships. This was not the only novelty: the hegemony of market process
among economists tor stimulating growth implied a transformation in all
dimensions ot the economic system, also in terms ot political actors and the role of
the institutions. Ditterent new market economies, varying degrees of institutional
correctness and stability have developed market relations in a different manner and
the question here is what kind ot ethical outcome has been emerging in various
regions in the light of the exact role of national institutional actors.
Authors offer various views about the right model to apply in Europe. For
example, Rifkin (2004) has been talking of a 'European Dream', a mirror opposite
ot the American Dream that is becoming elusive. Despite the American dream is
languishing and the new European Dream is capturing the attention and
imagination of the world (Rifkin, 2004), in reality, twenty-five nations now
forming the US of Europe require a definitive socioeconomic model for the next
decades. Although the EU is today the largest economy in the world, the world's
leading exporter as well as the largest internal trading market, Europe has still to
ameliorate and calibrate its model to fit non-homogeneous economic and social
circumstances and multicultural diversity. What it has been labelled as the
Bruxellcs Consensus (Sergi, 2003a) fits this new European perspective very much,
at least from a theoretical point of view. This Consensus applied to the European
soil would have several key aspects: be an ettective model ot engineering
economic growth when applied to those countries that were abandoning the Soviet
type system and needed recovery after the Berlin Wall events ot 1989; be the
lasting and successful model for the European continent; introducing and consider
strongly the ethical implications of any political economy, such as the dilemma ot
economic growth, social justice and poverty reduction, and how all these aspects
could join together in a real and successtul model ot governance.
Statistical data can substantiate our point of view. A recent Eurostat (2005)
study illustrates this issue well. For example, the EU-25 would be characterised by
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closeness to poverty for 72 million inhabitants as of 2003, as found by Eurostat in
the report Poverty and Social Exclusion in the UE-25 (2005). Eurostat defines
Risk-ot-poverty rate as the share of persons with an equalised disposable income
below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 per cent of the national
median equalised disposable income (after social transfers). This share is
calculated before social transfers (original income including pensions but
excluding all other social transfers) and after social transfers (total income).
Figures given by Eurostat put on top Slovakia, Ireland and Greece: they have a 21
per cent risk of poverty rates. On the other side, the Czech Republic (8 per cent),
Luxembourg and Slovenia both at 10 per cent. Eurostat (2005) has calculated this
risk bearing in mind social expenditures at the national levels; the poverty risk net
of any kind of contribution (i.e. also pensions) tops the rank in Poland with 49 per
cent of population risking poverty while EU-25 average would be 40 per cent.
Also at the global level, we have serious concerns regarding unemployment.
Global unemployment rose to record highs in 2005 in spite of continued strong
economic growth, reports the International Labour Organisation (1LO, 2006). Most
notably affected are among those between fifteen and twenty-four years of age.
This group makes up half of the World's unemployed, and their chance to remain
unemployed is three times as high as that of adults. Rising unemployment is a
result of rapid population growth in some parts of the World. Since the
employment growth did not match the population growth, this explains the rise.
1LO (2006) makes it clear that about half of the World's 2.85 billion workers are
subsisting on less than the USD 2 a day poverty line, the same as a decade ago. In
spite of the world economy, growing by 4.3 per cent in 2005, the number of
unemployed climbed to 191.8 million. This represented an increase of 2.2 million
in 2004 and 34.4 million in 1995. As evidence of this, the global unemployment
rate remained steady last year at 6.3 per cent after two years of decreases. It was
down from 6.6 per cent a decade ago - employment as a share of the working age
population stayed virtually unchanged at 61.8 per cent in 2004. The rate in
Central-East Europe rose to 9.7 per cent from 9.5 per cent in 2004, and Asia's
overall unemployment rate remained steady. In East Asia, unemployment is 3.8
per cent, the lowest in the world. In contrast, Middle East and North Africa show a
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13.2 per cent unemployment rate, the highest in the world; in Latin America and
Caribbean, the unemployed rose by about 1.3 million to an unemployed rate of 7.7
per cent (ILO, 2006). Despite these unfortunate numbers, certain countries in
Europe and Central Asia have succeeded in sustaining low levels of
unemployment without an acceleration ot inflation pressures or a worsening of
income inequality. In addition, the failure of many economies to create new jobs
out of GDP growth, combined with natural disasters and rising energy prices,
affected especially the worlds poorest. Ot the 500 million poorest people, only
14.5 million managed to clamber above the USD 1 a day income level last year
(ILO, 2006).
These very recent harmful figures prove the importance for new thoughts
concerning the European model, its social effects and how a new broader
consensus, that is the Bruxelles Consensus , could probe realistic and feasible when
applied in the wider European context. At the heart of the European social model
was the notion that all citizens should be involved in the wealth creation and its
balanced distribution, and then participate fully in the society. If having a job is a
sort of precondition to wider social and political participation, the new challenges
arising from the 'enlarged European social model1 are to rethink the policy and the
social model in a way that are created better conditions for wealth creation and
distribution and prevent a worse situation to materialise in selected Central-East
European countries and/or regions.
One can think the deliberate maintenance of overvalued currencies when the
home country prefers devaluation to be nothing more than protection of foreign
creditors and their related interests inside the country in question (this is an
important issue when referring to the different models ot economic transformation,
i.e. shock therapy, gradual model, post-Keynesian model, Chinese model).
As ten new Central-East market economies now belong to the European Union,
a proper renewal of the Bruxelles Consensus must take account ot the Social
Agenda that the European institutions are pushing forward (see e.g. Adnett and
Hardy, 2005; Jovanovic, 2005). In the light ot the importance of this issue (for
instance, the Commission's Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities
DG publishes a quarterly periodical titled Social Agenda), the new European
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Commission wants to concentrate on the key message that economic, employment
and social policies be geared to reinforce each other mutually, with the focus on
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion (Argandona and Gual, 2002).
As a matter ot tact, the 22-23 March 2005 summit outcomes discussed the
Commission s midterm review ot the Lisbon strategy tor economic, social and
environmental renewal. The European Council and the Commission decided to
prepare a midterm review ot the Lisbon process, to be presented to the Spring
Summit in March 2005. The March 2004 European Council mandated Former
Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok to lead a group of experts with the objective of
reviewing the Lisbon strategy (Sergi, 2005c). In fact, Wim Kok supervised an
earlier report. Jobs, Jobs, Jobs at the time of the Lisbon summit, but in this mid-
term review of progress towards the Lisbon objectives, Kok's report - or the report
ot the High Level Group on the Lisbon strategy that he chaired - concluded that
the disappointing delivery of the strategy has been due primarily to a lack of
determined political action and that we had made little progress over the first five
years and recommended to refocus the agenda on growth and employment
(European Communities, 2004). The report also underlined the need for real
ownership by the member states of the reforms needed and for determined action
to be taken urgently across five key policy areas: (I) the knowledge society to
increasing Europe's attractiveness for researchers and scientists, making R&D a
top priority and promoting the use of IT; (2) the internal market to complete as for
services, especially financial services and removing obstacles to the free
movement of goods; (3) the business climate to reduce the total administrative
burden; improving the quality ot legislation; tacilitating the rapid start-up ot new
companies; and creating an environment that is more supportive to businesses, (4)
the labour market to rapidly delivering on the recommendations ot the European
Employment Task force; developing strategies tor lifelong learning and active
ageing and partnerships for growth and employment; (5) environmental
sustainability to stimulate eco-innovation and pursuing policies which lead to
long-term and sustainability.
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Focusing on growth and employment, and simplifying domestic ownership via
more effective and realistic national action plans are the key elements to relaunch
the Lisbon reforms agenda. Nevertheless, the Commission's proposals to relaunch
the Lisbon agenda have raised controversy about the equality of the three pillars in
the process, i.e. economic growth and competitiveness, social inclusion and
environmental concerns; the dispute is between various political forces in the
European Parliament . Others, tocus on how the Commission could force the
member states to establish national action plans (and even it governments would
agree to such plans) and to monitor their carrying out (Sergi, 2005c).
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we examined the dispute over a definitive economic model and
offered more coherent information concerning the Bnixelles Consensus. A new
model of growth in Europe should evolve enough to guarantee social equilibrium
and ethical outcomes in a context of global actions and interactions (see chapter 5).
Therefore, there is the need to abandon the policies of the Washington Consensus,
rationalise supranational institutions that impose economic policies and
socioeconomic standards, and call for a new consensus to be applied to European
vision and reality.
Although we have called it the Braxelles Consensus , this one needs to be
calibrated again as the original proposal was aimed to address the model that
European institutions were introducing during the 1990s. In tact, while the unique
and original proposal of the Bruxclles Consensus was meant to address a process
of enlargement of European Union boundaries, additional work will develop a
final European model so that it takes into account all aspects ot Europe that is
setting up a more ambitious agenda. The sensible and reasonable new model in
Europe would attest the fundamental implications, changes and opportunities of
the new Europe in its past, present and tuture effects. The European Union has
9 The Socialists, Greens and other extreme left oriented groups in the European Parliament have
accused the 'business-friendly' Commission of selling out Lisbon to a 'neo-liberal growth-only
agenda.
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adjusted our model hut tuture waves ot enlargement towards Southeast Europe
will prompt the opportunity to elaborate and shape a definitive coherent and self-
reinforcing European approach. This is the major accomplishment ot the European
Union in the near future.
Next chapter concludes our analyses and even though Europe is today the
largest economy in the world, the world's leading exporter and the largest internal
trading market: Europe has still to relieve and calibrate its model to fit non-
homogeneous economic and social circumstances across its member countries.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
We developed an analysis that regards the directions of economic transformation
in Central-East Europe. By making use of our previous research output, our aim
was to highlighting and establishing the necessity ot having a definitive, more
coherent model of socioeconomic growth that is sustainable in the enlarged
European Union. Such directions and a new model of growth in Europe should
evolve enough to guarantee social equilibrium and ethical outcomes in a context of
global actions and interactions.
The past decade has witnessed several attempts at the European and national
levels to build up a unified and worldwide unique political economy model
intended to fulfil stability, social improvements and shared economic well being
by introducing and European-type standards. Despite budget constraints these and
other circumstances led to measure finalised to reinforce the European model, to
redirect economic resources towards weak regions to ensure other social goals.
The scope of this evolving model and its success or failure in the future its
intended and unintended consequences included. That is, the European institution
and the Bruxelles Consensus helped the transformation of new market economies
in Central-East Europe, and in fact the unique and original proposal of the
Bruxelles Consensus was meant to address a process of recovering and
enlargement of the European Union's boundaries.
In Europe, there is the need to reinterpret the Washington Consensus however,
and rationalise supranational institutions that impose economic policies and
socioeconomic standards, such as labour market strategies and the paradigm of the
Maastricht Treaty and the Growth and Stability Pact (Sergi, 1997a). While short-
term solutions usually have short-term effects, we support thinking 'outside the
box' and suggesting economic applications necessary for long-term benefits as
well. In order words, we need to call for a new economic and social consensus to
apply to the new European vision and reality, what has been called the Bruxelles
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Consensus (Sergi, 2003a). This new theory came at the time of the beginning of
the European enlargement and the fact that the Washington Consensus had already
lost much credibility in many parts ot the world. However, the analysis on the
Bruxelles Consensus needs to calibrate the original proposal that we aimed to
address the model that European institutions were adopting during the 1990s
As aforementioned, the membership of new states into the European Union
calls tor an updated and realistic analysis ot to integrate all these countries into the
European Union and to create a very dynamic socioeconomic block (Sergi, 2003a).
To begin with, we have seen that one ot the first steps undertaken by new market
economies in Central-East Europe has been the transformation of the banking
systems concerning the restructuring and consolidation process seems to have been
finished. Most ot the specific tactors of the transformation process have also been
dwindled. Economies are stabilised and are not suffering from the external and
internal shocks of the beginning of reforms. A legislative and institutional
environment has been cultivated, regulator and prudential rules have been
systematically introduced and applied, privatisation is ending, and corporate
governance has been gradually improved. The analysis presented in Chapter 3
shows that applied measures in dealing with banking crises have varied among
transition countries and they were dependent on a political consensus. Bad loans
clean up has turned out to be complex and a delay in restructuring increased costs
and eventually required a stronger response (Matousek and Sergi, 2005). Although
the experience does not otter us firm conclusions about the optimal crisis
resolution in the banking sector in transition, however, looking back we could
argue about the essential elements ol what could have been an optimal resolution,
elements that have, to some extent, characterised a quasi-optimal crisis resolution
as in Hungary.
Macroeconomic stability, enterprise restructuring and replacement ot inept
management must simultaneously accompany rescue operations and consequent
consolidation, and abolishment ot forced subsidised credits. It this is not achieved
then it will be retlected in the continuous inefficient credit loans. The tailure to
recognise the problem ot establishing a firm line between old and new loans (stock
vs. tlow) called for repeated bailouts in the Czech Republic. Another observed
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mistake ot banking crisis resolution is that government interventions did not
guarantee a 'level playing field' for enterprises and hanks. In addition, the
presence of moral hazards due to budgetary softness was evident in all three
countries. The Czech and partly even Hungarian case shows that without an
incentive structure, a re-capitalisation programme would tail.
A crucial aspect tor stabilisation of banking sectors, among others, was
privatisation. Delays in privatising (state-owned banks) had negative external
effects on the restructuring process and the economy as a whole. Partial
privatisation - e.g. as that applied in the Czech Republic at the outset of reforms
was undoubtedly positive but a further delay caused additional costs. Bank
privatisation, however, should not be perceived as a panacea for all shortcomings
within a given economy, but is essential to eliminating distortions caused by mixed
ownership structure. TTierefore,the inherited bad and nonperforming loans added
up to new debts due to bad banking lending, delayed enterprise restructuring and
prolonged economic crises. This fact has constrained the ability of commercial
banks to act as protagonists of investments and recovery. This experience
encourages three main policy recommendations: (i) the borrowing of the
experiences concerning central banking from advanced countries concerning a
strategic restructuring of commercial banks through internal deeper micro
restructuring; (ii) the importance to enhance collaboration across the region,
nonetheless consistent with the European integration and the global level; (iii) a
clear opening of domestic markets to foreign banks and competition.
A second step of our realistic analysis is to consider globalisation and global
entrepreneurship as being not less relevant, because this issue poses questions to
ponder as well as paradoxes. Should the balance between the freedom to operate
and the accounts1 1 to shareholders and international community be the same
everywhere? Alternatively, should managers/insiders be allowed more leeway in
less efficient markets? Should we insist on compliance with international best
practices or does this delay world economic growth? 1he international community
is slowly becoming divided regarding the benefits ot globalisation. Should there be
universal rules or is it more important to preserve national and cultural values? A
single global model may be inappropriate due to differences in cultural, social, and
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economic levels ot development in the developed countries versus those in less
developed countries. As the concept of globalisation and global entrepreneursh.p
impresses on Central-East European society's choices and alternatives between
their native values and the values ot globalisation policies, the difficulties can
swing from developing dynamism to absolute inconsistency that leads to economic
stagnation, social dysfunction and less cultural value in some part of the world.
Herein lays the challenge ot participating with an international system while
keeping one s national interests at heart. In such an environment, can business
legitimately function in its own eyes as well as in the eyes of the local and regional
population? That question still awaits a definite answer. Movement in the direction
ot a new consensus may not be occurring and growing with momentum provided
by the growing realities ot wealth disparity globally and the growing chorus for
change (Tumpel-Gugerell et al., 2002). In the final analysis, the impact of culture
cannot be ignored while dealing with globalisation since it drives the concept and
the process.
The third step is reconsidering the role of the European Union's institutions in
inspiring a durable recovery in Central-East Europe. This calls for an active and
pragmatic European policy that puts transition in Central-East Europe and overall
growth in the wider European Union under innovative economic and social
dimensions. Overall, these new realities urge us to recognise the history and
developments of this European model. The steps undertaken in Lisbon and its
after-effects serve the purpose to modernise European prospects and expectation of
those social groups who do not benefit from growth. The question one must
answer is whether international realities mark the new model with consistency.
The implications for decision makers are enormous and although the European
Union is today the largest single economic block in the world, the world's leading
exporter as well as the largest internal market, Europe has still to improve and
calibrate its model to tit no homogenous economic and social circumstances and
multicultural diversities. Under such a new European Union dimension, which is
much due to the definitive adoption and development of the Bruxelles Consensus,
this thesis features the development of a strategic model for European
socioeconomic policies resting on some assumptions set forward by Keynes,
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Schumpeter and supply-side economists (Sergi, 1996, 1997b, 1998a, 1999b
2003a). Our thesis is that the European policy could move in this more diverse
way across national experiences and become an example of successful structural
reforms by that proving that there is more than logical links among the three
visions than the standard account would suggest. By that, the major achievement
that we made in our publications and that was pertinent to inter the European
model ot the 1990s and the early part ot this decade, has to endeavour to introduce
an ethical perspective and effective policy headed for the new Europe.
In addition, it would be of interest to think about the March 2005 summit that
has discussed the Commission s midterm review ot the Lisbon strategy for
economic, social and environmental renewal. As we have seen, the European
Council and the Commission decided to prepare a midterm review of the Lisbon
process, this after having March 2004 European Council mandated Former Dutch
Prime Minister Wim Kok to lead a group of experts with the objective of
reviewing the Lisbon strategy (European Communities, 2004). The Kok report
concluded in November 2004 that we had made little progress over the first five
years and recommended to refocus the agenda on growth and employment. It also
underlined the need for real ownership by the member states of the reforms
needed. If the report focuses on the knowledge society, the internal market
completion for services, especially financial services and removing obstacles to the
free movement of goods, improving the business climate, reinforcing the labour
market, and environmental sustainability, four ot the five issues (except the
environmental sustainability) have been touched in this thesis.
We have analysed in the previous chapters the investment on information
technology and the passage from the past Soviet-type system to a market economy,
investment on IT, effective and realistic national action plans to relaunch the
Lisbon reforms agenda, labour markets (in Slovakia). Nevertheless, the
Commission's proposals to relaunch the Lisbon agenda have raised controversy
about the equality ot the three pillars in the process, i.e. economic growth and
competitiveness, social inclusion and environmental concerns, the dispute is
between various political forces in the European Parliament. Others focus on how
the Commission could force the member states to establish national action plans,
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and even if governments would agree to such plans, to control how we will carry
out these) (Sergi, 2005c).
It follows that focussing on growth and employment, simplifying domestic
ownership via more ettective and realistic national action plans, is the key element
to restart the Lisbon reform agenda and prepare the whole Europe to restructure
the European Union budget purposely by 2009. Despite the Commission's
proposals to restart the Lisbon agenda caused controversies, in the light of
previous scrutiny, which is evidence for tremendous effects on the logic of
decisions taken at the European Union level, the additional work to be done in
Europe will develop the final project ot European model so that it takes into
account all aspects ot European realities. The European model has to assess the
potential development ol the new model in a broader context we have to reflect on
different socioeconomic realities and uneven economic growth. Despite this fact
adds to diversity ot problems and policies, on the contrary the opportunity to
elaborate and shape definitively coherent and self-reinforcing European approach
is the major accomplishment of political and business leaders. In the light of
previous scrutiny, which is evidence for tremendous effects on the logic of
decisions taken at the European Union level, the additional work at the European
level is to develop a model that takes into account all aspects of European realities,
focusing on social solidarity and economic growth by dealing with the problems
that undermine the effectiveness of market-based competition in certain sectors
(for the health sector, see Kornai and Eggleston, 2001). The sensible and
reasonable new model in Europe that is known as the Bruxelles Consensus would
attest the fundamental implications, changes and opportunities of the new
European model in its past, present and luture effects on Central-East Europe.
The European model has been systematically adjusted and past and future
waves of enlargement to the East have to be interpreted carefully. The high level
of social protection that has long characterised the European model is an enjoyable
opportunity for the whole Europe. To assess the potential development of the new
model in a broader context one has to reflect on different socioeconomic realities
and uneven economic growth. I herefore, the necessity ot elaborating a coherent
and self-reinforcing European approach is the major accomplishment for European
leaders. In this European context, however, one should not oversee another main
point to consider, that is, the many interactions between the international economic
organisations and national governments. It is true that international economic
interaction and the role of economic organisations with their guidelines to national
governments, but said organisations have broadened their roles during the past
decades and attempted to adjust their policies in order to comply with national
realities.
7.1 Final Reflections
Most traditional political and economic interpretation regarding the European
economy and its enlargement towards Central-East has relied on a seemingly
separate and distinct ditterentiation, or even official separation, between traditional
economic development analysis and social judgment. In the post-1989
environment ot the entire Central-East Europe, this reality has represented the
single most serious mistake concerning the vast majority of official analyses. This
because the obvious gap between expectations at the public level and actual
development realities have been so overwhelming, the public has simply given up
on experts have still referred to as official analysis. The public naturally wishes to
assume that expectations created by experts and business leaders are realistic and
can be assumed to represent a certain degree of development reality. However,
post-1989 predictions and assessments have been so far from reality, and the
public began to assume a level of cynicism. This is why experts must create
expectations that are scientifically consistent and that meet the level of ethical
expectations carried by the public.
The political aspects ol the European Union's enlargement were expansive but
successful overall. Managing the costs attributed to trade, the independence ot
central banks, commercial banks and management ot domestic firms reveals
positive outcomes, but controversy developed when social restrictions were
loosened while its political environment continued to contradict with economic,
cultural and social standards of transforming countries. Proponents of totally tree
trade and the other pillars of the Washington Consensus argue that we already
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establish positive standards ot living. Weighing the social, economic and political
aspects of a country is a critical issue whose costs can be high, but ultimately can
determine the success or failure of the venture in the end. The Bruxelles Consensus
explored in this thesis, represents the way Europe has dealt with the transformation
in Central-East European economies. A renovated Bruxelles Consensus enhances
the chances of Europe growing healthily, establishing a smoothly socioeconomic
growth while providing a broad social consensus.
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